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There has been a renewed interest in the nature of the link between the development 
of the financial sector and economic growth. Many theoretical models have been 
proposed that show how financial sector development promotes growth. Empirically, 
financial development has been found to robustly and positively correlate with 
economic growth. However, establishing the direction of the relationship between 
finance and growth (causality), on the other hand, has been difficult. In the empirical 
results regarding Kenya, South Africa and Zambia not only was it found that the 
financial development and economic growth proxies are statistically significant but 
also found were the results which seem to lend support to un-directional and indirect 
hypotheses over the sample period 1965-2004. 
To unearth the above long-run relationship a multivariate vector, autoregression 
(VAR) and the Toda-Yamamoto framework were applied. Difficulties relating to 
empirical investigations to do with cross-country regressions and bivariate time series 
studies are pointed out. The long-run relationship of financial development and 
economic growth in all the sampled countries are identified in a co-integrating 
framework using Pesaran, Shin and Smith (PSS) and Johansen tests. In particular, in 
using the Johansen technique this thesis identifies the long-run relationship by 
applying over-identifying restrictions. To unearth the direction of the relationship 
between finance and growth the Vector Error Correction model was applied and the 
results obtained appear to lend support to the supply-leading hypothesis in all the 
three countries, a conclusion which seems to support the findings in existing 
literature. The results also show the indirect causal relationship taking place between 
finance and growth in these countries. This finding seems to suggest the existence of 
financial repression in these economies. The robustness of VECM test results were 
supported by those of Toda-Yamamoto. Overall I ascribe these findings to new 
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Background & Motivation of the Study 
1.1 Introduction 
It is generally recognised that financial development plays a significant role in economic 
growth. For instance, Hamilton (1781) argued that banks were the best piece of innovation 
that was invented for spurring economic growth. That is, there is a causation that runs from 
banking sector development to economic growth. This argument though old may be 
supported by the recent experience in Eastern Europe and Asia where it has been shown that 
countries that moved quickly to fix their banking industry were able to achieve a sustainable 
rate of growth and new job opportunities than those that did not. 
An extensive body of empirical evidence supports the argument that a well-developed 
financial system has a positive impact on economic performance by enhancing intermediation 
efficiency. This finding presupposes that a well-coordinated financial intermediation 
influences the allocation of resources and productivity growth. On the other hand, financial 
development may enhance economic growth via capital accumulation, liquidity provision or 
technological changes.  
The above link suggests that economic growth rarely (if ever) occurs without a well-
functioning financial system (McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973; King & Levine, 1993; Levine et 
al., 2000; Beck et al., 2000). In other words, extensive government controls imposed on the 
financial sector prevents financial development and impedes the contribution of the sector to 
economic growth.  
It follows, then, that in terms of causality, efficient and sound (non-repressive) financial 
development leads to economic growth. Yet, despite its theoretical validity, such a view 
seems inconsistent with recent experiences. Specifically, the rapid growth of many Asian 
economies in the 1970s was accomplished despite the financial sectors that could not be 
regarded as developed (Shan et al., 2001). With these contradictory signals with respect to 
the causal relation between finance and growth in empirical studies it is difficult to reconcile 












Whereas the finance-led growth hypothesis is not ruled out in recent studies on the finance-
growth link in Kenya, South Africa and Zambia, the literature throws little light on how a 
reformed and developed financial system can generate less economic growth. Yet out of this 
hypothesis emerge three highly relevant questions: How can the apparent relationships 
involving the unearthing of the direction of causality between finance and growth be 
interpreted? Is financial development a prerequisite to economic growth in these three 
countries or the reverse? Why and how did the supposedly reformed financial system of the 
three countries accommodate economic growth? 
The questions raised above have important policy implications. For instance, if financial 
development is found to cause economic growth, then policy-makers should focus their 
attention on the creation and promotion of modern financial institutions which includes banks 
in order to promote economic growth. Against this the thesis sheds light on the issue of 
causality by empirically examining the interactions between financial development and 
economic growth. The positive correlation between financial development and economic 
growth is already a stylized fact verified in many cross-country studies (King & Levine, 
1993a, 1993b; Levine & Zervos, 1998). 
However, findings on the causal relations and the contribution of the financial sector to 
(future) economic growth and vice versa are divergent. This view is supported by time series 
studies which report mixed results (Arestis & Demetriades, 1996; Demetriades & Hussain, 
1996). 
The motivation for this thesis is based on the argument put forth for lack of consistency in the 
time series studies and the fact that many of these studies are based on both bivariate and 
cross-country causality tests. And yet it is well known that both bivariate and cross-country 
tests suffer from omitted variable and homogeneity problems, and this leads to erroneous 
causal inferences (Lütkepohl, 1982; Jung, 1986). Time series studies are few and data seems 
to be a significant problem.  
Thus, in order to examine the causal relationship between the variables of interest, this thesis 
employs a time series analysis using a multivariate vector autoregression (VAR) setting. The 
dimension of the VAR is specified following the standard theoretical literature which is 
discussed in Section 2. In a multivariate system of co-integrated variables, the framework of 












complete way, i.e. without generalizing the results (Hall & Wickens, 1993; Hall & Milne, 
1994)1. Toda and Phillips (1993) recommend the Johansen framework as the best method of 
implementing Granger non-causality tests. Pesaran and Shin (1994) propose tests of just and 
over-identifying restrictions in order to identify co-integrating vectors as typical long-run 
economic relationships.  
To test the hypotheses of the direction of causal relation between variables of interest, the 
study employs the recent advances in time-series econometrics (i.e. VECM and Toda-
Yamamoto). First, co-integrating vectors are estimated making use of the method of Johansen 
(1988). This is followed by two types of identification of the model involving the just-
identifying and over-identifying restrictions in order to test for the direction of causality as 
postulated by Hall and Wickens (1993) and Toda and Phillips (1993). With regard to the 
robustness check the augmented VAR modelling by Toda and Yamamoto (1995) is 
employed. 
1.2 Objective of the Study 
The overall rationale of this study is to determine whether the direction of causal relationship 
between financial development and economic growth exists on a country specific level 
involving Kenya, South Africa and Zambia and thereafter conduct a comparative analysis. 
The specific objectives of the study in this case are: 
 To find out the role of regulation in so far as the development of financial sector 
system is concerned. This analysis is done via the review of the reforms of financial 
systems of individual countries.  
 To use the co-integration framework of Johansen (1988) to test for multivariate co-
integrating relationships. Additionally, the robustness test is applied using Toda-
Yamamoto (1995) to ensure that Johansen tests do not suffer power loss due to finite 
samples. 
 To test and distinguish between long-run and short-run causality. This distinction is 
very important since as Darrat (1999) states, most of the benefits of higher levels of 
financial development could be realized in the short-run while in the long-run as the 
                                               
1 This approach enables joint modelling of all relevant variables without a priory making assumptions about 













economy grows and becomes mature these effects slowly disappear. Thus, testing 
only for long-run causality would lead to the wrong conclusion, namely absence of 
any casual relationship between financial development and output growth. To this 
end, an error correction model (ECM) via which short-run causality is also tested. 
 Draw appropriate policy recommendation that could help promote economic growth. 
1.3 Main Contribution 
The main contributions to the literature are as follows. First, there is a clear lack of 
multivariate time-series tests of causality between financial development and economic 
growth in many developing countries. This study fills this gap. In so doing it addresses the 
mis-specification problem inherent in the existing bivariate studies. Also addressed in this 
thesis is the concern raised about the cross-country results by providing evidence based on 
country specific multivariate time-series analysis. Second, the empirical statistics identify and 
report the long-run financial development and output vectors which reveal the strength of the 
relationship between financial intermediary development and its determinants, real income 
per capita income, investment, real interest rate, financial uncertainty and openness of the 
economy. Finally, the systems approach that eliminates the single equation and avoids the 
bias that may have affected the previous studies is applied in the analysis of data.  
The results obtained in this study are thus distinct from others in that the uni-directional 
causality results were found to be more prevalent than bi-directional causality between 
financial development and economic growth. This finding is confirmed by the fact that bi-
directional causality in the long-run is only confirmed in one out of the three sampled 
countries, namely Kenya. In the remaining two other countries (that is South Africa and 
Zambia) the findings seem to suggest a uni-direction causal relation running from finance to 
growth. This is attributed to: (i) analysis of a higher dimensional system which involves 
simultaneous equations as opposed to single equation approach, (ii) a new approach of 
restrictions to the identification of the co-integrating vectors (i.e. long-run relationships), and 
(iii) a new approach to long-run causality testing using error correction terms and Toda-












1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter 1 is the introductory section. Chapter 2 
presents a comprehensive survey of the literature on finance-growth nexus and their 
regulatory reforms. This survey forms the theoretical basis for the study on Kenya, South 
Africa and Zambia’s cases. In this chapter, the relationship between finance and growth is 
analysed. Within the framework of finance and growth relationship the issue of causality is 
also examined. 
Chapter 3 describes the reform process of the financial institutions which has taken place in 
all the three countries related to this study. In this chapter, an overview of economy for each 
individual country is presented, their financial systems before and after reforms are briefly 
discussed and the measures adopted under liberalisation are analysed. 
Chapter 4 starts with the discussion of the theoretical framework applied in this thesis. This is 
followed by the discussion of unit root test. Furthermore, the chapter develops aggregated 
framework for the impact evaluation of financial development on growth and outlines the 
hypotheses of the study. The second model applied in this thesis is only used for identifying 
the variables to normalise on, while the last one is used for robustness checks of our VECM 
results.  
Chapter 5 contains the empirical test results based on a country-by-country basis. The chapter 
starts with the discussion of unit root test on the time series of the variables used in the study. 
The unit root tests results which are obtained by employing the Augmented Dick Fuller 
approach are presented. Empirical results are also reported on a country-by-country basis. 
The co-integration and short and long-term dynamics of causality are presented and their 
results summarised. The long-run relationships detected by the co-integration test assess the 
impact of financial development on economic growth and vice versa. Similarly, the causality 
test results from the Toda-Yamamoto method shed light on the direction of causality between 
variables of interest in long-term dynamics only. 














2.1  Introduction 
As with most disciplines at the frontier of research, the finance-growth nexus divides 
economists into a number of camps. Some dismiss such research as being unnecessary given 
the potential to over-stress the causal influence of finance on growth, others dismiss it in the 
belief that the proposition is too obvious to be worth serious investigation. A middle-ground 
is also found: support for the assertion that an underdeveloped economy can only enter a 
period of sustained economic growth if it also has suitable financial institutions, has been a 
recurring theme. Furthermore, there exist further arguments for causality in one direction, 
from financial depth to economic growth or from growth to finance, or in both directions. 
Much of the argument to date has concentrated on an empirical analysis of economic history, 
the use of large datasets or broad cross-country data to establish a correlation between 
financial structure (i.e., the development of stock markets, banking systems and their 
regulation) and economic growth. Evidence from recent empirical studies suggests that 
deeper, broader, and better functioning financial markets can stimulate higher economic 
growth (Levine, Loayza & Beck, 2000; Beck, Levine, & Loayza, 1999; King & Levine, 
1993a, 1993b). Although evidence on Africa is still limited, the results from existing 
empirical work supports the view that financial development has a positive effect on 
economic growth in African countries (Ndikumana, 2000; Allen & Ndikumana, 2000; 
Gelbard & Leite, 1999; Odedokun, 1996; Spears, 1992). The discussion of strategies for 
enhancing African economic development must therefore take into account the role of the 
financial sector in economic development.  
2.2  Finance-Growth Nexus in Sub-Saharan Africa countries 
During the last decades, the economic performance of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has been 
distinctly worse than that of other developing world regions. Between 1960 and 1980, the 
average annual per capita income growth in the region was 1.3%, compared to 2.5% 
worldwide. Between 1980 and 2000, SSA countries even experienced a decline in annual 












Sachs and Warner (1997) attribute the region’s poor economic performance to geographical 
factors such as climate or access to seas as well as to inappropriate economic policies. In 
particular, they argue that the region’s lack of openness to international trade has been a 
major obstacle to better performance, a factor that almost naturally coincides with low levels 
of trade liberalization in SSA. 
Collier and Gunning (1999) similarly suggest that geographical disadvantages have 
negatively affected economic growth. They also argue that poor economic policies have 
impaired growth more markedly. For instance, they suggest that the lack of trade openness, 
poor infrastructure and public services, and the underdevelopment and closeness of both 
financial and product markets are among the factors that have had growth-reducing effects. 
Financial systems in SSA can generally be described as underdeveloped. As summarised by 
Gelbard and Leite (1999) and Ncube (2007), regional financial sectors suffer from various 
unfavourable characteristics. These characteristics include limited financial products and 
financial innovation, wide interest rate spreads, weak legal systems, poor institutional 
environments and pronounced market fragmentation. The level of financial depth and 
financial efficiency in the region is rather low, also in comparison to other developing world 
regions. Financial systems in SSA are strongly bank-based, whereas stock markets are 
generally not well-developed. 
2.2.1 Trends and Patterns of Finance & Growth of African Countries 
In the case of African countries, recent surveys, especially those by Mehran et al. (1998) and 
Gelbard and Leite (1999) have made a significant contribution to this area. Based on results 
from a survey of 38 sub-Saharan African countries in 1997, Gelbard and Leite compiled 
indicators on six major aspects of financial development: (1) the market structure and 
competitiveness of the financial system; (2) the range of financial products available on the 
market; (3) the degree of financial liberalisation; (4) the institutional environment under 
which the financial system operates; (5) the degree of integration with foreign financial 
markets (financial openness); and (6) the degree of sophistication of monetary policy 
instruments. Gelbard and Leite computed indices that summarise the level of development of 












level financial development in 1987 and 1997.2 Countries were then classified as 
undeveloped, minimally developed, somewhat developed, or largely developed. The 
indicators compiled by Gelbard and Leite are highly informative not only on cross-country 
variations in the overall level of financial development, but also on differences in certain 
features of the institutional environment that are relevant for financial development. The 
findings from these surveys are summarised in section 3.4 below. 
2.2.2 Financial Development: Trends and Patterns in SSA 
In this section, we present some stylised facts on economic performance and overall financial 
development using aggregate statistics based primarily on the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators. As can be seen from Table 1, average real income, investment, and 
saving have declined in the 1990s compared to the 1980s (Collier and Gunning, 1999a, 
1999b). In the sub-Saharan African sample, average real income, investment, and saving have 
declined systematically in every decade since the 1970s. 




per capita (US$) 
Gross Fixed Capital 
Formation (% GDP) 
Gross Domestic 
Savings  (% GDP) 
1970-1979 579.8 24.6 23.0 
1980-1989 555.6 18.0 20.1 
1990-1999 504.6 17.2 15.3 
2000-2004 511.2 17.0 15.8 
Average Annual % changes 
1970s to 80s -0.4 -3.7 -1.4 
1980s to 90s -1.0 -0.5 -3.1 
1990s to 2000s 0.1 -0.1 0.3 
Source: WDI online data 
According to these statistics, only 12 of the 42 countries experienced an increase in real 
income from the 1970s to the 1990s. For as many as 16 countries in the sample, per capita 
real income in the 1990s was lower than in the 1970s. These statistics illustrate what some 
researchers have referred to as ‘growth tragedy’ or ‘development disasters’ (Easterly & 
Levine, 1998; Chari, Kehoe, & McGrattan, 1997). While the continent includes success 
stories like Botswana, Mauritius, and Seychelles, whose income levels are high and rising, it 
also includes a number of disappointing cases. Even countries with vast resources like the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (former Zaire) and Nigeria have been unable to meet 
                                               
2 The study by Gelbard and Leite covered only 1997, while the information for 1987 was compiled 












expectations due to many factors, including poor macroeconomic management and political 
corruption. Since the 1980s, aggregate indicators of financial development have either 
stagnated or declined on average in sub-Saharan Africa Table 2.  
Table 2: Some indicators of financial development for sub-Saharan Africa 
Period Liquid Liability Private Credit Bank Credit 
1970-1979 42.6(19.5) 42.9(14.3) 59.1(20.5) 
1980-1989 40.9(24.2) 46.6(18.3) 64.3(32.1) 
1990-1999 38.1(22.5) 64.5(14.6) 80.7(26.4) 
Average Annual % changes 
1970s to 80s -0.4(2.2) 0.8(2.5) 0.8(4.6) 
1980s to 90s -1.7(-0.7) 3.3(-2.2) 2.3(-1.9) 
Source: WDI online data 
 Figures in brackets exclude South Africa and the North African countries 
For sub-Saharan Africa, excluding South Africa, the average size of the financial system as 
measured by total liquid liabilities and credit supply were lower in the 1990s compared to the 
1980s. If South Africa or North African countries (Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia) are included, 
the statistics show an increase in the volume of credit supply from the 1970s to the 1990s. 
The data also highlight the predominant size of the South African financial system. The 
average bank credit to GDP ratio for the sub-Saharan African sample in 1990-98 is 81 
percent when South Africa is included, but only 26 percent when it is excluded. It is primarily 
through the supply of credit that financial intermediation stimulates real economic activity. 
Therefore the decline in credit supply in SSA may be a factor for the poor economic 
performance of the subcontinent over the past two decades. 
The aggregate indicators of financial development hide wide disparities across countries. As 
a result there is a large gap between countries with sizeable financial systems, with liquid 
liabilities of over 40 percent of GDP, and countries with much smaller financial systems. The 
countries with relatively large financial systems include North African countries (Algeria, 
Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia) and some sub-Saharan African countries such as Kenya and 
South Africa. These countries also have high ratios of credit supply to GDP, and most of 
them have experienced an increase in credit supply while credit supply declined in the 
majority of other sub-Saharan African countries over the 1970-1999 period. 
However, since the mid-1980s progress has been made with regard to financial liberalisation 












The reforms positively contributed to additional inflows and caused greater diversification of 
risk through risk sharing with foreign investors. In addition, financial development in the 
form of portfolio diversification, consumption smoothening and insurance helped to facilitate 
the management of risk. Further, interest rates were liberalised and quantitative restrictions 
removed. The reform process also pushed forward the privatisation of state institutions and 
promoted the independence of central banks. Most importantly, reforms included the 
provisions in prudential regulations for guidance on risk appetite (Kasekende, 2008). 
Table 3 shows that since 1990s the financial sector in Africa has been strengthened, captured 
in part by the increase in bank deposits relative to GDP in both low and middle-income 
African countries.  
Table 3: Indicators of financial development by income group in sub-Saharan Africa 
 Sub-Saharan Africa Others 
 Low-income Mid-income Mid-income 
 1990-99 2000-04 1990-99 2000-04 1990-99 2000-04 
Bank deposit  
to GDP 




credit to GDP 
12.3 13.3 52.1(21.5) 64.0 (21.0) 
 
39.4 40.3 
M2 to GDP 21.9 29.6 49.8 (35.0) 55.6 (32.1) 
 
77.3 94.2 
Liquidity liability  
to GDP 
19.1 23.8 47.9 (34.5) 53.4 (32.5) 36.6 41.2 
 Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics  
              Figures in brackets represent Mid-income countries minus RSA 
Similarly, money (i.e. M2 and liquid liabilities) has risen amounting to more than 50 percent 
of GDP in the middle-income countries in the 2000-04 period. With regard to private sector 
credit, slight positive trends can be observed in the low-income region while middle-income 
countries have experienced a significant increase in private sector credits. Once again, it has 
to be noted that the positive developments in the middle-income countries are driven largely 
by the changes in South Africa which accounts for more than half of the total output 
contribution. The evolution in middle-income sub-Saharan Africa countries without South 
Africa has been rather negative particularly with regard to quasi-money relative to GDP, 












2.2.3 Stock Market Development 
With banking dominant, the remainder of the formal financial system controls far smaller 
resources. This again is characteristic of low-income countries in general and not specific to 
Africa. But there is some variation among African countries revealing the potential for 
improvements in those that lag behind. 
Non-bank finance can offer a range and variety of services that is not part of the standard 
product range of banks. Furthermore, a strong non-bank sector can also provide competition 
for the banks. Financial systems in the advanced market economies are characterised by a 
very diverse array of institutions and markets offering a variety of products. Apart from 
banks, this includes capital markets, with both equity and debt securities and contractual 
savings institutions, such as insurance companies, pension funds and mutual funds. This 
wider range of institutional specialisations has the potential to offer a wider range of financial 
services and better risk-pooling at keener prices in a more competitive environment than is 
characteristic of the bank-dominated systems that are observed in most of Africa and in most 
low- and lower middle-income countries across the globe. In particular, contractual savings 
institutions can be major forces in providing patient capital, equity or loans, for long-term 
projects. Organised securities markets help to improve the transparency of funding 
arrangements by determining the market-clearing price of equities, as well as market-clearing 
interest rates for bonds. Equity markets are particularly valuable in providing financing to 
risky ventures about which there may be wide differences of opinion. Banks are often 
reluctant to finance these because the downside risk is insufficiently compensated by the 
contractual interest rate; well-resourced investors can build a portfolio of equity claims on 
such ventures for which the securities market will provide an exit mechanism in due course 
for those that are successful. 
2.2.3.1 Securities Markets 
With a market capitalisation of USD 600 billion, the South African (Johannesburg) market is 
the fourth largest emerging market in the World (after Korea, Russia and India). Yet even 
Johannesburg is not a big enough market to retain the primary listings of several of South 
Africa’s largest companies. Altogether, 21 of the companies listed in Johannesburg have their 
primary listings elsewhere; including the mining conglomerate Anglo American, the banking 
group Investec, the brewing company SAB-Miller, the insurance giant Old Mutual and the 












that the context in which African securities markets are operating is one in which the larger 
companies will be looking abroad as well as to the home market. 
There are 15 organised securities markets in Africa. Several other projects are under 
discussion, or partly implemented, but without any activity so far. (This does not count 
Cameroon and Gabon, both of which recently established stock exchanges but have not 
attracted any listings yet.) One exchange, the BRVM headquartered in Abidjan, caters to the 
eight-country UEMOA zone, having been expanded from the Abidjan stock exchange created 
in 1976. Four other exchanges were started in the days of the British Empire, those with 
headquarters at Nairobi, Lagos, Harare and Johannesburg, the latter two having histories 
going back into the 19th Century. The older exchanges also have the largest number of 
equities listed. These five, along with those established in 1988-9 in Botswana, Ghana and 
Mauritius are the only exchanges with market capitalisation at end of 2004 in excess of 10 
per cent of GDP, even though market capitalisation has been increasing in recent years. 
Trading data shows a different aspect of the contribution of stock exchanges in developing 
countries. It is influenced by secondary market liquidity and also by the degree to which a 
large fraction of the shares in developing markets are effectively locked-up in the strategic 
stakes of controlling shareholders and are not normally available for trading. It should be 
noted in this context that funds actually raised on these as on most capital markets are but a 
tiny fraction of market capitalisation. The eight oldest exchanges also have the most trading, 
with value traded fluctuating around 2 per cent of GDP for the past several years (see Table 
8). Even these more active African exchanges (Johannesburg aside) cannot be considered to 
have much trading. Except for Johannesburg, turnover on all markets is less than 15 percent 
of market capitalisation. There was no trading on the Maputo exchange in 2004. 
Low turnover is reflected in, and feeds back into, a lack of liquidity as illustrated by large 
gaps between buy and sell orders, and high price volatility. This lack of transaction is also 
somewhat reinforcing, as the transaction volume does not justify investment in technology 
either by the exchange itself or member brokers. Limited trading discourages listing and 
raising money on the exchanges. Even linking different centres electronically (as for example 
in the BRVM, or with the case of Namibia whose stock exchange is now electronically linked 












In international comparison of composite indicators of equity market development on the 
available data, typically only for 7 or 8 of the African exchanges that the main African 
exchanges fall behind the developing country average mainly in regard to efficiency, as 
distinct from size, stability and access (of issuers these concepts are spelled out in World 
Bank, 2006). 
The other seven markets, all established since 1989, are small on all measures. The smaller 
African countries tend to have neither organised exchanges nor any prospect of one. This 
may change in the future as more emphasis is placed on markets driving the economies in 
LDCs. Furthermore, these stock markets are characterised by high diversity in terms of age, 
size and, and performance. The region also counts both for long-established stock markets 
(South Africa and Zimbabwe) dating as far back as 1880s as the more recent ones (see Table 
4 below). 
Table 4: Indicator of stock market development in Africa, 2004 





% of GDP 
Value 
traded 








Botswana 18 29.4 0.6 2.1 0.21 1989 
Cote d’Ivoire 39 13.6 0.3 2.5 0.21 1976 
Ghana 29 30.7 0.8 3.2 0.12 1989 
Kenya 47 24.9 2.1 8.0 0.20 1954 
Malawi 8 9.0 1.0 11.1 - 1996 
Mauritius 41 39.3 1.6 4.4 0.12 1988 
Namibia 13 8.1 0.3 4.7 0.39 1999 
Nigeria 207 20.1 2.3 13.9 0.08 1992 
South Africa 403 214.1 76.5 45.0 0.06 1887 
Swaziland 6 9.3 0.0 00 - 1960 
Tanzania 6 6.2 0.2 2.5 - 1990 
Uganda 5 1.4 0.0 0.2 - 1998 
Zambia 11 8.0 0.1 1.1 - 1998 
Zimbabwe 79 87.9 14.0 3.9 0.08 1896 
Source: Financial Structure Database; World Bank Financial Sector Development Indicators    
The small size and illiquidity of Africa’s stock exchanges partly reflects low levels of 
economic activity, making it hard to reach a minimum efficient size or critical mass, and 
partly also the state of company accounts and their reliability. Several of the exchanges 
established in the late 1980s and 1990s were set up mainly in order to facilitate privatisation, 
and in the hope of attracting inward investment with the modernisation and technology 












was established in the process of privatising Mozambique’s national brewery, which is still 
the only listed company and which has to bear the operating costs of the stock exchange. To 
the extent that their establishment was driven by outside influences rather than emerging 
from a realistic need felt in the market, whether by investors or issuers it is perhaps 
unsurprising that many have so far struggled to reach an effective scale and activity level. 
Despite the problems of small size and low liquidity, African stock markets continue to 
perform remarkably well in terms of return on investment. The Ghana Stock Exchange was 
ranked as one of the world’s best-performing markets at the end of 2004 with a year return of 
144 percent in US dollar terms compared with 30 percent return by Morgan Stanley Capital 
International Global Index (Databank Group, 2004). Within the sub-Saharan Africa five other 
stock markets (i.e. Uganda, Kenya, Egypt, Mauritius and Nigeria apart from Ghana) were 
amongst the best performers in the year. 
2.2.4 Structural & Institutional Indicators of Financial Development 
From the surveys by Mehran et al. (1998) and Gelbard and Leite (1999), we can draw the 
following stylised facts about the development of financial markets in African countries over 
the past two decades. 
2.2.4.1Overall development 
The structural and institutional indicators illustrate the cross-country diversity in financial 
development as pointed out earlier using aggregate measures. The structural and institutional 
indicators paint an encouraging picture (than aggregate indicators) for the overall financial 
development in the continent. Based on Gelbard and Leite’s overall financial development 
index, the number of countries in their sample that were classified as somewhat or largely 
developed financially grew from two (Mauritius and South Africa) in 1987 to 27 in 1997 (see 
Table 5 below). 
According to Gelbard and Leite, the countries with the most developed financial system in 
1997 were Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa, and Zambia. However, 
measures of credit supply have deteriorated in some countries that are classified as largely 
developed or somewhat developed. This is the case for Zambia (largely developed), Nigeria, 
Malawi, and others (see Table 5). It is important to note that the rankings in Gelbard and 
Leite (1999) are relative to other African countries; so they should not be interpreted as 












South Africa, which are classified among ‘emerging markets’ can be considered as relatively 
developed from an international standard. 





Credit to Private 
Sector (% GDP) 
Credit by banks 
(% GDP) 
 1987 1997 1980-89 1990-98 1980-89 1990-98 1980-89 1990-98 
Benin Midev Sodev 22.3 26.5 27.7 11.0 27.4 12.0 
Botswana Midev Sodev 24.7 23.2 9.7 11.9 12.2 13.0 
Burkina Faso Midev Sodev 16.8 22.6 15.5 11.3 13.4 10.2 
Cameroon Midev Sodev 21.7 17.6 27.1 13.5 25.4 23.7 
CARS Midev Midev 17.9 18.6 10.3 4.8 17.8 12.5 
Congo DRC Midev Midev 14.9 15.0 2.2 1.1 9.2 13.2 
Congo Rep Undev Sodev 17.4 17.4 20.0 10.8 25.3 22.1 
Cote d’Ivoire Midev Sodev 28.6 27.9 38.1 25.8 44.9 36.3 
Gabon Midev Sodev 19.9 16.1 19.2 9.9 23.5 19.2 
Gambia Midev Sodev 24.5 24.9 19.3 10.5 41.8 6.8 
Ghana Midev Sodev 14.8 17.1 2.8 5.8 21.0 22.7 
Kenya Midev Ladev 29.0 39.3 30.1 33.1 47.4 52.9 
Lesotho Undev Midev 49.9 37.8 12.2 19.0 28.8 23.9 
Madagascar Midev Sodev 17.0 20.3 18.5 13.7 39.6 23.0 
Malawi Undev Midev 21.9 19.4 13.1 8.3 33.6 16.2 
Mali Midev Sodev 20.1 22.3 17.1 12.5 27.5 12.4 
Mauritius Sodev Ladev 49.2 72.9 25.9 43.9 55.3 61.1 
Mozambique Undev Sodev 41.7 26.0 37.2 13.9 51.9 6.7 
Niger Midev Sodev 16.3 14.9 16.4 7.8 18.5 11.9 
Nigeria Midev Sodev 29.4 18.3 15.4 8.6 37.7 21.2 
Rwanda Midev Sodev 14.3 15.9 7.2 7.3 9.4 15.5 
Senegal Midev Sodev 27.1 23.0 36.1 21.1 46.9 27.8 
Seychelles Midev Sodev 31.3 52.5 12.7 14.9 35.6 73.2 
Sierra Leone Midev Sodev 18.5 12.2 4.4 3.0 30.9 42.9 
South Africa Ladev Ladev 54.2 51.9 68.8 108.2 89.8 128.1 
Sudan Midev Sodev 28.3 16.1 10.8 3.6 32.0 13.8 
Swaziland Midev Sodev 31.6 30.0 20.6 21.7 16.1 4.7 
Togo Midev Midev 39.5 29.5 24.3 21.7 26.2 23.8 
Uganda Midev Sodev 12.1 10.3 3.3 4.3 23.2 8.5 
Zambia Midev Ladev 31.7 17.8 14.8 7.5 63.2 58.8 
Zimbabwe Midev Sodev 24.6 23.5 20.0 31.0 42.7 49.4 
Source: Gelbard and Leite (1999) 
  Key: under developed (Undev), minimally developed (Midev), 
  Somewhat developed (Sodev), largely developed (Ladev)  
2.2.4.2Market structure 
Ownership in the banking industry has evolved significantly from a predominantly state-
controlled to a more privately owned system. In 1997, 13 out of the 38 countries in Gelbard 












predominantly state-owned in 10 countries in the sample, where the state accounted for at 
least 30 percent of bank loans and deposits. The banking system is still highly concentrated in 
the majority of sub-Saharan African countries as indicated by the conventional Herfindahl 
index and the interest rate spread in the Gelbard-Leite (1999) study. 
The performance of the banking system has improved in some countries, but it is still low in 
the majority of them. High proportions of non-performing loans illustrate the inefficiencies in 
the credit allocation process and in loan repayment enforcement mechanisms. The average 
share of non-performing loans for the 38 countries in Gelbard-Leite’s sample was over 20 
percent in 1997. Low loan repayment rates (high default rates) constitute an important 
handicap for the stability of the banking system and it has adverse effects on the real sector. 
In particular, high default rates discourage lending, thereby reducing the overall supply of 
credit, which depresses private investment. 
With the exception of South Africa, African financial systems offer a limited range of 
financial products. Gelbard and Leite (1999) find that bank lending is predominantly short 
term, government securities tend to have short maturities (less than a year in 23 countries in 
1997), banks in many countries still don’t issue credit cards (issued in only 15 countries in 
1997), and inter-bank lending is still underdeveloped (inexistent in 8 countries in the sample 
in 1997). 
The institutional environment is still deficient in many countries. One of the studies to 
investigate this is that of Mehran et al. (1998). They study the supervisory framework of 
(banking law and central bank autonomy), prudential regulation (bank capital ratios), the 
safety net (availability of deposit insurance), and the legal infrastructure. Their results show 
that some of the basic requirements for effective banking regulation and supervision are still 
inexistent in many countries. For example, many countries have no provisions for deposit 
insurance and the legal infrastructure for the protection of bank performance is weak or 
inexistent in many countries. 
The Gelbard-Leite (1999) study paints a brighter picture. According to the Gelbard-Leite 
indexes, in 1997 the institutional environment could be considered as reasonably supportive 
for financial intermediation in 23 countries, up from just 8 countries in 1987. The institutional 
environment index includes indicators of specific features of the legal system and the 












existence of property and creditors’ rights and the ability of the judicial system to enforce 
such rights.  
Empirical studies have established a positive connection between financial development and 
the quality of the legal environment (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998, 
1997; Levine, 1998). The two aspects of the legal system that are most critical for financial 
intermediation are the quality of laws and the effectiveness of enforcement of these laws. So 
far with respect to the three study countries, only the South African system seems to have 
made a lot of headway with the quality and enforcement of these laws. For instance, the 
South African system has special courts through which the financial sector system can get 
help, while in the case of Kenya and Zambia, they still use the normal court system which is 
tedious and slow most of the time.   
These two aspects must exist simultaneously. The quality of a legal system determines the 
rights of creditors pertaining especially to the respect for the security of loans and the ability 
to repossess the assets of defaulting borrowers. To encourage lending, these legal rights must 
be both clearly defined and effectively enforced. Enforcement of the rights of creditors 
requires a judiciary that maintains the rule of law, low corruption, and low risk of 
expropriation or contract repudiation. 
While visible progress has been achieved over the past years, there are important institutional 
constraints to financial intermediation that African countries need to address. For example, 
the Gelbard-Leite survey reports that in 1997 the loan recovery process was difficult in as 
many as 28 sub-Saharan countries, commercial legislation was inadequate in 14 countries, 
and there was no legislation of the use of checks in as many as 11 countries in the sample. 
2.2.5 Selected Issues in Finance-Growth Policy 
This section identifies and briefly discusses some important topics related to financial 
development and the role of financial markets in economic development. The list is by no 
means exhaustive nor is the discussion in any way comprehensive and it includes the issues 
of financial reforms in less developing countries and financial sector structure (i.e. Markets 













2.2.5.1 Financial Repression 
In the early post-independence era, African governments sought to use financial development 
as a tool of speeding up economic growth. Governments became the main players in the 
creation of new financial intermediaries, including development banks and commercial banks 
as well as in the nationalisation of commercial banks. Policy makers adopted the view that it 
was possible to foster economic growth by identifying growth promoting sectors and 
providing subsidised credit to promote those sectors. Governments also controlled interest 
rates, which, in the context of high and volatile inflation, often resulted in negative real 
interest rates. 
By the 1980s, the financial sector was experiencing the same problems of mismanagement 
and inefficient allocation of resources that plagued the public sector in the majority of 
African countries. The financial system was characterised by pervasive default on loans, 
especially by state-owned enterprises, which accounted for a large share of the domestic 
credit supply. This weakened financial intermediaries, forcing governments to inject more 
resources in the system in the form of subsidies to keep ailing institutions afloat.  
The disappointing experience of government-sponsored financial development forced 
countries to revise their strategies. Even though the government’s presence is still significant 
in many countries, there is a visible trend towards more private ownership of banks. As part 
of the financial sector reform programmes initiated in the 1980s and accelerated in the 1990s, 
state-owned financial institutions have been privatised or restructured to reduce the share of 
the government in the ownership structure, and the creation of new private banks has 
accelerated due to the easing of licensing requirements.  
One undesirable effect of liberalisation in some countries has been the proliferation of small 
undercapitalised institutions (World Bank 2000b). Moreover, the expansion of private sector 
participation has not resulted in a systematic increase in competition in the banking sector. 
Banking systems in many countries are still characterised by a high degree of concentration 
just as the case is in South Africa and Zambia. In these two countries at least four major 
banks account for more than 60 percent of the business in terms of asset and liability 
portfolios to both the public as well as the private sector. The system in Kenya seems to have 
done better with respect to bank concentration. The main drivers for this were the NBFIs and 












The government can foster financial development by pursuing sound macroeconomic 
management, especially fiscal discipline to improve macroeconomic stability, which 
minimises macroeconomic uncertainty. African countries have systematically suffered from 
bad fiscal policies that have exacerbated the effects of external shocks, resulting in high 
chronic fiscal deficits. At reasonable levels, fiscal deficits have minimal adverse effects on 
the financial system. But when fiscal deficits are chronically high, this increases the 
likelihood of monetary financing of the deficits and also forces the government to compete 
with private sector in the credit market.  
There is evidence that some African countries that have made significant progress in 
macroeconomic and financial sector reform also have experienced improvement in economic 
performance and that their financial systems are improving. Uganda is often cited as an 
example of recent success in economic reform (see, among others, Kasekende and Hussain, 
2000). The Ugandan government as well as its Reserve Bank has progressively established a 
good record of credibility in policy decision making, which has promoted an environment 
that is conducive to private investment and growth. 
The government also can enhance financial development by promoting a strong, independent, 
and effective legal system. The judiciary plays an important role in enforcing the 
constitutional protection of individual and property rights, and by adjudicating commercial 
disputes. The benefits of an efficient judiciary include the predictability of the legal 
environment and the protection of investors against policy reversals. The predictability of 
commercial law reduces the risk associated with saving and other forward-oriented 
transactions both in the real sector and in the financial system. As a result, this facilitates the 
maturity transformation role of financial intermediaries as well as portfolio management by 
savers. 
Legal systems in many African countries do not adequately fulfil their role of facilitating and 
enforcing the rules of economic exchange. Legal procedures often are excessively long, 
which imposes costly delays on economic actors (Widner, 2000). The lack of autonomy of 
the judiciary from the executive branch and from political and business interest groups results 
in lack of impartiality in the handling of commercial disputes. There are wide variations 
across African countries in the quality of law and the effectiveness of the legal system in 
facilitating economic exchange. There are no studies on Africa that have linked these cross-












worthwhile to investigate whether the results from the existing cross-country studies that 
suggest that enforcement of investor rights and financial market development vary depending 
on a country’s legal origin (as suggested by La Porta et l. 1997, 1998 and Levine, 1998) 
hold in the case of African countries. 
2.2.6 African Experience 
This section of the literature consists of efforts to assess the experience of African countries’ 
growth with respect to their financial sector development. To show the trend of literature the 
rest of this section is organised along three lines. The first section reviews studies which have 
investigated the relationship between finance and growth based on a number of countries. 
The second section discusses studies on a country specific basis and last but not least we look 
at those studies which have investigated the effects of financial liberalisation and their effects 
on economic growth. 
2.2.6.1 Cross-country cases on Finance-growth nexus 
Bhatia and Khatkhate (1975) used correlation graphs to examine the relationship between 
economic growth and financial intermediation for eleven African countries. Financial 
intermediation is measured by the ratio of currency, demand deposits, and time and savings 
deposits to GDP. The authors find no definite relationship between growth and financial 
intermediation for the countries either individually, or for the whole group. Splitting the 
financial intermediation measure into two the ratio of money to GDP and the ratio of quasi-
money to GDP  still does not reveal any definite relationship between growth and financial 
intermediation. 
Ogun (1986) used cross-section analysis to estimate the correlation between financial 
deepening and economic growth by using data for 20 countries in Africa from 1969 - 1983. 
The degree of financial intermediation is measured using the ratios of monetary liabilities 
(M1, M2, and M3) to GDP. For the full sample, all the monetary liabilities are negative and 
only the ratio of M3 to GDP is statistically significant. When the countries are split into high 
and low-income countries, some of the coefficients of the monetary liabilities are positive 
while some are negative. However, they are all insignificant and offer no support to the 
growth enhancing capabilities of financial intermediation. 
Spears (1991) studied the causal relationship between financial intermediation and economic 












and Malawi), where a strong link between the development of the financial sector and 
economic growth. The concept of causality used in this study is that of Granger 
(Econometrica, 1969) and the test involves two distributed-lag regressions: (1) (Mathematical 
Expressions Omitted) and (2) (Mathematical Expression Omitted) where (GDP/POP) is real 
gross domestic product per capita, (FI) represents a financial intermediation indicator, and m 
represents the number of lags applied to both variables. Two measures of financial 
intermediation were used, M2/GDP and Quasi-money/M2. With respect to the latter, there 
was no indication of causality in either direction in any of the five countries, with the 
exception of Burkina Faso. The F-test, however, indicates that financial intermediation as 
measured by M2/GDP causes economic growth, as measured by real gross domestic product 
per capita, in all five countries. The results lend support to the view that in the early stages of 
development, financial intermediation plays a supply-leading role and induces some measure 
of economic growth in the sample of SSA countries surveyed.  
Furthermore, Allen et al. (1998) made an attempt to examine the role of financial 
intermediation in the economic union of Southern Africa called SACU by using four 
indicators of financial intermediation and three different panel techniques-simple OLS 
regressions, regressions including country-specific fixed effects, and regressions including a 
high-income dummy. In their empirical regressions, they found a positive correlation 
between financial development and the growth of real per capita GDP for the Southern Africa 
Development Community (SADC). However, their study suffers from two major weaknesses 
as far as the question of the relevance of domestic financial intermediation is concerned. 
First, it fails to take into consideration the heterogeneous nature of the economies concerned. 
Second, other studies have shown that the degree of financial and monetary integration 
among the SADC countries is still very weak (See for instance, Jenkins and Thomas, 1998: 
153-156; and ADB, 2000: 152-154). By contrast, it has been shown that the financial sector 
in the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) countries are highly integrated because of 
the monetary union among most member countries.  
Ndikumana (2000) studied the effects of financial development on domestic investment in a 
sample of 30 sub-Saharan African countries. The empirical investigation employed is based 
on a dynamic serial-correlation investment model that includes various indicators of financial 
development, controlling for country-specific fixed effects and nonfinancial factors of 












investment and private investment) and various indicators of financial development. Higher 
financial development leads to higher future levels of investment, implying a potent long-run 
effect of financial development on domestic investment. The findings imply that financial 
development can stimulate economic growth through capital accumulation. 
Following Ndikumana’s (2000) method of panel data analysis, Allen et al. (2000) used 
various indicators of financial development to investigate the role of financial intermediation 
in stimulating economic growth in Southern Africa. The results lend some support to the 
hypothesis that financial development is positively correlated with the growth rate of real per 
capita GDP. This relationship is more evident in regressions that use pooled data (5-year 
cross-sections) than those using annual data. According to the two authors their finding seems 
to suggest that the finance-growth nexus is a long-run phenomenon. The data indicate that 
while Botswana, Mauritius and South Africa are making progress towards a high-income 
steady state, the rest of the countries in sub-Saharan countries are stagnating to low income 
levels and low growth rates.  
Atindehon et al. (2001), extends the study on causality issue to another sub region of Africa 
called Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and found a weak causal 
relationship existing between financial development and economic growth in almost all the 
countries included in their panel. The results show that economic growth causes economic 
growth in the following countries: Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone 
and Togo. In contrast, they also found that financial development seems to have led to 
economic growth in Ivory Coast, Mali, Gambia, Mauritania and Sierra Leone. Most 
importantly, the study found that the credit allotted by the banks, did not have any impact on 
economic growth. 
Agbetsiafa (2003), brings the issue of causality even closer to home when he investigates the 
issue of causality between finance and growth on a number of sub-Saharan African countries 
by testing whether the levers of financial sector development exerts causal impact on 
economic real per capita GDP growth using the co-integration test procedure which was 
initially proposed by Johansen and Juselius, and causality test based on vector error 
correction model (VECM). The empirical results of the study indicate that each of the 
financial development indicators and economic growth are co-integrated of order one.  
Furthermore, co-integration test results show that financial development and economic 












respect to causality tests, the author found that there was predominance of uni-directional 
causality from finance to growth in six countries (namely, Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, South 
Africa, Togo, and Zambia), and economic growth to financial development in Ivory Coast 
and Kenya. 
Following the Agbetsiafa, Abu-Bader et al. (2005) implemented the causality tests on 
different periods of time within a trivariate VAR for five MENA countries: Algeria, Egypt, 
Morocco, Tunisia and Syria over the period 1960-2004. This study differs from the one 
discussed earlier as this one deals with countries north of the sub-Saharan countries. The 
panel also includes one country from the Middle East.  In carrying out the empirical tests, the 
authors employs four different measures of financial development besides the income 
variable which include: ratio of money to stock, ratio of M2 minus currency to GDP, ratio of 
bank credit to the private sector to GDP and last but not least credit issues to nonfinancial 
private firms to total domestic credit. The results obtained show weak support for long-run 
relationship between finance and growth for the finance-led hypothesis. Further, in cases 
where co-integration was detected, Granger causality was either bi-directional or it ran from 
output to financial development. In this respect the authors therefore argue that the causality 
pattern vary across countries depending on the financial proxy used. This result highlights 
one important issue and that is statistical inference based on cross-country regressions or 
using financial development proxies that does not capture the different mechanisms through 
which financial development can lead economic growth.  
Ncube (2007) departs slightly from the use of the usual econometric rigor by conducting a 
study where he investigates ways in which the financial sector can lead economic growth in 
Africa by just applying the theory and trends. In this regard the author uses the theory based 
on the structure and characteristics of the financial sector system in Africa that may affect 
economic growth. The issues covered are vast and include: weak regulation environment, 
weak legal systems, bank-based vs market-based system, wide spreads of interest rates, poor 
corporate governance, inadequate design of deposit insurance, oligopoly banking structure, 
absence of banking innovations, inefficient deposit and payment system, small and shallow 
stock markets, market fragmentation, informal systems and low levels of financial deepening. 
In this detailed analysis of characteristics of financial system, Ncube found that financial 
sector systems do affect the impact of financial services on economic growth and 












that can mitigate against the distortionary effects of the characteristics in order to promote 
economic growth. 
Gries et al. (2008) make yet another contribution on finance-growth nexus by testing for 
causality between financial deepening, trade openness and economic development for 16 sub-
Saharan African countries. An advanced econometric methodology is applied to add to 
existing empirical evidence. Only limited support is found for finance promoting regional 
development. In particular, support for the popular hypothesis of finance-led growth is not 
substantial. In general, it is found that financial deepening and trade openness have swayed 
regional development only marginally. Thus, development strategies prioritising financial 
sector or trade liberalisation cannot be supported. Instead, a holistic policy approach taking 
into account other fundamental development factors is advocated. 
2.2.6.2 Country Specific Case Studies  
Based on a number of problems associated with cross-country studies and also the reforms 
policy which have been implemented since the 1980s, the thesis now reviews some of the 
studies which have specific reference to the time series and that are country specific starting 
with the work on Kenya which was done by Odhiambo.  
Odhiambo (2004) examines the dynamic causal relationship between financial depth and 
economic growth in Kenya. As opposed to the usual bivariate model the author in this case 
allows for an additional variable savings as an intermitting variable thereby creating a simple 
tri-variate causality model. Using the co-integration and error-correction techniques, the 
empirical results of this study reveal that there is a distinct uni-directional causal flow from 
economic growth to financial development. The results also show that economic growth 
Granger causes savings, while savings drive the development of the financial sector in 
Kenya. The lessons picked from this study, therefore, warn that any argument that financial 
development unambiguously leads to economic growth should be treated with extreme 
caution. 
In a quest of covering more country specific studies, Odhiambo (2005a) investigates the role 
of financial development on economic growth on yet another east African country, Tanzania. 
Just like in his previous study on Kenya in this study he uses more variables in his model by 
including three proxies of financial development against real GDP per capita. Using the 












empirical results of this study, taken together, reveal bidirectional causality between financial 
development and economic growth in Tanzania even though a supply-leading response tends 
to predominate. When the ratio of broad money to GDP (M2/GDP) is used, a distinct supply-
leading response is found to prevail. However, when the ratio of currency to narrow 
definition of money (CC/M1) and the ratio of bank claims on the private sector to GDP 
(DCP/GDP) are used, bi-directional causality evidence seems to prevail. The study therefore 
recommends that the current financial development in Tanzania be developed further in order 
to make the economy more monetised. 
Abu-Bader et al. (2005), examines the causal relationship between financial development and 
economic growth in Egypt during the period 1960-2001 within a trivariate VAR setting. They 
employ four different measures of financial development and apply Granger causality tests 
using the co-integration and vector error correction methodology. Their results show that 
there is support for the view that financial development causes economic growth either 
through increasing investment efficiency or through increasing resources for investment. This 
finding suggests that the financial reforms launched in 1990 can explain the rebound in 
economic performance since then and that further deepening of the financial sector is an 
important instrument to stimulate saving/investment and therefore long-term economic 
growth. 
Frank (2007) departs from the bank vs. growth model by examining the effect of stock 
market expansion on South Africa’s economic development covering the period from 1989 to 
2001 and uses a simple OLS model. In this model the author includes the following variables: 
real GDP per capita, ratio of bank credit to the private sector to GDP, index of stock market 
volatility and index of stock market development. Surprisingly, the author finds counter 
intuitive results of statistically significant negative relation between stock market 
development and economic growth.3 The explanation advanced in this regard is that of data 
and argues that the presence of thin trading prevents the theorised benefits of market 
development from accruing to the economy. 
Quartey et al. (2008) investigates whether financial development in Ghana conforms to either 
the Supply-leading, demand-following or Patrick’s Stages of development hypotheses. A 
bivariate VAR model is estimated in four scenarios, after which Granger causality test, 
                                               













Impulse Response Function and Variance Decomposition analyses were conducted for each 
respective scenario of the VAR. Whereas there is some evidence in support of demand-
following hypothesis, when growth of broad money to GDP ratio is used as a measure of 
financial development, there is no significant evidence to support either the supply-leading or 
demand-following hypotheses when growth in domestic credit to GDP ratio, private credit to 
GDP ratio, and private credit to domestic credit ratio are used as proxies for financial 
development. Also, in all the four cases, there is no statistical evidence to support Patrick’s 
stages of development hypothesis in Ghana. 
2.2.6.3 Financial Liberalisation and Growth Studies 
Oshikoya (1992) used time series econometrics to see how interest rate liberalisation has 
affected economic growth in Kenya. The author used data from 1970 to 1989 and the results 
showed a negative and insignificant coefficient for the real interest rate. The sample was then 
split into two sub periods: 1970-1979 and 1980-1989. The real interest rate had a negative 
and significant coefficient for the 1970-1979 period, but was positive and significant for the 
1980-1989 period; thus offering no robust result of the effect of interest rate liberalisation on 
growth. 
Berthelemy (1997) reports the disenchantment with financial liberalisation in Senegal due to 
a reduced access to credit. According to him, liberalisation resulted in excessively high 
positive interest rates and in the new environment, banks found it difficult to identify and 
select investment opportunities. Most banks therefore ended up not lending and holding 
excess liquid assets. In addition, following liberalisation, over 70% of bank lending was 
short-term with small and medium-scale enterprises (SMEs) experiencing a sharp reduction 
in access to finance.  
Ayogu, et al. (1998) analysed Nigeria’s experience with financial reforms and concluded that 
reforms have neither enhanced the financial system nor improved macro-stability.4 While 
reforms resulted in a sharp increase in the number and types of financial intermediaries, there 
was no significant change in financial depth and the quality of financial services did not 
improve. Financial fragility emerged with the collapse of many banks; private sector access 
                                               
4 The finding by Ayogu, is very much related to what has happened in the three study counties (South Africa, 
Kenya and Zambia) in that financial liberalization has not led to much development of their financial sector. In 
some cases like Zambia and South Africa the financial sector has even declined or remained flat as proxied by 













to credit shrank as fiscal deficits ballooned (mostly financed by the banking system) and a 
mushrooming of insider lending and bad loans implied that the efficiency of credit allocation 
deteriorated. Fiscal deficits put monetary policy under considerable pressure and impeded the 
effectiveness of indirect monetary instruments. However they attributed these adverse results 
to the inconsistent and ad hoc implementation of the reform programme, with frequent policy 
reversals creating credibility problems. The Nigerian authorities also failed to strengthen 
prudential regulation and supervision leading to excessive risk-taking by banks and other 
financial institutions. Mass opposition to the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP), of which 
financial reforms were a part, also complicated implementation and sharply reduced the 
likelihood of a positive outcome.  
In evaluating Uganda’s experience with financial liberalisation, Aleem t al. (2001) also 
report reduced access to finance. Although liberalisation reduced bank concentration, and 
almost doubled monetary depth and the share of bank deposits in GDP, it also led to a sharp 
reduction in the access of micro-enterprises and farmers in the rural areas to credit and 
perversely, liberalisation has led to an expansion of the informal financial sector which now 
provides the bulk of financial services to these underserved segments of the population. This 
phenomenon is due to the removal of state-intervention in credit allocation without any viable 
alternative framework in a liberalised regime. Unlike in Asia where financial liberalisation 
has led to banks expanding into rural areas (see Williamson & Mahar, 1998), liberalisation in 
Uganda seems to have resulted in a retrenchment of banks from rural areas. Indeed, in India, 
authorities continue to maintain directed credit schemes despite the move to a more 
liberalised financial system due to fears of an undesirable pull-back of financial institutions 
from rural areas (see Sen & Vaidya, 1998).  
There were other costs of liberalisation in Uganda, including higher real and nominal interest 
rates and the bailout of unsound banks that were allowed into the system (low quality at 
entry). Therefore, from 1995, more emphasis was placed on institutional development, 
especially improvements in banking supervision and enhancing the skills of bankers to cope 
with a liberalised financial system.  
Olumuyiwa et al. (2007) developed panel co-integration techniques which they applied to 
data for six African countries to test the Feldstein-Horioka approach to measuring capital 
mobility. The results suggest three conclusions: savings and investment in panel data are non-












countries during 1970-2000, with estimated savings retention ratios of 0.73 (FMOLS), 0.45 
(DOLS), 0.51 (DOLS with heterogeneity) and 0.39 (DOLS with cross-sectional dependence 
effects); and there was a marked drop in the savings retention ratio from 1970-85 to 1986-
2000. These results could imply that capital mobility in African countries has increased, 
reflecting the implementation of market-orientated reforms, including the privatisation and 
rationalisation of the public sector, and the partial liberalisation of their exchange rate 
regimes and financial systems.    
2.3 Theoretical Framework 
In the following section, possible impact patterns, directions of influence in the interplay 
between the financial and the real sector and their basis are discussed. Transmission channels 
and both macro and industry-level structural effects are depicted. 
2.3.1. Possible causal links between finance and real growth 
The relation between the financial development and the economic growth can be classified in 
terms of causality with respect to five possible hypotheses: (1) no causal relation; (2) 
demand-following; (3) supply-leading; (4) negative causal link from finance to growth; (5) 
interdependence. In addition, a number of syntheses can be based on the five hypotheses, 
basically with respect to evolutionary sequencing or different needs on the part of industries 
or types of enterprises. 
The view that financial sector development is not significantly related to real growth is 
expressed most prominently by Lucas (1988: 6). As Graff (2000: 3) points out, this assertion 
is consistent with a neo-classical world of zero transaction costs and perfect information we 
may add. In such a world the Modigliani-Miller theorem (See Modigliani and Miller, 1958) 
holds that the way firms finance themselves is irrelevant (their irrelevance propositions), 
which is consistent with the perception that financial markets as independent entities from the 
rest of the economy and so finance and growth are unrelated. On the other hand, there are still 
economists who would argue that finance and growth are unrelated.  
The difficulty of establishing the link between financial development and economic growth 
was first established by Robinson (1952: 86). Robinson’s statement that “finance follows 
where enterprise leads” is often quoted, when it comes to arguing that the causal relation runs 












financial development as endogenously determined by the real economy or its needs.5 This 
view is consistent with the Coase theorem (see Coase, 1956) and much of New Institutional 
Economics where it is argued that institutions adjust to market imperfections in a way that 
maximises individual utilities. The demand-following approach is often based on empirical 
evidence and regarded as a temporary situation that may persist only under special 
circumstances, such as transition to a market economy. 
The modern branch of the supply-leading finance literature starts with the works of 
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973). The supply-leading hypothesis po its a causal 
relationship from financial development to economic growth, which means deliberate 
creation of financial institutions and markets increases the supply of financial services and 
thus leads to real economic growth. Numerous theoretical and empirical writings on this 
subject have shown that financial development is important and causes economic growth. 
King and Levine (1993a, b), Neusser and Kugler (1998) and Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000) 
support the supply-leading phenomenon.  
On the other hand, the demand-following hypothesis po tulates a causal relationship from 
economic growth to financial development. Here, an increasing demand for financial services 
might induce an expansion in the financial sector as the real economy grows (i.e. financial 
sector responds passively to economic growth). Gurley and Shaw (1967), Goldsmith (1969) 
and Jung (1986) support this hypothesis.6 
Apart from the three competing hypotheses, there is a fourth one, mainly held by a minority 
and argues that finance has a detrimental effect to the real development of an economy. 
Economists supporting this view regularly refer to the danger of financial crises, often in 
relation with speculative bubbles (Bhatt, 1995) or, more generally, the veiling of 
fundamentals of the real economy, particularly through capital market speculation. This 
strand of literature is often motivated by the observation of poor economic performance 
accompanied by financial market growth in particular world regions, especially Latin 
America, during the past 20 to 30 years. 
                                               
5 Endogenously determined means that financial sector is determined within the gun model. 
6According to this view, the lack of financial institutions in some less developed countries is simply a 












Much of the empirical evidence, but also the theoretical discourse, suggests that both 
arguments in favour of supply-leading and demand-following finance are of relevance. This 
implies that the causal link between finance and real growth runs in both directions. This 
mutual influence may be exerted at the same time, implying that financial depth (i.e. large 
financial markets) drives real growth, while the growing economy’s demand for finance is 
met by the advancing financial sector. Alternatively, or indeed additionally, it may depend 
crucially on an economy’s general development stage whether its financial sector is supply-
leading or demand-following. The most prominent hypothesis of such a sequential pattern of 
causation was forwarded by Patrick (1966). Patrick argues that underdeveloped countries can 
gain significantly in real terms from developing their financial sectors (supply-leading 
finance), whereas in highly developed economies finance becomes increasingly demand-
following. This is contrasted by Gerschenkron’s (1962) assertion that developed economies 
tend to become increasingly supply-leading as production becomes more and more capital 
intensive. 
While there is some truth in the above arguments, the consideration is that it is important not 
to lose perspective. Financial institutions and systems in this regard, banks and securities 
markets, are regularly at the centre of attention of research and policy advice. They are, 
however, not the sole and not even the most important providers of finance for investment. 
Strikingly, the clearly dominant source of corporate finance is cash flow. Thiel (2001), 
reports that in Germany more than 50% of investment is financed through cash flow and 
depreciation. Graff (2000) summarises empirical evidence from a number of studies stating 
that, no matter how developed financial markets may be in a particular country, self-
financing is always dominant and above the 50% margin. Ignoring the dominant role of cash 
flow, sometimes referred to as ‘financial xenophobia’ (Nyman, 2001), implies the danger to 
overemphasise the importance of the financial system’s contribution to real development in 
theory and to be surprised by a seemingly weak empirical performance of financial market 
variables. Furthermore, the important role of cash flow financing may lead to a 
counterintuitive empirical short-run bias, as other sources of finance may serve as substitutes 
for self-financing and therefore run counter to the business cycle (Thiel, 2001:12). Generally 
speaking, the use of internal funds is difficult to quantify which is one reason why they are 
widely ignored in empirical studies. Interesting exceptions are the recent works of Rivaud et 
al. (2001) and Laevens (2002). African experience relating to this literature will be reviewed 












2.3.2 Transmission Channels 
It is generally argued that the financial system plays a growth-supporting role and also takes 
on additional market functions. Financial institutions develop out of the need to deal with 
transaction costs and overcome information problems (Levine, 1997: 891). They influence 
the real economy by enhancing capital accumulation and innovation. Capital accumulation as 
an endogenous determinant of real growth is in line with the traditional (neo-classical) 
growth theory. The development of endogenous growth theory focuses on innovation as a 
determinant of real growth and offers thus a more important role for finance as a driving 
force of the real economy (Thiel, 2001).  
Senhadji (2000) estimates a Cobb-Douglas production function and discriminates between 
growth due to capital accumulation on the one hand, and factor productivity growth on the 
other. He finds large regional disparities and a particularly high contribution of productivity 
growth to real GDP growth in underdeveloped countries. Claessens and Laeven (2002) 
construct a model which distinguishes between a ‘finance effect’ and an ‘asset allocation’ 
effect. The latter influences the ratio of investment in fixed assets relative to investment in 
intangible assets. According to this model the asset allocation effect is just as important for 
real growth as the finance effect. Capital accumulation and factor productivity are the major 
channels through which real growth can be stimulated by the financial system. The financial 
system mobilises dispersed (hoarded) savings and pools them in order to make them available 
for investment. This function is fundamental, as many investment projects require larger 
amounts than one individual is able or willing to provide. It is also performed indirectly by 
diversifying liquidity and more general risks.  
Furthermore, the financial system influences resource allocation with respect to investment 
productivity, both directly and indirectly. Banks and financial markets specialise in the 
acquisition and transformation of information on investment projects and supposedly perform 
these functions more efficiently than savers could, as duplication of efforts is avoided and 
transaction costs are reduced. In this respect the financial system also deals with agency 
problems which stem from asymmetric information between the borrower and the lender. 
This implies an investment project evaluation function and an ex post monitoring function of 












2.3.3 The Structure of Financial Systems 
The discussion on the optimal or the most growth-supportive financial structure focuses very 
much on the question whether banks or the capital market produce better outcomes. 
Arguments in favour of either view are reviewed from a macro and a micro/industry 
perspective. It is argued that there is both competition and functional complementarity of 
capital markets and financial intermediaries. The suggestion put forth in literature is that of 
using the terms “bank-oriented” and “securities-oriented” instead of the value-loaded 
terminology often applied. 
2.3.3.1 The Macro Perspective 
Theoretically, the most important characteristics separating the two systems concern the 
provision of information and of corporate control (Graff, 2000: 28 ff.). Financial contracts 
between intermediaries and borrowers regularly take extensive information on particular 
projects into account. The extent to which information is truly reflected in share prices, 
however, is doubtful (e.g. Stiglitz, 1989). But even in case securities markets that reflect 
information correctly, externalities may hamper the efficient functioning of the market more 
severely than is the case with intermediaries. Banks are specialised in acquiring and 
processing information on investment projects. If a project fails, a bank is among the few 
parties that suffer from the resulting losses. The incentive to engage in serious information 
management is therefore high. On the capital market there are regularly a large number of 
financiers with low incentives to acquire information (potential free riders). Information on 
the worthiness of investment projects is correctly or incorrectly incorporated in publicly 
observable market prices. Consequently the limited incentives are accompanied by 
information spill-over effects. Standard economic behavioural assumptions concerning self 
interest, however, generally lead to the conclusion that negative external effects of non-
exclusivity prevail over positive spill-over effects. 
On capital markets corporate control is exerted in an impersonal way by (not) buying and 
selling equity (so-called ‘arm’s length finance’). The ultimate threat to an arguably bad 
management is a potential take-over. Bank-oriented systems are characterised by long-term 
relationships between lender and borrower. This has led to the conclusion that corporate 
control would be better performed by capital markets due to their harder budget constraints. 












and lender to save projects. This potential benefit should be weighed against the potential 
costs of a softer ex ante budget constraint. 
Corbett (1990) highlights the important role of banks as institutions which have both the 
potential and the incentives to strive for reorganisation of companies in trouble. She infers 
from the dominant fraction of external investment that is financed through banks in most 
countries that capital markets play more of a corrective or residual role within the financial 
system. Most importantly, capital markets contest credit markets when they fail to allocate 
capital efficiently to promising projects and they are a means of evaluating the residual real 
value of corporations when reorganisation has failed (Corbett, 1990). 
With reference to the establishment of hard budget constraints in bankruptcy laws of Central 
and Eastern European EU accession countries, Revoltella (1998) highlights the existence of a 
binding trade-off between flexibility and rigidity. Particularly for some transition countries 
this trade-off may extend to a trade-off between efficiency and (system) stability, given the 
fragility of financial systems in some of these countries. Hawkins discusses the question of 
possible substitution effects between bank credit and bonds. Emphasising on emerging 
economies including some CEECs he finds that the development of bond markets which 
typically lags behind the emergence of effective banking systems may have slowed down 
banking sectors’ growth over the long term (Hawkins, 2002). However, he finds no 
consequent contraction of the banking sector and concludes “that it is important to have 
healthy banks to have a sound bond market. And a bond market may improve the health of 
banks, by improving market discipline.” Mihaljek t al. (2002: 24 f.) find empirical evidence 
for positive correlations between three financial sectors and constitute various forms of spill-
over effects from the banking sector to the other two market segments. Hellwig (1998) argues 
that financial intermediaries perform an important market making function for capital 
markets, i.e. there is direct complementarity for both financial segments. Similarly it can be 
argued that certain products offered by banks, like investment funds, are necessary to help 
savers access capital markets despite limited information. Building on this idea of 
complementary relations between the various market segments (and all other parts of the 
financial system) Schmidt et al. (2001) analyse the financial systems of Germany, France and 
England. They cannot find any signs of superiority of either of the two and claim that the 
consistency of a system is much more important than the type of a system itself. Moreover, as 












question the possibility and usefulness of a smooth convergence of financial systems. In the 
case of South Africa, Zambia and Kenya, banks appear to be superior with respect to their 
role in financial intermediation. 
Caution has to be applied with regard to terminology used. A considerable part of the 
literature emphasising the design of financial systems is preoccupied with the classification of 
systems as either ‘market-based’ or ‘bank-based’. This thesis considers this terminology 
misleading, because the provision of finance through banks and other intermediaries also 
involves markets.  
2.3.3.2 The Micro/Industry Perspective 
While in this research context the above mentioned institutional factors accounting for 
differences between financial systems are more important, a branch of the literature analyses 
capital structures from a micro-perspective. This approach builds on the fact that markets and 
intermediaries perform very different functions reflecting the heterogeneous needs of the 
respective clients and client industries willing to invest. Borrower characteristics are of 
particular importance for potential access to various financing instruments, whereas project 
characteristics primarily (though not exclusively) influence companies’ financial choices. The 
organisational structure, the reputation, the availability of collateral or the sheer size of a 
company may limit its access to certain financial instruments. 
Capital markets are said to be superior in processing rather uncertain information about 
innovative and potentially highly rewarding projects (Thiel, 2001); Small companies 
normally have no access to share or bond markets; banks may provide finance for small, 
decentralised projects more efficiently than centralised capital markets (Smith, 1992); access 
to trade credit as substitute for bank loans and other forms of credit might be different and so 
forth. Zingales (1995) analyse not only the influence of (cross-country) institutional factors 
but also of firm characteristics on their financing structure. Size and profitability of a firm, as 
well as tangibility of assets (ratio of fixed to total assets) or the ratio of book to market value 
are assumed to be correlated with financial leverage. They find that tangibility of assets is 
positively correlated with leverage, while a negative relationship exists between profitability 
of enterprises and leverage. Guiso, Sapienza, Zingales (2002) show empirically that small 












large Italian-based corporations find finance investment in various ways, notably on 
international markets.  
Carlin and Mayer (1998) investigates the link between industry activity, financial industry 
structures and legal environment. Among the manifold indicators considered, they find strong 
evidence that the relations between financial structure and economic activity come through 
expenditures on R&D rather than fixed capital formation.  
Both theoretical and empirical considerations clearly illustrate that various financial 
instruments serve the heterogeneous needs of heterogeneous companies. From a company’s 
perspective another vital question concerns the maturity of financial contracts. In bank-
oriented systems banks provide both short- and long-term finance on a regular basis to all 
types of clients, including large corporations. In securities-oriented systems, corporations 
access long-term finance primarily via capital markets and also raise a considerable 
proportion of working-capital finance via commercial paper programmes. 
Obviously, financial systems react to heterogeneous and changing needs, as is evident from 
the appearance of new instruments, e.g. venture capital. This is consistent with the notion of 
“varieties of capitalism”. At the same time it is clear that other factors, like politics, history, 
or the legal framework (common law systems vs. civil law systems) influence the financial 
system (Roe, 1994; Carlin and Meyer, 1998). This variety of determinants is reflected by the 
heterogeneity of financial systems across countries. While the factors mentioned may play an 
additional explanatory role, it is very hard to control them (Carlin and Meyer, 1998:1).  
2.3.4 Theoretical Models 
Graff (2001: 89) points to the fact that standard works on endogenous growth theory largely 
ignores the potential influence of financial markets. Yet the finance-growth literature 
regularly constructs models on the basis of endogenous growth theory. Pagano (1993) uses an 
AK production function with A being a variable indicating the economy’s general efficiency 
in using the capital stock K. He then goes on to redefine the closed-economy equilibrium 
condition by use of a variable indicating the costs associated with the financial system’s 
activity, i.e. only a fraction of income saved transforms into investment, the rest being used 












In this model the real growth rate can be raised by an increased savings rate, a rise in the 
overall efficiency parameter A or an increased financial system parameter. As the two 
efficiency parameters can be assumed to be significantly correlated, however, it becomes 
difficult to interpret the financial efficiency parameter that is of major interest. A highly 
developed, capital intensive economy uses a relatively high fraction of real income for 
running the financial system, which does not necessarily imply that this system is inefficient. 
To go one step further, by taking into account the costs of a financial system and its ability to 
promote real growth, it should be possible to determine the optimal size of an economy’s 
financial sector (relative to the real economy).  
Based on a theoretical model of Holmstrom, Tirole (1997) and Santomero, Seater (2000) 
claim the optimal size of a country’s financial sector can be determined. Yet their result that 
the optimal relative size is independent of an economy’s state and the business cycle does not 
seem too realistic. Even in the long run and irrespective of the development stage the optimal 
relative size of a financial sector may vary across economies, e. g. because of differences in 
capital intensities. Focussing on transition economies Fink-Haiss (1999a, 1999b) construct a 
model where the size of a financial market converges to a steady-state in the very long-run. 
The speed of convergence depends on the savings ratio and real GDP growth. 
A number of models have been specified in a fashion similar to Pagano (1993). An excellent 
overview of this theoretical strand of the literature can be found in Graff (2001). Several 
studies attempt to model demand-following and supply-leading finance simultaneously. 
Greenwood, Jovanovic (1990) describe a real economy with higher growth resulting from 
improved allocation due to the development of the financial sector which in turn produces a 
more sophisticated and thus more efficient financial sector. They also take into account the 
higher costs of a more sophisticated financial sector. In the model of Berthélemy, Varoudakis 
(1994) reciprocal causality leads to multiple equilibriums and the possibility of being caught 
in a poverty trap. Reciprocity arises due to the assumption of an initially highly concentrated 
financial sector becoming more competitive with the growing real sector which in turn is 
boosted by the increasing efficiency of the financial sector. Saint-Paul (1996) models 
reciprocity as a consequence of learning processes in the financial sector which may also lead 












2.3.5. Evidence from Empirical Studies 
Goldsmith (1969) provided the seminal empirical work linking the performances of the 
financial sector with that of the real economy. He defines a variable FIR (financial 
interrelations ratio) by dividing the aggregate value of financial wealth by total wealth or, 
more operationally, GDP. Amongst his famous twelve stylised facts there is the observation 
that the finance interrelations ratio is increasing steadily, approaching a certain value 
asymptotically. According to the findings reported in this section on size, structure and 
dynamics of financial markets, however, transition economies’ financial interrelations ratios 
do not generally grow faster than those of more developed ones. One could argue that this 
may simply reflect non-linearity and the very short observation period. By contrast, 
Goldsmith’s (1969) observation period ranges from 1860 to 1963. However, a recent study of 
Rajan, Zingales (2001) reveals that even most industrialised countries relapsed from a peak 
level of financial development in 1913 and could not return to this level until the 80s of the 
20th century. 
Industrial countries which have lost their function as important financial centres, like Austria, 
are still far away from their peaks. Starting with Goldsmith’s (1969) study a vast empirical 
literature arose and its growth has gained momentum over the decades to follow. Levine 
(1997), Graff (2000), and Thiel (2001) provide valuable overviews. This study compares and 
reviews the findings of three spheres of research: bank-centred, stock-centred and cross-
country studies on the finance-growth nexus. The review finds that bond financing is still 
widely ignored by the empirical literature.  
Ignoring the bond markets poses a limitation that most empirical studies encounter. Domestic 
growth and therefore the impact of domestic capital sources usually is a core concern of 
macroeconomic policy. A point to bear in mind in this respect is globalisation of financial 
markets. As financial markets continue to integrate, particularly in Europe and indeed Africa, 
the contribution of national financial systems to their national real economies becomes 
increasingly blurred. It has been shown by Thiel (2001) that intra-European capital flows 
have a certain bearing on national savings and investments within member states, a measure 
frequently applied to demonstrate the degree of international financial integration. However, 
while this mirrors the somewhat advanced level of integration of the European wholesale 
financial market, integration in retail financial markets is much less advanced (Schuler and 












slower than expected financial market integration by calling in the Lamfalussy Report and by 
establishing the Financial Sector Action Task Force. Both provide further evidence that the 
country financial markets still are of focal concern. 
2.3.5.1 Cross-country studies 
Morris (1968) provided one of the first cross-country studies involving the relationship 
between the financial and real sector. Finance is not at the centre of attention from the outset 
of this work, but among a number of institutional and socio-economic explanatory variables. 
Financial factors turn out to be among the most significant driving forces of growth. Levine, 
Renelt (1992) and Sala-i-Martin (1997) perform extreme-bounds analyses of growth 
determination on an even broader basis, whereby financial variables are just a few of many 
variables possibly affecting real growth. The result is that a whole range of (non-financial) 
variables explains real growth to some extent, whereas financial variables are ineffective. 
However, as Sala-i-Martin (1997: 182) concedes, this holds true for his search for linear 
relationships, whilst the finance-growth literature regularly postulates non-linearity. Average 
values over longer periods are frequently used for growth regressions. Increasingly, pooled 
data are used with five-year steps (King and Levine, 1992, Berthélemy and Varoudakis, 
1997, Graff, 2001, etc.). 
2.3.5.1.1 Cross-country studies concentrating on banking intermediation 
The cross-country approach has been criticised for ignoring national and regional differences 
of economies by Thiel (2001) and others. Odedokun (1996) and Berthélemy, Varoudakis 
(1997) apply fixed-effect models involving large numbers of countries of approximately 81 
and 82 respectively. Both studies arrive to a considerable extent at results indicating a 
negative effect of money aggregates on real growth. These results conflict with the majority 
of cross-country studies which tend to find positive effects of financial intermediation on 
growth. Berthélemy, Varoudakis (1997) provide a differentiated interpretation of their results, 
arguing that particularly in poverty traps financial systems cannot perform their otherwise 
beneficial function. 
Fourteen out of 21 articles in Table 6 are concentrating on intermediation-related variables 
find a positive relationship between intermediation and real output. One of them is Levine et 


























Table 6: Cross-country studies: banking intermediation covered only 












Method Investigated links Major findings  Additional results 
 Wallich 1969 43 countries  
(no details 
available) 
1956-1965 Real GDP  
growth 
Claims of banks against 
private sector / total domestic 
bank claims; (M1+M2)/GDP 
Investment rate; income 









 Between intermediation 
and growth, if investment 
rate does not enter 
Regression 
 
Investment rate is the key 
factor 
that links financial with real 
development 
Bhattacharyay 1988 45 countries (no 
details available) 
1985/86 Real GDP per 
 capita 









 Gelb 1988 45 countries 
(nodetails 
available) 
1985/86 Growth of real 

















higher credit interest 
rates is positively related 
to real economic 
development 
 
High credit interest rates do 
not harm investment 
 Ghani 1992 52 developing 
Countries 
1965-1989 Real growth per 
capita 
M3/GDP Various variables; on 






financial depth and 
economic growth 
Positive relationship 
between initial financial 
depth and real growth 
 
 
 King, Levine 1992 85 countries (up 
to 19 EU+; up to 
3 ACC) 
1960-1989 Growth of real 
GDP per capita 




government spending / 












between financial and 




with panel approach 
 
 
 King, Levine 1993a Up to 80 
countries (up to 
19 EU+; up to 3 
ACC) 





Liquid liabilities / GDP; 
assets of commercial and 
central banks /GDP; private 
credit / GDP; credits issued 
to private enterprises / GDP; 
credits issued to private and 
public enterprises and local 
governments / GDP 
 
Initial GDP; school 
enrolment; trade 
exposure; government 
spending / GDP; 
inflation 
Panel analysis 











King, Levine 1993b Up to 80 
countries (up to 
19 EU+; up to 3 
ACC) 





Liquid liabilities / GDP; 
assets of commercial and 
central banks / GDP; private 
credit / GDP; credits issued 
to private enterprises / GDP; 
credits issued to private and 
public enterprises and local 
governments 
Initial income; school 
enrolment; trade 
exposure; government 













Case studies and firm-level 
studies: liberalisation of the 
financial market leads to 
higher growth rates, but also 
seems to be related to the 
financial crisis that occurred 
in many countries 3-5 years 



















Dependent variable Explanatory financial 




Method Investigated links Major findings  
          




1950-1988 Real GDP per capita Bank credit to non-financial 
sector / GDP; (M2-M1)/ 
GDP 
Investment rate; 
dummies for countries, 
regions and time 
Panel regressions 
analysis 
Links between banking 
intermediation and state of real 
economic development 
Positive relationship between 
intermediation and real economy 
Japelli, Pagano 1994 30 countries (18 
EU+; 1 ACC) 
1960-1985 Growth of real 
income per capita 
Maximum amount of credit 
accessible for private 









Links between access 
of private households 
to credit and economic growth 
Negative relationship between 
private households’ access to 
credit and real growth 
De Gregorio, 
Giudotti  
1995 95 countries (19 
EU+; 3 ACC) 
1960-1985 Growth of real 
income per capita 
Bank credit to non-financial 
sector 
Investment rate; school 
enrolment; size of 




Links between banking 
intermediation and 
economic growth 
Positive relationship between 
intermediation and real growth 
for whole sample and group of 





1996 24 OECD 
countries (no 
details available) 
1960-1990 Growth of income 
per capita 
M1 Investment rate; 
education; convergence; 







Financial development and 
economic growth 
Positive relationship between 
financial development and real 
growth 











Links between financial depth 
and marginal capital 
productivity 
Negative relationship between 




1997 85 countries 
(details not 
available) 
1960-1990 Growth of real 
income per capita 
ln (M2/GDP) Convergence; investment 
rate; 
inflation; education; 






financial depth and 
economic growth 
Negative relationship between 
financial depth and real growth 
Graff  2000 93 countries (18 
EU) 
1960-1990 Growth of real GDP 
per capita 
Variable composed from 
bank density, relative 
banking sector 
employment and financial 
sector size 
Inflation; regional 
dummies; variables on 










All possible causality patterns 
and occasional negative 
relationships found; supply 




2000 77 countries (19 
EU+; 2 ACC) 
1960-1995 Growth of real GDP 
per capita 
Private credit / GDP; liquid 
liabilities / GDP; credit by 
deposit 





education; initial GDP 













Positive relationship between 
exogenous components of 




















Dependent variable Explanatory financial 










2000 71 countries (19 
EU+; 2 ACC) 
1960-1995 Growth of real GDP 
per capita 
Liquid liabilities / GDP; 
assets of commercial and 
central banks / GDP; private 
credit / GDP (private credit 
from central bank not 
included) 
Legal origin; Legal 
indicators to extract 
external component; 
inflation; trade exposure; 
black market premium 
Cross-country OLS and 














2001 49 countries (19 
EU+; 11 ACC); 
EU+ primarily 
1995 Real GDP per capita Asset ratio and bank 
(density) ratio referring to 
actual numbers relative to 
benchmarks given by 
OECD countries 











number of banks and 
banking sector reform 
(measured by EBRD 
banking rating) on the 
one hand and GDP per 
capita on the other 
Convergence of transition 
economies’ banking 
systems with those of 




2001 17 countries (13 
EU+; 0 ACC) 
1850-1997 Growth of real GDP 
per capita 
Broad money relative to 
GDP 
Initial real GDP; initial 











financial and real sector 
Positive relationship 
between finance and real 
growth is reduced at later 
stages of development 
Rousseau, 
Wachtel 
2001 84 countries (no 
details 
available) 
1960-1995 Growth of real GDP 
per capita 
M3 / GDP; (M3 - M1) / 
GDP; total credit / GDP 











between financial and 
real development 
Relationship disappears 
at high levels of inflation 
Al-Yousif 2002 30 OECD 
countries 
 
1970-1999 Growth of real GDP 
per capita 
M1, M2 / GDP  Panel regression analysis (for time 











Results are country 
specific; for further 





2002 Italian provinces  1860-2000 Growth of real GDP 
per capita; firm 
creation; mark up; 
average age of 
entrepreneurs 
Rejection rate of potential 
borrowers at the local level 
Initial GDP per capita; 
infrastructure; average 





access to credit 
and economic 
growth on the 
local level 
Positive relationship 





only relevant for SME, 












2.3.5.2.2 Cross-Country Studies Covering Intermediation and Securities 
Atje and Jovanovic (1993) employ two different cross-country approaches, one of which 
involves the estimation of a constant-returns-to-scale production function with capital, labour, 
human capital, and financial capital as input factors. Their results show a significant, positive 
impact of capital markets on growth, whereas intermediation variables remain ineffective. 
These remarkable results have been quoted on a regular basis, but caveats have been put 
forward with respect to asymmetries in modelling and data coverage discriminating 
methodologically between the two financial sectors (Graff, 2000: 176 ff.). Furthermore, 
Harris (1997) challenged the results of Atje and Jovanovic, using the same methodology and 
concluded that a significantly higher contribution of capital markets to real growth can at best 
be determined for very few high-income countries. 
Most cross-country studies covering both stock markets and banks find that both sectors are 
positively related to real output. A superior contribution to real output by stock markets 
compared to banks is found by more studies than the opposite (see Table 7). However, an 
overview of the cross-country literature on securities and intermediation markets’ linkage to 
growth supports the view of two complementary sectors serving different needs of an 
economy. Only a few studies cover less developing countries. Haiss (1999) find some 
evidence that particularly in this kind of countries stock market expansion can have a 
detrimental effect to real development. This contributes to the picture arising from other 
studies that economies at low development stages have a relatively higher need for 












Table 7: Cross-country studies: financial intermediation and securities covered 













Method Investigated links Major findings  
          




1960-1984 Growth of real 
GDP per capita 
Proxy variable for 
institutional flexibility 
of financial system 
Investment rate; 







flexibility of financial 
institutions and 
economic growth 
Positive relationship between financial 
institutions flexibility and real growth 
Atje, 
Jovanovic 
1993 94 countries in 
2 groups (15 




Growth of real 
income per 
capita 
Private credit / GDP; Stock 
market turnover times 
investment ratio 






financial sectors and 
economic growth 
Positive relationship between capital 
markets and growth, no effect of 
intermediation 







Shares / credit 
ratio 
Average investment rate; 
population growth; 









No significant relationship between 
financial structure and growth 
Harris 1997 49 countries 
(appr. 19 
EU+; appr. 
1980-1991 Growth of real 
GDP per capita 
Investment ratio * 
stock market 







financial sectors and 
economic growth 
Very limited positive relationship 
between capital markets and growth 
only for high-income countries, 




1998 30 countries 
(14 EU+; 1 
ACC) 
1980-1985 Additional firm 




Bank deposits / GDP; Stock 
market Capitalisation; and stock 
market turnover 










financial sectors and 
firm growth 
Positive relationships 
between availability of 




1998 47 countries 
(17 EU) 





Bank credit / GDP (bank credit 
loans by commercial banks and 
other deposit taking banks) ; 
Capitalisation of Domestic listed 
Companies / GDP; value traded / 
GDP; Volatility of share returns 
Initial output; enrolment; 
number of revolutions 






financial sectors and 
economic growth 
Strong positive relationship between 
both financial segments and economic 
growth; no negative effects caused by 
share volatility or international capital 
market integration 






















Explanatory financial variables 
I: banking intermediation  
Control variables, 
other variables 
Method Investigated links Major findings  
          
Rajan, 
Zingales 
1998 41 countries 
(15 EU+; 1 
ACC) 
1980-1990 Growth of real 
value added 
Total capitalisation (domestic 
credit + stock market 













and growth of 
companies dependent 
on external finance 
Companies depending on external 
finance grow faster in economies with 






1999 21 OECD 
countries (19 
EU+) 
1960-1990 Real output 
growth per 
capita 
Liquid liabilities and credit to 
nonfinancial sector / GDP 
Stock market Capitalisation / 
GDP 
Investment rate; export 
growth; inflation; 







financial sectors and 
economic growth 
Positive relationship only 
for stock market 
Carlin, 
Mayer 
1999 27 industries 









Interaction variables linking 
financial variables with 
Industry specific characteristics 













Industries with heavy dependence on 
R&D are very positively affected by 
financial development Investment in 
R&D is more important for growth 




1999 150 countries 
(no details 
available) 
1990-1998 Real GDP per 
capita 
Various variables covering the 
financial structure size and 
efficiency of intermediaries 
Various variables covering 
financial structure, size and 
efficiency of stock markets 
 
 Correlation analysis 
Links between 
financial sectors, 
financial structure and 
economic growth 
Positive relationship between legal 
environment, financial market 
development and growth Relatively 
stronger development of capital 
markets in developed countries and of 
intermediaries in developing countries 
Fink, 
Haiss 
1999 27 countries 
(17 EU+; 10 
ACC) 






financial sectors and 
real sector 
Positive relationship between banking 
and real growth. Furthermore, Bonds are 
substitutes for bank credit; stock markets 
have a weak or even negative impact on 
real growth, particularly in some EU 
accession countries 
























Explanatory financial variables 
I: banking intermediation  
Control variables, 
other variables 
Method Investigated links Major findings 















Combined indicators of 
intermediation and capital 
markets referring to financial 
structure, financial development 
market depth etc. 









legal framework and 
economic growth 
Link between legal factors 
and output, but no link 
between financial system 




2000 40 countries (18 
EU+;0 ACC) 
1989-1996 Additional firm 




Bank assets Stock market 













structure and firm 
growth 
Finance-friendly legal rules positively 
influence positive relationship 
between financial sectors and growth of 
firms depending on external finance; 
























No links between stock 





2001 21 countries (18 
EU+; 0 ACC) 
1971-1998 Growth of real 
GDP per capita; 




Liquid liabilities / GDP; private 
credit from deposit banks / GDP 
















(particularly stock market) 
and real sector 
Cetorelli, 
Gambera 
2001 41 countries (16 
EU+; 1 ACC) 
1980-1990 Growth of real 
value added in 
manufacturing 
industries 
Domestic credit; banking 
concentration 








financial sectors and 




development and growth of 
value added in 
manufacturing industry 






















Explanatory financial variables 
I: banking intermediation  
Control variables, 
other variables 






2001 19 countries 




Private credit from deposit banks 
/ GDP; liquid liabilities / GDP 
Stock market capitalisation / 
GDP 
Real long-term interest 
rate; output growth; 
inflation and its variation; 
public revenue and 

















Financial development and finance-
friendly legal framework enhance 
growth via innovation; All financial 






2001 9 countries (9 
EU+) 
















No correlation between financial 
variables and industry performance 
Claessens, 
Laeven 




1980-1989 Growth of real 
value added 
Private credit / GDP; Cash flow Various legal indicators, 
especially dealing with 
property rights; country 
specific 











and property rights on 
one hand, and growth 
of companies 
depending on external 
finance on the other 
Companies depending on external 
finance grow faster in economies with 





(15 EU+, 1 
ACC) 
1980-1989 Country pair wise 
correlation of 
industry growth 
Private and credit / GDP; 
Stock market capitalisation / 
GDP 
Relative importance of 
government ownership of 
banks, trade openness, 
other variables on 








and the correlation of 
same-industry growth 
across countries 
Growth opportunities can only be 
exploited (indicated by highly correlated 
industry growth across countries), when 
the financial sector is well developed 
Hahn 2002 23 countries 




Bank credit to the private sector / 
GDP; liquid liabilities / GDP; 
Stock market capitalisation / 
GDP 
Value traded and 
turnover (in order to 




















effects of financial 
markets 
Only minor causal links between 
financial development and economic 
growth, but a strong relationship because 













2.3.5.3 Time-Series Studies 
Whilst cross-country studies usually assume that a possible link between the financial and the 
real sector must run from finance to the real economy, time-series prominently address the 
question of causality. This is mostly done by use of Granger causality tests. Uni-directional 
causality patterns relatively stable over several decades under research has been found very 
rarely through time-series research. Empirical evidence in favour of the Patrick (1966) 
hypothesis that a supply-leading pattern characterises early stages of financial and more 
general economic development is weak. The same is to be noted about the Gerschenkron 
(1962) hypothesis which states the opposite pattern in the long-run. 
2.3.5.3.1. Time-Series Studies Concentrating on Banking Intermediation 
The study of Jonung (1997) is unique in that it examines a country (Sweden) over a long time 
period which is suitable to test long-term causal patterns in the sense of Patrick (1966) or 
Gerschenkron (1962). Their co-integration analysis shows bi-causality between bank credit 
and real GDP per capita for most of the time from 1834 to 1991 and supply-leading for 1890-
1934.  
Al-Yousif (2002), who applies both a cross-country and a time-series approach in his 
contribution, also finds bi-directional causality to be the dominant, yet not the only 
observable pattern. Rousseau, Wachtel (1998) find evidence for supply-leading finance in 
USA, Canada, UK, Sweden, and Norway for the period of 1871 to 1929. Most other studies 
find very unstable causality patterns across countries and time. Overall, time-series studies 
concentrating on intermediation produce rather mixed pictures, as regards causality. Supply-













Table 8: Time series studies: banking intermediation covered only 






Economic variable Explanatory financial 
variables I: banking 
intermediation 
Method Investigated links Major findings  
         
Fritz  1984 Philipines 1969-1981 Variable composed 
from 
7 output indicators 
Composition from 10 
monetary indicators;  
Granger causality tests Links & causality between financial 
deepening & economic development 
Supply-leading  1969-1975 & 1975-1981 





Index of industrial 
production 
M1; M2; M3; private 
credit 
Granger causality tests Links and causality between banking 
intermediation and industrial production in 
developing countries 
Supply-leading in 8 out of 14 developing 
countries, bidirectional causality in 6 
countries 






Growth of real GDP 
per capita 
Cash/M2; M2/GDP Granger causality tests Links and causality between financial 
deepening, financial structure and 
economic growth 
No general causality pattern; supply-leading 
more likely to occur in developing countries, 
demand-following more likely 
in developed countries (for cash / M2) 





Real GDP per capita Cash/M2; M2/GDP Granger causality tests Links and causality between financial 
deepening, financial structure and income 
in developing countries at different financial 
development stages 
Supply-leading more likely in developing 
countries with lower financial development 
Wood 1993 Barbados 1946-1989 Growth of real GDP M2/GDP Granger causality tests Links and causality between financial 
deepening and economic growth 
Falsification of Patrick hypothesis: demand-
following 1946- 1986, supply-leading 1969-
1990 







Real GDP per capita M3/GDP; (M3-
Cash)/GDP 
Granger causality tests Links and causality between financial 
deepening and economic growth 

















Continued: Time series studies: banking intermediation covered only 






Economic variable Explanatory financial 
variables I: banking 
intermediation 
Method Investigated links Major findings  
Demetriades, 
Hussein 
1996 16 countries  
(3EU+; 1 ACC) 
1960-1995 Real GDP per capita Bank deposit liabilities 
/GDP; bank claims on 
private sector /GDP 
Granger causality tests Causality between banking intermediation 
and economic growth 
Little evidence for supply-leading, 
some for demand following; bi- 




1997 Sweden 1834-1991 Real GDP per capita Bank credit to non-financial 
sector per capita 
Co-integration analysis and 
Granger causality tests 
(investment per capita as 
conditioning variable) 
Co-evolution of banking intermediation and 
real income 
Mostly unstable relationship between 
intermediation and output; supply-
leading 1890-1934; positive influence 




1998 USA; Canada; 
UK; Sweden; 
Norway 
1870-1929 Growth of real GDP 
per 
Capita 
Money base; various 
proxies for intermediation 
based on bank deposit and 
credit 
Granger causality tests 
(VAR framework) 
Links and causality between banking 
intermediation and economic growth 
Supply-leading in early phase of 
economic development 
Al-Yousif 2002 30 developing 
countries 
1970-1999 Growth of real GDP 
per capita 
M1, M2 / GDP Granger causality tests in error 
correction model (for panel 
data analysis see overview 1) 
Links and causality between banking 
intermediation and economic growth 
Strong evidence for bi-directional 
causality; limited evidence for other 
patterns; for further additional results 












2.3.5.3.2 Time-Series Studies Covering Intermediation and Securities 
Time-series analysis covering both banking intermediation and stock markets provide some 
particularly heterogeneous evidence on the links between the financial and the real sector 
(Table 9). Demetriades (1997) applies Granger causality tests to Germany and the USA, 
whereas the former country shows supply-leading finance, no uni-directional causality 
pattern can be found for the latter. Neusser, Kugler (1998) use financial sector GDP of 13 
OECD countries from 1960 to 1997 as an explanatory variable and find the whole range of 
possible causality patterns, varying across countries and time. Shan, Morris, Sun (2001) find 












Table 9: Time series studies: banking intermediation and securities covered 









variables I: banking 
intermediation 
Financial  variables II, 
securities 








Real GDP per 
capita 
M2/GDP (Germany); 
domestic bank credit 
/ GDP (USA) 
Stock market 
capitalisation / GDP; 
Stock market volatility 
(16-month standard 




tests and system 
exogeneity 
analysis 




Cross-country analysis  
oversimplifies results; links 
between financial sectors and 
growth are different in 
Germany and USA: causality 
from financial to real sector 
for Germany; no evidence for 





1998 13 countries 
(13 
EU+) 

















financial sector and 
growth 
MGDP and FGDP are co-
integrated in 7 countries; 
MTFP and FGDP are 
cointegrated more often; 
evidence for causal 
relationships from the 
financial to real sector only 
for USA, Japan and 
Germany; and evidence for 
the inverse direction in some 
other countries; no evidence 
for causal relationships 
in small countries 
Shan,  Morris, 
Sun 
2001 10 countries 









Growth of real 
GDP 
per capita 
Bank credit / GDP (bank 
credit = loans by 













5 countries show bi-
causality, 3 demand-












2.4 Summary of Empirical Evidence 
The possible relations between the financial and the real sector can be categorised by the 
following five basic hypotheses as alluded to in this section: 
• no causal relation 
• demand-following 
• supply-leading 
• negative causal link from finance to growth 
• interdependence 
Hypothesis (1) appears to be falsified by the majority of empirical studies under review. 
Evidence for the existence of some kind of relationship between finance and growth is high. 
Hypotheses (2) and (3) have been tested by a number of time-series studies, distinguishing 
between different countries and different time periods. Both supply-leading and demand-
following patterns have been observed. The evidence found, however, is strikingly 
heterogeneous in both the regional and the time dimension. To date we have little insight in 
which factors cause the different causality patterns observed. Further research is necessary to 
solve this issue. 
2.5 Conclusion 
The exact nature of the relationship between finance and growth has been the subject of heated 
debates for many years. Consequently, many models and empirical studies have been proposed 
to shed light on this issue. One strand of this literature investigates the positive link between 
financial sector and economic growth while the other investigates the causal relationship. This 
section is part of that literature. 
The approach taken to investigate the link between the financial sector and economic growth 
focused on the role of the financial sector in promoting growth from the African point of view 
and then broadening it on international studies. It is motivated by the scant empirical evidence 
that prevails in Africa on this important issue. Empirical research on the links between finance 
and growth in Africa is still limited. However the existing evidence seems to suggest that 
financial market development is positively related to the growth rate of income. Research is 
constrained by lack of detailed information that can allow one to assess the extent to which 












Secondly, it is clear from the few empirical studies on the African continent that the evidence of 
the issue of causality is at best mixed with no clear cut results supporting one hypothesis. 
Furthermore, as seen from the trends and patterns of financial development in literature so far, it 
would be expected that the result would be a distortionary rather than a promoting effect of 
financial markets on regional economic development. Empirical studies on this issue for SSA 
have yielded mixed results which are discussed in section 2.2.6. Evidently, some studies suggest 
that financial factors have enhanced economic growth in the past, e.g. by positively influencing 
the levels of investment or capital accumulation. Others find that the impact of financial 
development on growth has been rather negligible. The issue of finance-growth causality is by 
far not settled. This is supported by the empirical studies of: Ghirmay (2004), who finds strong 
evidence of a virtuous circle between financial development and economic growth. Also 
Atindehou et al. (2005) whose results indicate the opposite causal effect between finance and 
growth, with finance and growth exhibiting only a weak causal relationship. 
Two issues come out from this review: (1) that most studies which have been done on the 
African continent are based on cross-country or panel regression, (2) that the few countries 
conducted on a country specific level appear to be misspecified in that only two or three 
variables are included in their models and therefore may suffer from omission of variables and in 













Financial Sector Development in the Study Countries 
3.1 Introduction 
The financial development in the three study countries differs from country to country and over 
time. The banking sector in South Africa is well developed but concentrated, with the five largest 
commercial banks – Standard Bank of South Africa, Nedbank, Amalgamated Banks of South 
Africa (ABSA, now majority-owned by Barclays Plc), First Rand Bank and Investec Bank – 
holding over 86% of the banking sector’s assets. There are 18 registered banks, two registered 
mutual banks, 15 registered branches of international banks with combined assets of 
approximately ZAR 2 trillion. The sector also has 1,354 micro-finance institutions. Commercial 
banks are supervised by the South African Reserve Bank (SARB), whereas other financial 
institutions and the financial market fall under the supervision of the Financial Services Board 
(FSB). There is a trend towards closer co-operation with the insurance sector, with alliances 
developing between the major banks and insurance companies. Foreign participation in South 
Africa’s banking sector is concentrated in corporate and investment banking (South African 
Reserve Bank Annual Report, 2005). 
The Johannesburg Stock Exchange, formed in 1887, is one of the largest stock exchanges in the 
world by market capitalisation. The South African financial sector consists of the South African 
Reserve Bank, commercial banks, insurance companies, micro-lenders, the Development Bank 
of Southern Africa, the Land Bank, unit trusts, the Post Bank, and the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange, among others. The South African Reserve Bank can be considered to be independent, 
even though there is some degree of consultation between the bank and the government. 
According to the South African Constitution (Act No. 108 of 1996), “The South African Reserve 
Bank, in its quest of achieving its primary objective, must perform the functions independently, 
but there must be regular consultation between the bank and the cabinet member responsible for 
national financial matters”. The South African Reserve Bank relies entirely on indirect 
instruments of monetary policy, namely open market operations, reserve requirements, and credit 
facilities, amongst others. Although South Africa is considered to have one of the most 
developed and sophisticated financial systems in sub-Saharan Africa, its market share, as in the 












1990s, for example, more than 95 per cent of the banks’ total assets were held by only four 
banking groups, whilst the remaining 5 per cent were spread among 27 local banks, nine foreign-
controlled banks, a few branches of foreign banks and some mutual banks.  
Though not as sophisticated as the South African financial sector, the Kenyan financial sector is 
considered to be well developed, with a number of specialised financial institutions (see 
Legovini, 2002). By 2004, the financial system comprised 43 commercial banks, 2 non-bank 
financial institutions, 4 building societies, 75 foreign exchange bureaus, 2 mortgage finance 
companies, a large Post Office Savings Bank and a well-established Nairobi Stock Exchange, 
among others. Currently, there are about 41 commercial banks, 2 non-bank financial institutions 
(NBFIs), 2 mortgage finance companies and 89 foreign exchange bureaus, amongst others.  
The Central Bank of Kenya has implemented a number of institutional and monetary policy 
reforms in order to increase competition in the financial sector and to strengthen its regulatory 
and supervisory roles. The amendment of the Central Bank Act in April 1997 gave the Bank 
greater monetary autonomy. Though required to support the general government economic 
policy, the Central Bank of Kenya has independence in exercising the powers conferred on it by 
the Central Bank of Kenya (Amendment) Act 1996. Although the financial sector in Kenya has 
undergone substantial financial and economic reforms over the last decade, the sector is still 
dominated by a few banks, just as in the case of South Africa. For example, by 1998 it was 
estimated that only nine banks controlled 70 per cent of the market share. This can be partly 
attributed to the financial distress in the 1990s when the number of commercial banks placed 
under the statutory management of the central bank increased fivefold: from one in 1994 to five 
in 1998. 
Unlike South Africa and Kenya, the financial system in Zambia is still in its infancy. The system 
is mainly bank-centred. The financial deepening and widening has not reached the expected 
level. The financial market is underdeveloped and there is no significant development of leasing 
institutions, housing finance institutions, hire purchase and retail credit companies. The long-
term lending sector remains underdeveloped with small and weak contractual saving institutions 
and a relatively small stock exchange (Lusaka Stock Exchange), which was only established in 
1993 and became operational in 1994. As a result, money and capital intermediaries such as 
dealers, brokers and discount houses have not developed to the expected level (FSDP, 2004). 
The banking sector in Zambia is relatively small and less developed when compared to those of 












dominated the banking sector. This scenario has remained the same up to this day. In 1990s, the 
government implemented a number of policies in order to strengthen the development of 
financial institutions in Zambia. These do not seem to have yielded much result. Currently there 
are about 13 commercial banks, 14 micro-finance institutions, 10 leasing companies and 1 
savings and credit bank. The rest of this chapter details the financial sector development in the 
three countries starting with Kenya, followed by South Africa and then Zambia. 
3.2 Kenya 
Kenya, an east African country, has worked for economic stability since its independence from 
Britain in 1964. Despite efforts of government and central bank, the country remains in a pattern 
of external debt and domestic deficits, with sluggish gross domestic product (GDP) growth. This 
sluggish growth pattern, coupled with low domestic savings and repressed financial sector, has 
prevented Kenya from achieving the growth it has envisaged.  The following section, discusses 
the sluggish macroeconomic trends, which characterise Kenya’s position. 
3.2.1 Macroeconomic Trends for Kenya  
Kenya’s gross domestic product (GDP) for 2003 was 1.04 trillion Kenyan shillings or 13.8 billion 
US dollars. Kenya’s recent GDP growth can be characterised as sluggish at best and varying 
somewhat dramatically from year to year. In the 1960s and 1970s, GDP growth fluctuated 
significantly from 23 percent to minus 5 percent, the result of a variety of factors, including political 
independence from British rule, world oil shortages in the early 1970s, increase in world demand for 
coffee (one of Kenya’s major exports) in 1976 and 1977, and the collapse of the East African 
Community in 1977. 
                  Figure 1: Real per capita GDP & GDP growth (1965-2004) 
 












(The EAC was an economic partnership among Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania that failed due to 
ideological differences).
 
Since 1980, Kenya’s GDP growth has stabilised relative to the 1960s and 
1970s but still shows marked variation from year to year. Within the past 15 years, GDP growth has 
mostly been below 3 percent (See Figure 1). This growth, while slow, is comparable to overall 
African GDP growth which has been between 3 to 4 percent for the past 10 years (IMF, World 
Economic Outlook). 
While Kenya’s economy has shown positive growth in recent decades, population growth has 
outpaced GDP growth, and the result is a declining per capita GDP and a declining standard of 
living. Figure 1 shows the trend in the resultant declining per capita GDP over those years. 
Population growth in Kenya has been relatively steady for the past 40 years, varying only from 2.5 
percent to slightly over 4 percent during that time. Since the 1980s, population growth has been on a 
steady decline. Since fluctuations in GDP growth are the reason for periodic declines in Kenyan per 
capita GDP and, further, since population growth is largely out of the control of government policies, 
increased and steady GDP growth is the key to improving the standard of living in Kenya. 
When the key drivers are segmented into three sectors (i.e., agricultural, service and industry) 
over the period 1963-2004, agricultural growth fell from 5 percent in the 1970s to less than 1 
percent in the 1990s. In the industrial sector, output growth fell from a buoyant 11 percent in the 
1970s to a mere 4 and 2 percent in the 1980s and 1990s respectively. Growth in the service 
sector where financial sector is included declined as well from 8 percent in the 1970s to 5 and 3 
percent in the 1980s and 1990s (Figure 2). 
           Figure 2: Growth by sector 
 












The relatively stronger performance of the service sector affected the composition of the 
economy. Between 1963 and 2000, services gained share from 44 to 60 percent of value added 
while the share of agriculture fell from about 38 to only 23 percent (Figure 3 Composition of 
Value Added). Employment in agriculture dropped accordingly from 87 percent of the labour 
force in 1963 to 77 percent in 1999. 
The growth rates experienced in the 1970s were the result of a combination of favourable 
factors. In agriculture, the newly independent government had successfully distributed 
productive land to small farmers and promoted the cultivation of cash crops such as tea, coffee, 
and hybrid maize and the development of dairy farming. As a result of this and good market 
conditions, rural incomes rose by 5 percent a year from 1974 to 1982, and the smallholders' share 
of coffee and tea production rose to 40 and 70 percent respectively in the early 1980s, as did the 
varieties of maize produced (Swamy, 1994).  In the 1963-1980 period, sustained commodity 
exports provided foreign exchange earnings, which favoured investment and capital imports 
(Figure 3). In industry, a mutually benefiting alliance between business and the body politic 
provided the rationale for implementing an industrial strategy based on import-substitution. The 
approach afforded high barriers to entry to importers and disincentives to export growth. It 
delivered high growth rates for the sector in the first years of implementation even though it 
relied too heavily on capital intensive technology to provide for the growth in employment 
policymakers had hoped for. It also set the basis for an inefficient and rent seeking industrial 
sector. 
                      Figure 3: External Balance for Kenya 
 












Starting in the early 1970s several factors started to negatively affect Kenya’s growth potential. 
Among them a series of trade shocks, poor macroeconomic responses, and a change in the 
structure of the economy in which the government started to become an increasingly dominating 
force. 
The government expanded largely. Its expenditures increased by 60 percent in 1972-94. The 
fiscal imbalances that accompanied the expansion put pressure on domestic credit and inflation. 
Domestic credit provided by the banking sector expanded from 12 percent of GDP in 1966 to a 
peak of 56 percent in 1992.  Money and quasi money swelled from a low 27 percent of GDP in 
1988 to a high 45 percent in 1997, an election year. And, from a low average of 5 percent in the 
1960s, inflation fluctuated between 10 and 20 percent annually from the mid-1970s to the mid-
1980s, and accelerated further in the 1990s reaching a peak of 46 percent in 1993 (CPI) (Figure 
4). 
         Figure 4: M2/GDP, Commercial Bank Credit/GDP & Inflation 
 
                  Source: World Development Indicators 
Changes in the structure of the economy were set off by a rapidly expanding state-owned 
enterprise sector. Involved in manufacturing, financial services, and processing and marketing of 
agricultural products, it engendered distortions and inefficiencies. Large financing requirements 
of parastatals, combined with favouritisms from the state-owned banking sector crowded out 
private sector production and investment. The absence of productivity gains in the state-owned 
enterprise sector significantly lowered productivity gains in the economy overall. Furthermore 












policies increased inefficiencies and decreased the economy’s capacity to adjust to changing 
external conditions.  
Policy response was also weak (Njunguna, 1994). When the natural market afforded by the 
regional customs zone with Uganda and Tanzania broke down in 1977, Kenya failed to 
implement the needed policy shift towards a more export-oriented approach. Instead, it 
continued to protect local business. Even weaker was the response to the oil crises. 
The rapidly deteriorating terms of trade of the 1970s led to the balance of payments crises of 
1974 and 1978-80. With the first oil shock the terms of trade fell 24 percent (1972-75); rose 41 
percent in the next two years with the coffee boom; dropped again 28 percent with the second oil 
shock; continued falling all through the 1980s another 30 percent; and finally improved to pre-
shock levels by 1994 and thereafter (Figure 5). The external balance followed a similar pattern, 
falling in the red during the first oil crisis, recovering during the coffee boom, and falling again 
in the aftermath of the second oil shock. The deficit in the trade balance has persisted to the 
present with the exception of 1994, the year after the 81 percent devaluation of the Kenyan 
Shilling (Figure 5). 
           Figure 5: Terms of Trade & external balance 
 
                  Source: World Development Indicators 
The government reacted to the crisis by imposing controls on bank lending, licenses on foreign 
exchange transactions, import quotas, and price and interest rate controls. While restrictions on 
domestic credit were later lifted, the others were made even more stringent. These generated 












Ndung’u, 1999). Real interest rates were negative from 1974-78, and domestic savings 
plummeted in 1975 and 1979 and never fully recovered (Figure 6).  
         Figure 6: Real interest rate, Gross Fixed Capital formation & Domestic Savings 
 
         Source: WDI, World Bank  
The coffee boom of 1976-77, while easing the economic crisis, was used to delay the necessary 
economic adjustment. Both fiscal and monetary variables expanded rapidly, and so did state-
owned enterprises. Government expenditures rose by 37 percent in the two years between 1977 
and 1979. Money (M2) grew 18 percent and domestic credit 23 percent in one year (1978/77). 
Investment of state-owned enterprises rose a stunning 14 percentage points of gross domestic 
income between 1978 and 1982 (from 17 to 31 percent), adjusted downward after 1982 and 
climbed back to 31 percent by 1990.  
As state-owned banks financed low-productivity public investments, investment efficiency fell. 
Returns on public investment averaged a meagre 0.2 percent as compared to a 15 percent return 
on private investments (GoK, 1982).  Real interest rates followed an upward trend from 1978 
onwards and so did interest rate spreads reflecting the higher levels of uncertainty in the 
economy, the increasing number of non performing loans and low investors’ confidence (Figure 
7). Domestic savings declined from a high of 27 percent of GDP in 1977 to a low 7 percent in 
the year 2001 (compared to about 15 percent average in sub-Saharan Africa). Gross fixed capital 
formation (% of GDP) followed a similar trend by falling from a high of 25 percent in 1978 to 15 
percent in 1997 (Figure 6) and rose slightly thereafter to an average of 16.6 percent between 












                      Figure 7: The Interest rate spread for Kenya (1990-1995) 
 
                 Source: World Development indicators 
3.2.2 Structure of financial sector 
During this period Kenya financial sector had 21 commercial banks which were dominated by 5 
big banks with approximately 69% of total commercial bank deposits. These five banks were the 
most important mobilisers of financial savings. In the 1970s and early 1980s, the growth of 
NBFIs was rapid, from 11 in 1976 to 35 in 1984, of which 15 were owned by commercial banks. 
The impetus behind this growth was clearly a favourable differential in interest rates that the 
NBFIs could pay on deposits, which at the time was effectively about 3%, above what the 
commercial banks were paying. 
The expansion of NBFIs and the differential regulatory environment attracted deposits away 
from commercial banks, especially the parastatal deposits. This contributed to the segmentation 
of the financial market. Four large banks operated as a “gentleman’s club” retaining strong ties 
to multinationals and adhering to conservative lending practices (Swamy, 1994). In addition, the 
operations of government-owned DFIs, which provided equity and term loans to industrial 
enterprises, had further negative effects on the financial markets (World Bank, 1992). First, they 
worsened the segmentation of the financial markets. Their activities, characterised by low 
funding costs, large spreads and high arrears, made the commercial banks even more reluctant to 
provide lending. Second, the DFI sector was heavily subsidised from the central government and 
represented a significant drain on budgetary resources due to the institutions’ poor performance. 
At the time the financial sector was being threatened by three issues (GOK, 1984). First, the 












proportion of available credit away from the financial system. For example, the public share of 
credit from domestic financial institutions increased from 29% in 1979/80 to 43% in 1981/82; by 
1987, this share had increased to 47% (see tables 10). 
This increasing crowding out of private sector borrowers by the public sector led to the rationing 
of credit to the private sector, with less favoured borrowers getting less of their credit needs. 
Even by the late 1980s, the position had not changed. Empirical work by Killick and Mwega 
(1993) showed that an increase of Ksh1 million in the banking system credit to the public sector 
would result in a Ksh0.36 million reduction in credit to the private sector. This portrays high 
levels of crowding out and is consistent with the indicators in Table 10. 
Table 10: Macroeconomic Indicators, 1975-1980 
Period DC public DC private 
1975 33 67 
1976 33 67 
1977 28 72 
1978 27 73 
1979 29 71 
1980 25 75 
1981 33 67 
1982 43 57 
1983 39 61 
1984 39 61 
1985 38 62 
1986 44 56 
1987 47 53 
1988 41 59 
1989 36 64 
1990 43 57 
1991 42 58 
1992 35 65 
1993 33 67 
              Source: IFS, Central Bank of Kenya, Statistical Review and Economic Surveys  
Second, the capacity of the system to provide long-term local currency finance for productive 
investment in the form of equity and term loans had been declining. The problem was diagnosed 
as both policy and institutional weaknesses (GOK, 1984). From the institutional side, the DFIs 
were financially weak because of poor portfolios while the markets for equity and debt securities 
were undeveloped. On the policy side, the short-term lending rates were higher than the long-












Third, the rapid growth of NBFIs led to the creation of financially weak deposit taking 
institutions that could (and did) collapse under financial pressure and shake public confidence in 
the financial system. Furthermore, the bulk of deposits in these institutions were from 
government owned corporations (parastatals). Any policy changes in the parastatals or the 
government could trigger an out-flow of deposits. The consequence of these factors was that the 
commercial banks provided short-term finance, mainly overdrafts, because they obtained the 
bulk of their funds through short-term deposits. The end result was a financial system oriented 
towards the provision of short-term finance (GOK, 1984). 
As the expansion of the NBFIs thrived on deposits from the parastatals, the 1984-1989 
Development Plan set out to change the operating environment (Ndii, 1996). The plan noted that 
the expansion of the small banks and the NBFIs emanated from an increase of parastatal and 
trust fund deposits, which grew from 12.1 percent in 1980 to 22.3 percent in 1984 (Table 11). On 
the other hand, the ratio of NBFIs deposits to commercial bank deposits increased more than 
two-fold in the same period, indicating a growing competition for business between the 
institutions. This growth difference was attributed to weaknesses in the regulatory framework, 
where NBFIs were subjected to less stringent controls compared to commercial banks. NBFIs 
were not subjected to the statutory reserve requirement and were allowed to lend at higher 
deposit rates compared to commercial banks (Ngugi, 2000). 
Table 11: Financial sector development during reform era (1990-1996) 








1980 28.1 12.1 34.7 
1981 27.6 12.9 36.3 
1982 27.4 14.6 39.0 
1983 25.4 21.8 45.5 
1984 25.8 22.3 54.8 
1985 25.2 21.9 57.1 
1986 28.1 19.0 52.1 
1987 28.9 13.6 52.6 
1988 26.6 13.9 55.7 
1989 27.1 14.5 56.6 
Central bank of Kenya, statistical review 
 The plan noted that the assets were higher in the NBFIs than in the commercial banks and thus 
questioned the policy of differential returns (market segmentation in general). This reflected a 












the 1986 confidence crisis in the financial sector. The collapse of some banks and NBFIs caused 
a panic in the financial sector and deposits shifted to the large banks. Thus the crisis emanated 
from the weaknesses in the policy formulation; the situation further strengthened the monopoly 
of the large banks and did not help improve financial sector development.  
The report on financial and money markets in Kenya (GOK, 1984) argued that one of the priority 
areas for development of Kenya’s financial system was the securities market. A developed 
securities market would improve the allocative efficiency of savings mobilised for investment. 
At the time, the situation in practice was that the issue of new equity and debt securities by 
business firms was controlled by the government through a capital issues committee set up under 
the Ministry of Finance in 1971. Due to this control and the fact that the stock market had no 
legal framework to enforce its operations, business firms rarely raised capital through public 
issues of equity and debt securities. The main sources of local equity and new investments were 
retained earnings, group or family savings, direct government investment, and development 
banks. For debt financing, firms relied to a large extent on direct borrowing, largely through 
overdrafts from banks and other financial institutions. 
A secondary market trading in long-term securities was operated by six stockbrokerage firms 
based in Nairobi. A private association of these brokerage firms, formed in 1954 under the 
Kenya Cooperative Societies Act, is now the Nairobi Stock Exchange (NSE). For a long time, 
until 1989, the stock exchange had no physical trading floor and was not regulated by specific 
securities legislation or a securities commission. The stock exchange operated according to rules 
and regulations adopted by the members in 1954 and amended in 1981. 
It was against this background that the government, with the help of the World Bank, undertook 
financial sector reforms under the package of structural adjustment. But again there were policy 
errors. Interest rates were liberalised in 1991, in complete disregard of the pre-conditions 
necessary for successful financial sector reforms according to Montiel’s (1995) four-step 
liberalisation sequence: 
• Restore macroeconomic balance together with restructuring or liquidating ailing financial 
institutions; 
• Introduce indirect monetary instruments with freely determined interest rates together 












• Foster competition in the banking sector, by encouraging more domestic and foreign 
banks and reducing government shareholding in the financial sector; 
• Liberalise interest rates and remove all forms of administrative controls on the financial 
sector. 
In addition, successful reform requires that the government maintain the following conditions: an 
appropriate legal framework; well established property rights and an efficient judicial system; a 
financial safety net to avert a liquidity crisis; an adequate regulatory and monitoring framework 
to prevent collusion and excessive risk taking due to moral hazard problems; a potentially 
successful borrowing class and Fiscal adjustment. 
The above preconditions relate to both institutional and macroeconomic reforms. It is not 
surprising that in the assessment of the Financial Sector Adjustment Credit (FSAC), the World 
Bank (1992) argued that in a vastly under-regulated and under-supervised financial system, 
interest rate liberalisation came too early. This encouraged over competition in the financial 
system and encouraged weak financial institutions to invest in riskier assets, thereby adding to 
their difficulties (World Bank, 1992). The ensuing legislative reform measures had little impact 
since even though the technical capacity of the supervisory department of CBK was improved, 
political forces weakened enforcement. It was estimated that 11 banks and 20 NBFIs were in 
financial distress in 1992 (Swamy, 1994). 
3.2.3 Direct Controls in Kenya 
Financial repression in Kenya dates back to the 1960s, after independence. At independence, 
Kenya inherited a financial system composed of East African Currency Board (EACB) and 
commercial banks dominated by foreign banks. These banks concentrated mainly on short-term 
commercial and trade finance with few branches to serve the country (Ngugi and Kabubo, 1998). 
To ensure that resources are allocated in line with the development strategy, the government 
opted for direct participation in the banking system.7Against this background, new institutions 
were established to collect savings and financial investment. Among the financial institutions 
established were the Development Finance Institutions under the ownership of the government. 
Banks were also directed to lend to priority areas such as agriculture and small scale business.  
                                               
7 One of the objectives of development strategy at the time was to “nationalise” the economic management, and 












Apart from the ownership the government other controls were initiated and these included: 
control of interest rates and selective credit allocation schemes. These monetary controls were 
implemented through liquidity asset ratios and cash reserve ratios which were imposed on the 
commercial banks and the NBFIs, and through credit ceilings imposed on commercial banks 
based on historical market share of each institution. The central Bank of Kenya also set 
minimum deposit and maximum lending rates of interest for both commercial banks and NBFIs 
(Killick and Mwega, 1990). Real interest rates for both deposits and loans were negative during 
the 1970s, but after nominal rates were raised in 1982, real loan and time deposits remained 
higher than inflation throughout the rest of the decade.  
Despite these efforts, the financial sector that developed between 1963 and 1986 was in many 
ways unsatisfactory for the efficient development of the economy. It was not capable of 
generating adequate amounts of equity and long-term debt finance for private projects in all 
sectors of the economy. Interest rates were controlled in the commercial banks, treasury bill rates 
were set by the government, there was no real secondary market for the treasury paper and the 
capital market was biased towards loan finance rather than equity (GOK, 1984). Government 
paper was composed of short-term 90-day treasury bills and long maturity bonds with very low 
rates. The short-term securities dominated by government paper did not effectively serve the 
private sector. There was thus no continuum between the money and capital markets and the 
rates of return did not reflect the true cost of capital (Mullei, 1995). 
The banking sector was dominated by four large banks with a long tradition of working together 
rather than of aggressive competition. This hampered the conduct of monetary policy since more 
indirect policy instruments could only be expected to work well in a context of competitive 
banking and financial systems (Killick and Mwega, 1993). The DFIs developed by the 
government to channel capital to emerging entrepreneurs effectively failed. They were hampered 
by portfolio weaknesses and could not raise domestic funds, particularly for equity. The Banking 
Act was not particularly effective in controlling under-capitalised financial institutions. 
The origin of the non-bank financial constitutions (NBFIs) can be traced to the policy 
environment in the 1970s. The government policy at that time was to encourage specialised 
institutions for the collection of savings and the financing of investments. These institutions 
thrived and expanded tremendously due to three factors. First, the Banking Act of 1968 eased 
entry requirements into the banking sector for indigenous entrepreneurs by setting low share 












NBFIs and commercial banks and foreign NBFIs and commercial banks. This bias was further 
reinforced in subsequent modifications and amendments in the 1980s. Second, controlled interest 
rates in force during the 1971s and 1980s favoured the NBFIs over the commercial banks. 
Finally, the NBFIs and the small indigenous commercial banks thrived on parastatal deposits, 
particularly deposits from the National Social Security Fund and the National Hospital Insurance 
Fund. As such, they enjoyed a preferential policy environment but were also vulnerable to any 
policy change regarding these deposits. These factors ensured a tremendous growth in the 
NBFIs. 
Thus, during the 1970-1983 period, the government licensed new banks and NBFIs in an effort 
to increase local Kenyan participation in the financial system (World Bank, 1992). The NBFIs 
were not subject to statutory reserve requirements and were allowed to lend at higher rates than 
the commercial banks. As a result, NBFI assets tripled during 1980-1985, from Ksh6.5 billion to 
Ksh19 billion, while commercial bank assets doubled over the same period. This expansion of 
the NBFIs outstripped the ability of the central bank to supervise their activities effectively. 
There was also the argument that the economy was “over banked”. 
The ensuing amendments to improve Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) surveillance caused the 
commercial banks to expand into NBFIs in order to avoid more stringent requirements. These 
NBFIs were also undercapitalised and overexposed. An increasing proportion of deposits were 
being placed with them since they were not subject to controls on interest rates or credit. The 
effectiveness of monetary policy was thus weakened. The stock market, for its part, operated as 
an informal club with no protection and no laws to prosecute insider trading (Mullei, 1995). 
3.2.4 Effects of Government Intervention on Financial Sector System 
Although government intervention in the financial system had been extensive, Kenya had 
managed to avoid some of the most damaging features of the financial repression that 
characterised several other countries in the sub-Saharan countries, and this is reflected in the 
expansion of the financial sector system in terms of volume of both liabilities and assets and the 
diversity of its institutions over the three decades since independence (Brownbridge, 1998). 
Whereas in 1966 the broad money to GDP ratio was 22.9 percent, this figure improved to 38.3 
percent in 1992. The same happened to the liquidity liability of banking system which saw the 
figures improving in 1966 to 50.6 percent in 1992 (see Table 12). Despite the interest rate 
ceiling, interest rates were not sufficiently unattractive to the investors and this was largely due 












did not prevent Kenyans from acquiring the assets in the financial sector system and in turn this 
led to the provision of resources for financial intermediation in the banking sector. 
Table 12: Financial Indicators (1966-1992) 
Year 1966 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1992 
M2/GDP 22.9 30.4 28.6 30.6 26.7 29.7 38.3 
Liquidity/GDP   33.8 38.8 39.1 43.3 50.6 
Banking system claims 
on public sector 
0 1.2 9.1 9.1 15.2 15.9 11.3 
Banking system claims 
on private sector 
12.8 15.1 21.8 30.2 31.5 32.8 30.2 
Source: IMF, IFS and World Development Indicators 
Public sector deficit was large, but access to foreign capital, together with the size of the 
domestic financial sector system helped to ensure that private borrowers were not crowded out of 
the domestic credit market. As a result credit advanced to the private sector system by the 
commercial banks during the 1970s averaged 76 percent of the net domestic credit and 59 
percent during the 1980s. 
Furthermore, because the repression of the financial sector system was not so severe, few of the 
private sector financial institutions had the quality of their financial assets compromised or 
profitability impeded through direct controls of allocation of credit to government preferred 
institutions. However, apart from Kenya Commercial Bank, government intervention into the 
financial sector system had contributed to poor performance of many other financial institutions 
and in particular DFIs. 
3.2.5 Deregulations in Kenya 
The period 1980-84 marked the first and failed attempt at economic adjustment: partly because 
commitment to reform was limited to a few top civil servants, the government failed to carry out 
trade reforms and liberalise grain marketing. Broader consensus was achieved during a second 
period of adjustment in the second half of the 1980s and some trade liberalisation measures were 
successfully put into place. Not so for agricultural reforms that lagged severely behind. 
Implementation remained weak and commitment uneven. One major flaw was that structural 
adjustment took place within an environment of severe fiscal laxity (Swamy, 1994). The 
beginning of the 1990s marked a third wave of reform when interest rates were liberalised and 












progress was also made in reducing government intervention in the economy by privatising state-
owned enterprises, and liberalising agricultural markets.  
3.2.5.1 Financial Policy Reforms 
Kenya has a fairly well developed banking system that comprises 47 banks, 5 non-bank financial 
institutions, 4 building societies and 47 exchange bureaus. The four largest banks hold 55 
percent of gross assets and deposits (IMF, 2002b). Two of these banks are foreign-owned and 
private and two are local and partially government-owned. Since its creation in 1982, banking 
supervision has been under the responsibility of the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK). Prudential 
regulation has traditionally been weak but has been strengthened in recent history. However, 
regulatory enforcement is lacking and continued political interference in the court system hinders 
efforts of banks and liquidators to resolve lending and contractual disputes. The Capital Markets 
Authority controls licensing and supervising of brokerage, asset management, rating and other 
capital market institutions.   
As discussed in the previous sections, financial controls and political interests distorted banking 
in Kenya. The ‘political banks’ were local institutions founded by the business and political 
elites to exploit contacts in parastatals to enlarge their deposits and engage in murky 
development schemes. Furthermore, development finance institutions were set up by the 
government in the 1960-70s, which specialised in lending to particular sectors. Among them was 
the Agricultural Credit Corporation. Without exception, poor portfolio decisions rendered these 
institutions unprofitable and financially unsustainable.  
Initial reforms in the banking sector in the early 1980s responded to the concern that foreign 
owned banks had a majority share in the Kenyan market. Financial institutions proliferated as 
licensing requirements were relaxed. Lack in uniformity in banking regulation across different 
types of institutions allowed near bank financial intermediaries to avoid interest rate ceilings and 
attract deposits from commercial banks by offering higher deposit rates. In 1986, poorly 
enforced regulations on capital and reserve requirements resulted in the failing of four 
commercial bank groups that owned large near bank financial intermediaries (Swamy, 1994). By 
1989, many more financial institutions were on the brink of failing.  
To facilitate reforms, the banking Act was amended in 1989. In addition to strengthen the 
Central Bank’s regulatory and supervisory roles, other areas affected by the amendments 












minimum capital requirement, the establishment of the deposit insurance funds, new guidelines 
for granting loans and minimum disclosure requirements, and increasing penalties for non-
compliance. 
Nevertheless, enforcement of the banking regulations even after the amendments of the Banking 
Act continued to be hampered by political forces, leading to a new banking crisis in 1986 when 
two banks and twenty NBFIs faced liquidity problems. Thus, reforms in the later part of 1980s 
and early 1990s emphasised tight credit controls to suppress inflation. This was achieved in part 
through adjustment of cash ratio requirement for commercial banks and raising of interest rates. 
The political factors seem to have persisted and in 1989 several banks and financial institutions 
were in crisis and placed under statutory management control while others were liquidated. 
The financial reforms that followed in 1990 were aimed at removing all charges and fees from 
the ceiling of commercial bank rates, which allowed the effective interest rate to exceed the 
ceiling. In 1991, the auction market for government bills and bonds was established. Still the 
government arranged most transactions directly with financial institutions to try to minimise 
interest payments (Swamy, 1994). These arrangements impeded the development of secondary 
markets for government paper. Other reforms included the establishment of a cash reserve ratio 
and the imposition of liquidity ratios on commercial banks and other financial intermediaries.  In 
1999, prudential regulation was strengthened to safeguard against major risk activities of the 
banks and capital requirement for financial institutions raised from KSh 75 million to KSh 300 
million, effective January 2002, and KSh500 million, effective in 2005 (IMF, 2002b). 
To date, the restructuring of the banking system and the establishment of a strong regulatory 
enforcement mechanism remain on the unfinished agenda. As a result, the banking system 
remains fragile and vulnerable to the extremely high and growing ratio of non-performing loans 
(41% in 2001 up from 25% in 1998 and 20% in 1997) (IMF, 2001b). These loans are held 
predominantly by public banks, which have traditionally given credit priority to parastatals, 
irrespectively of sound financial practice. Public banks display a level of unprovisioned non-
performing loans equal to 260 percent of equity capital. This is one of the factors behind high 
real interest rates. The restructuring of these banks remains an issue. In addition, the 
segmentation of the market where large banks cater to multinational concerns and state-












3.2.5.2 Foreign Exchange Reforms 
Kenya has in recent past undertaken significant reforms of foreign exchange markets with a view 
to removing exchange controls on most current account transactions as well as the capital 
account. Imports and foreign exchange allocation licenses have been abolished, except for a 
small negative list for security and health reasons, and most restrictions on foreign direct 
investment eliminated. Kenya has acceded to Article VII of the IMF Articles of Agreement, 
whereby all transactions on the current account are free of controls. However, foreign 
participation in the Nairobi Stock Exchange has not yet been fully liberalised.  
Kenya has also progressively moved to market determined exchange rates. Exchange rates are 
determined by the interbank market for foreign exchange and the Central Bank of Kenya 
intervenes only to buy whatever foreign exchange it needs to buy for its own use or that of the 
Government to service external debt. Accordingly, determination of the exchange rate of the 
Kenya shilling has been fully liberalised. More recently, in order to enhance the convertibility of 
the Kenya shilling, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda have agreed to make their currencies 
convertible into each other. Thus the currency of each country can be quoted in the financial 
markets of the other.  
The shift to market determined exchange rates has, however, not been without problems as the 
value of the Kenya shilling oscillated from one end to the other depending on developments both 
at home and abroad. However, the currency now appears to have stabilised around Ksh 55.0 to 
US$ 1.0.  
3.2.5.3 Bank Interest Rate Reforms 
Kenya has progressively moved towards market determined interest rates. This process started in 
late 1980s with ceilings on deposit interest rates being adjusted upward periodically and ceilings 
on lending rates of commercial banks being moved closer to those charged by non-bank financial 
intermediaries. These changes progressively led to harmonisation of interest rate structure in 
Kenya.  
The most notable development in the process of moving towards market determined interest 
rates occurred in 1990 when the Central Bank of Kenya removed the requirement that ceilings on 
loan interest rates had to include any levies and charges imposed by commercial banks. This 
allowed effective interest rates on loans to significantly exceed the ceilings. Kenya has at present 












financial markets. Commercial banks and non-bank financial intermediaries are now free to set 
their own interest rates based on demand and supply for financial resources.  
Kenyan monetary authorities are of the opinion that despite the diversity of the Kenyan financial 
structure and the large member of institutions, the country’s financial sector is far from being 
competitive. This is reflected in the ‘wide spread’ between deposits interest rates and lending 
rates; which at times have been as much as 12 percentage points. The authorities argue that a few 
major commercial banks continue to dominate the financial sector.  
The management of commercial banks argue, however, that interest rates spreads in Kenya 
reflect to a large extent the following factors: high cost of raising funds and lending them; credit 
premium risk associated with bad and doubtful debts; and high labour costs in the industry. 
Furthermore, management of banks argue that because of the dispersion of the Kenyan 
population over a wide area, setting up branches in rural areas can be an expensive exercise. 
Furthermore, in 1994 the Government imposed on banks a wage increase of 45 percent which 
the institutions have had to filter through to clients through higher lending rates. 
Financial institutions have welcomed the current system of determining interest rates, which is a 
significant improvement on the previous process where the Central Bank of Kenyan set ceilings 
on both deposits and lending rates. However, financial institutions in Kenya recognise that the 
current mechanism for determining interest rates is far from being perfect because of the 
underdeveloped nature and narrowness of the interbank market. Nonetheless, liberalisation of the 
financial sector has injected greater competition for financial savings in Kenya’s financial 
system. 
3.2.5.4 Other Institutional Reforms 
In order to improve on regulation of financial institutions which fall beyond the category of 
commercial banks and non-bank financial institutions, Kenya is considering establishing a 
"Financial Services Board." This would be an overall regulatory body for the financial sector in 
the country. (c) Revisions in the Capital Markets Authority Act.  
The Nairobi Stock Exchange (NSE) has been in existence since 1954 and initially operated as an 
informal association of stock broking firms. However, in 1990 the Government of Kenya 
established the Capital Market Authority (CMA) through an Act of Parliament. The Authority 
was created in order to provide legal, regulatory and supervisory framework for capital markets 












made to the rules and regulations governing operations of the Nairobi Stock Exchange (NSE). 
The Capital Markets Authority Act defines the roles and responsibilities of the various actors in 
the market and provides for implementation of investor protection measures by the Authority. 
The mandate of the CMA includes promoting the development of capital markets in Kenya.  
Several policy and institutional measures have been introduced in recent years in order to 
improve the operation of capital markets and to stimulate the development of such markets. 
These measures have focused on enhancing the returns from equity investments in order to 
reduce bias favouring debt instruments and also to improve the institutional framework. Policy 
changes have included: removal of the Capital Issues Committee’s role in regulating share 
issues; elimination of the double taxation of dividends by conversion of the withholding tax into 
a final tax; elimination of the corporate tax on the dividend income of unit trusts; exemption of 
the withholding tax on the dividend income of corporate tax-exempt bodies, such as pension 
plans; abolition of stamp duties on retail share transactions; and deductibility of all costs incurred 
in issue of shares, debentures and bonds. Furthermore, rules regarding foreign participation in 
the Nairobi Stock Exchange have been relaxed.  
As regards institutional framework, a number of measures have been introduced focusing mainly 
on restructuring the Nairobi Stock Exchange in order to make it more representative of the 
market and also to provide investor protection. The Board of the Capital Markets Authority 
(CMA) has been converted from one controlled mainly by stock broking firms, to a more broad-
based one comprising of five stockbrokers, two representatives of listed companies, three people 
representing various interest groups (institutional investors and retail dealers), and the Chief 
Executive of the Nairobi Stock Exchange.  
The Amendment Act of the CMA also gave the Capital Markets Authority, the powers to 
propose rules and regulations regarding the operations of capital markets in Kenya, including 
issues pertaining to foreign participation in such markets. The rules regarding foreign 
participation in the Nairobi Stock Exchange were previously dictated by Kenya's foreign 
exchange control regulations. The CMA Act also gives the Authority powers to license 
stockbrokers and traders on the Nairobi Stock Exchange. The CMA Amendment Act also dealt 
with the ‘rights issues’ and ‘accounting procedures’ to be adhered to by stockbrokers and 
dealers. In order to list on the Nairobi Stock Exchange, a company is required to produce balance 
sheets of its operations for the last five years, and for those that have been in operation for a 












In order to enhance further the operations of capital markets in Kenya, the Government intends 
to create a ‘Central Depository System’ for capital instruments and to encourage the 
establishment of ‘Rating Agencies’. The legal, regulatory and supervisory framework for capital 
markets has been significantly enhanced and improved in Kenya. Nonetheless, the markets are 
far from vibrant as one would have expected with the liberalisation that has taken place. Activity 
on these markets could be even more vigorous if a ‘secondary market’ for Government Treasury 
Bills and Stocks were to emerge and the Government was to accelerate the process of 
privatisation of state-owned enterprises. Indeed, activity on the Nairobi Stock Exchange was 
significantly buoyed by the Government of Kenya having offered some of its shares in the 
Commercial Bank of Kenya and the National Bank of Kenya to the public.  
3.2.6 Experience with the Financial Reforms 
First and foremost, it has been alluded to that the reforms initiated by the government of Kenya 
in the 1980s were intended to achieve a number of objectives which included among many 
others: First, stimulation of the financial savings and deposit mobilisation through higher real 
deposit interest rates. Second, higher lending rates was going to encourage a more efficient 
allocation of loanable funds by reducing rent seekers.8 Third, reforms were aimed at reducing or 
eliminating the distortions which was prevailing as a result of administrative controls, such as 
those between commercial banks and NBFIs and this was suppose to create a more dynamic and 
efficient financial sector system (Ngugi & Kabubo, 1998).  
3.2.6.1 Impact of reforms of interest rates on savings 
From data available for the era 1982 to 1990, there was little evidence to suggest that the 
increased real interest rates which occurred between 1982 and 1990 had positive impact on 
savings and deposit mobilisation. Deposit Interest rates in both commercial banks and NBFIs 
rose as a percentage of GDP from 24.2 percent in 1981 to 31.7 percent in 1993 but the rate of 
increase was less than in the 1970s when real deposit rates were lower. Mwega et al. (1990) 
tested the impact of changes in real deposit rates on private sector savings and financial savings 
defined as currency and deposits held in the banks and NBFs. Their results did not yield any 
support for the proposition that real deposit rates had a significant positive effect on either 
private or financial savings (see Table 13). 
                                               












Table 13: Nominal and real interest rates (1975-1990) 
Year 1975 1980 1985 1990 
Commercial banks’ lending rate 10.0 (-7.9) 11.0 (-2.5) 14.0 (0.8) 19.0 (2.9) 
Commercial banks’ deposit rate 5.1(-12.0) 7.0 (-6.1) 11.3 (-1.6) 14.5 (-1.0) 
NBFIs’ lending rate 12.0 (-6.0) 14.0 (0.1) 19.0 (5.2) 19.0 (-1.0) 
NBFIs’ deposit rate 7.5 (-10.0) 11.0 (-2.5) 14.5 (1.2) 18.0 (2.1) 
Treasury bills rediscount rate 5.7 (-11.5) 5.6 (-7.3) 14.1 (0.9) 15.9 (0.3) 
Consumer price index (% change) 19.4 13.9 13.1 15.6 
Source:  Quarterly Economic Review and IFS   
Figures in parentheses refer to real interest rate interest rate.  
3.2.6.2 Impact of Financial Reforms on Efficiency 
It has been argued that the impact of reforms which took place to enhance efficiency of 
allocating credit in Kenya is hard to determine empirically. Brownbridge (1998) points out that 
most of the intended consequences intended are of microeconomic nature as opposed to macro 
and that makes it hard to determine whether the effects have taken place or not. For instance, 
raising real lending interest rates may not improve resource allocation in credit market if the 
distortions remain elsewhere in the economy. This position was buttressed by the World Bank 
(1983a) study on FSAC which found that the efficiency of the financial sector reforms in 
improving credit allocation was limited because the demand for credit from high yielding 
investment projects was depressed by the constraint in the real sector such as poor infrastructure 
and price controls (World Bank, 1993a). 
3.2.6.3 Impact on Reforms on Competition during 1970s and 1980s 
According to Brownbridge (1989), reforms which were implemented during the 1980s era seems 
to have yielded some positive results on improving the market efficiency of the financial sector 
system. For instance, with the removal of interest rates ceilings, deposits rates appear to have 
become more competitive. Many of the commercial banks and NBFIs were now actively 
competing for deposits and this was evident through advertisements they were putting up 
through the media. Services were also improved by the NBFIs and this was followed up by 
introduction of additional products in the market such as credit cards. On the other hand it must 
be pointed out that there was less competition in credit markets where the local banks had a 
disadvantage in servicing the loan requirement by big customers because of capital constraint. 
Despite the evidence of competition in some segments of the financial sector, the system is said 
to have remained oligopolistic in nature, with large banks operating a cartel in setting interest 












Commercial Bank) were shielded from more aggressive completion because of their size and 
nature of their clientele. 
The effort to enhance competition in the financial sector system through reforms of the 1980s 
and early 1990s was also hindered by the deterioration of public finance in the early part of the 
1990s. This period witnessed the government increasing its bank borrowing to fund fiscal deficit 
which was equivalent to around 8 percent of GDP in 1992/3. This act on the financial sector 
system led to rapid increase in money supply and inflation which jumped from the rate of 30 
percent in 1992 to 46 percent in 1993. In order to resolve the problem the government through its 
Central Bank raised the Treasury bill rates to 70 percent by the mid-1993. Despite the 
deregulation of interest rates, by 1993 banks were still reluctant to revise their interest rates to 
match those of Treasury bills or the rise in inflation. One of the reasons advanced for this, is that 
of fear of insolvency of some of the borrowers. 
3.2.6.4 Impact of Reforms during the 1990s on Financial Sector 
During this period of reforms, a number of NBFIs converted to banks or merged with the parent 
commercial banks. As a result the number of NBFIs reduced from 52 in 1990 to 24 in 1996, 
while commercial banks increased from 26 to 48 in the same period. By 1996, 11 NBFIs had 
converted to commercial banks while 4 had obtained permission to start business as banks. Thus, 
50 percent of new banks were mainly as a result of conversion from the NBFIs. As such there 
was a marked decrease in the assets of NBFIs while the assets of commercial banks went up. 
As indicated in Table 14, the ratio of the NBFIs deposits to commercial bank deposits reduced 
from 66 percent in 1990 to 16.7 in 1996, while the commercial bank structure changed such that 
time deposits were 83 percent of the total deposits in 1996 compared to 62.3 percent of 1990. In 
view of this growth in commercial bank liabilities was very minimal reflecting mainly the 
transfer of liabilities from NBFIs to commercial banks. At the same time GDP growth rate was 
slow and as the figures indicate, when GDP growth rate showed a downward trend, M2/GDP 











Table 14: Financial sector development during reform era (1990-1996) 










1990 31.4 28.7 43 57 4.2 16.1 66.0 
1991 33.6 30.3 42 58 2.1 16.5 59.1 
1992 38.8 36.5 35 65 0.5 16.7 51.1 
1993 39.0 36.0 33 67 0.1 16.3 42.4 
1994 40.6 40.6 41 59 3.0 15.0 37.5 
1995 41.4 45.0 33 67 4.9 10.2 25.6 
1996 45.1 50.4 29 71 4.6 7.5 16.7 
Source: Central bank of Kenya, statistical review 
On the asset side, the advances/deposit rate indicated a declining loan advance up to 1993 and an 
increase later that mainly reflected financial repression. With regard to the depth of the financial 
sector, the trend indicates that the sector achieved financial deepening with an increase in 
M2/GDP ratio. However, these results may be attributed to the conversion of NBFIs to 
commercial banks, which represented a transfer of liabilities and not an actual increase in 
financial assets and liabilities, which implies no financial deepening (Ngugi, 2000). This line of 
thought is supported by the marginal increase in the deposits of commercial banks. The rate of 
growth of deposit was also volatile, thereby reflecting that the interest rate was volatile and 
negative. 
On the issue of the ratio of commercial bank credit to total, the variable indicates stagnation in 
the trend while the advanced/deposit ratio (proxy for demand for credit) was lower compared to 
NBFIs ratio. This result partly reflects a shift for quality assets among the commercial banks. 
Loans were not attractive with increase in uncertainty in the risky environment characterised by 
macro-instability. These factors were compounded by increase in bank bad debt, and high 
reserve requirement that penalised the banks as an implicit tax, thereby making commercial 
banks charge higher lending rates. These higher charges on loans discouraged further borrowing 
from private sector, while at the same time encouraging increased distressed borrowing. 
3.2.6.5 Effect on Interest Rate – 1990s 
Interest rates were negative in real terms immediately after the liberalisation and were highly 
volatile, gaining unrealistically high positive real interest rates in 1995/96. This was a sign of 
financial distress. The interest rate spread between lending and deposit rates also widen thereby 
indicating the high inefficiency which was prevailing in the financial sector system (see figure 
8), increased macro-instability increasing the risk premium, weakness in the legal framework 












reserve requirement that acts as an implicitly tax. This wide margin on interest rates reflects 
failure to achieve competitiveness in the financial structure where four large banks continued to 
dominate the market, while the increase in the reserve ratio acted as a deterrent for entry of new 
firms into the market.  
3.2.7 Summary 
The financial sector reforms adopted by the government in Kenya had varied effects on the 
development of the financial sector development and in particular banking sector system. The 
government repression policies took the form of establishing government owned commercial 
banks, imposing direct controls over interest and credit. The reforms also involved less stringent 
rules for NBFIs as opposed to commercial banks. Despite all these policies inflicted upon the 
financial sector system, the repression effect on the financial sector is said to have been less 
severe and that it did not prevent the development of the financial sector in terms of depth and 
diversity. One important development since the early 1970s is the entry of local financial 
institutions into the banking sector system. This has led to a situation where the banking sector is 
not dominated by the foreign banks, but equally dominated by the foreign and local banks. 
During the 1980s, a number of reforms were implemented. These included the gradual phasing 
out of the interest rate and credit controls. Reforms also included the changes to the banking 
regulation laws and creation of bank deposit insurance fund (Deposit Protection Fund). After the 
bank crisis the banks which were found wanting, were taken over and merged to form the 
government-owned bank in 1990. The Central Bank of Kenya closed down some of the failed 
financial institutions and two large government owned banks; the National Bank of Kenya on the 
other hand was restructured 1990 after it was found to have problems.  
One of the most dynamic features of the Kenyan financial sector has been the rapid expansion of 
local NBFIs, and commercial banks in recent years. This development has been stimulated by 
the feeling that more of the economic sectors have not been adequately serviced by the existing 
banks. The growth of NBFIs though encouraging at face value has been rather complex in that 
the mushrooming of these institutions came as a result of regulatory policies which were tailored 
to favour them as opposed to levelling the playing field in the banking sector. 
On the regulatory part of the banking financial sector system, it has been argued in literature that 
this has not been very effective. For instance, following the bank crisis of the mid-1980s, the 












However, these changes were undermined by the political interferences which rendered the 
Central Bank of Kenya to be ineffective as the Central Bank was prevented from carrying out the 
inspection. This trend has since been reversed with inspections now being conducted out both on 
sight and off sight. 
In summary, the banking sector in Kenya, though not as developed as South Africa, is 
considered much better and more developed than most of the other sub-Saharan countries which 
include Zambia. Furthermore, despite the repression of the financial sector prior to 1990s, and 
the piece meal policies which were initially implemented by the government, the issue of 
financial disintermediation was avoided. Results also appear to be encouraging as the financial 
sector systems seem to have weathered the storm.  
3.3 South Africa 
South Africa’s macroeconomic history depicts steadily worsening growth performance but 
reasonably sound short-run macroeconomic dynamics (Moll, 1992).  
        Figure 8: Real GDP Per Capita and Growth of Real GDP. 
 
                     Source: South Africa Reserve Bank, quarterly bulletin 
Post-world war II growth history of South Africa displays two characteristics of a long-term 
decline in the pace of expansion and increasing volatility. This is illustrated inFigure 8: growth 
averaged around 5 percent per annum in the 1960s, but then declined steadily to below 2 percent 












1980s and worsening employment conditions; the proportion of the labour force without formal 
jobs rose from 19 to 40 percent between 1970 and 1990.  
According to Strydom (2002), structural changes, the high cost of apartheid, sanctions, and 
economic disruptions from abroad were important factors in explaining this poor performance. 
During the 1960s and early 1970s the economy operated under growing government 
intervention. The structural problems of the time related to the policy of imports substituting 
industrialisation, and high tariff barriers. Although the need for high tariff barriers had run its 
course by the 1970s the government continued to enforce these policies to avoid any shortages of 
strategic materials because of the threat of sanctions. 
In the mid 1970s these interventionist trends were compounded by the oil crisis and the Soweto 
Uprising, followed in the early 1980s by a slowdown in the world economy, and the growing 
sanctions and disinvestment movements against the country. The government reacted by 
imposing strict controls on the flow of international capital, forcing South African companies to 
invest domestically. Because of the degree of protection offered to these companies, it gave them 
little or no incentive to train and skill their workforce in order to improve productivity and 
become internationally competitive. Disinvestment also led to the intensification of the 
concentration of ownership in the economy as large South African conglomerates bought out the 
foreign multinationals. The effect of this on employment was indirect: slowing economic growth 
as well as declining investor confidence created fewer employment opportunities than might 
otherwise have been the case. 
Furthermore, Figure 8 illustrates that growth has not only been steadily declining, but has also 
been highly volatile. This volatility appears to have been primarily a response to a series of 
external and internal shocks, rather than a natural business cycle. There were two main sources 
for these shocks: politics and gold. 
The political struggle had a rising influence on economic conditions over time. After Sharpeville 
(1960) growth barely faltered; a year after Soweto (1976) the economy experienced zero growth 
for the first time since the war and by the 1980s there were several years of negative growth, 
interspersed with partial recoveries, with rising internal violence and the imposition of external 













South Africa’s external trading position was affected by both developments in world commodity 
markets and sanctions. The first oil price shock, along with sanctions, appears to have led to a 
significant worsening of the non-gold terms of trade. However, gold saved the day for the 
economy at least until the early-1980s. Gold price increases in the late 1970s offset the 
developments on the non-gold account and this led to a mini-boom in 1979-80. Overall changes 
in the terms of trade were quite moderate for two decades. 
3.3.1 Macroeconomic Trends of South Africa 
The above shocks were reflected in a range of macroeconomic outcomes as discussed below. 
Five changes are emphasised here: 
3.3.1.1 The Balance of Payments 
Mohr (1999:309) holds the view that “the pace of economic activity and direction of economic 
policy in South Africa have frequently been governed by the state of the balance of payments.” 
During the 1950s and 1960s South African economic policy was based on a mixture of import 
substitution and commodity exports. The import substitution strategy relied on a sizeable 
domestic market and high tariff barriers. As the importance of mining diminished, it became 
clear that the import substitution did not have the desired effect of limiting the growth of the 
current account deficit. This was propounded by the increase in domestic demand for imports of 
goods and services. During this time the deficits were largely financed through net inflows of 
foreign capital. 
However, following the domestic and political unrest of 1976, the deficit on the current account 
could not be supported by the capital account, as net outflows of foreign capital were recorded, 
as is reflected in Figure 9 and Figure 10. This led to a balance of payments constraint on 
economic activity. To overcome the problem, South Africa had to access foreign financing and 
pursue domestic policies that constrained domestic demand. The result was a long and severe 
economic recession. However, towards the end of the 1970s an international commodity boom 













       Figure 9: Current account balance, 1965-04 (% GDP) 
 
            Source: South African Reserve Bank, Quarterly Bulletin, Various. 
 
            Figure 10: Financial account balance, 1965-04 (% GDP) 
 
                  Source: South African Reserve Bank, Quarterly Bulletin, Various. 
After the foreign debt crisis of 1985, when the government imposed repayment restrictions on 
foreign debt after foreign banks had refused to roll over short-term loans, South Africa was cut 
off from foreign financing and was forced to run a surplus on the current account. In addition to 
the debt repayment problems, South Africa experienced massive capital flight, leading to a 
sustained deficit on the capital account. From 1985 balance of payment considerations often 
dictated macroeconomic policy. This once again necessitated a contraction policy on the part of 












account, with monetary policy severely curbing domestic spending. These restrictive monetary 
measures remained in place well into the 1990s, having a profoundly negative effect on the 
creation of employment and on economic growth in South Africa. 
Since the re-entry of South Africa into global markets in 1994, the current account has tended to 
move into a deficit position. This has largely been financed by high real interest rates that have 
attracted considerable amounts of short-term capital. The high interest rates have, however, 
constrained investment, as well as dampened employment creation and growth. The fact that the 
balance of payments is still a major constraint to economic policy means that South Africa has 
no option but to rely on a strong export orientated growth path. The role of the financial sector 
within this type of strategy is clear and being sufficiently addressed through the reforms. 
3.3.1.2 Savings and Investments 
Savings and investment are crucial prerequisites for sustainable growth and development. From 
Figure 11, it can be seen that both savings and investments, as a proportion of GDP, have fallen 
consistently since the mid 1970s. 
                     Figure 11: Gross savings and total investments (% of GDP) 1965-04 
 
                  Source: South African Reserve Bank, Quarterly Bulletin, Various. 
Furthermore, it is evident here that the average gross savings as a percentage of GDP reached a 
peak of 28.7% in the period 1976-1980, decreasing to 14.9% for the period 1996-2000. 
Similarly, the average gross investment as a percentage of GDP decreased from a high of 28.5% 












are, amongst other things, low levels of domestic saving, adverse labour developments, the 
impact of sanctions and disinvestment, and the weakening exchange rate (Du Toit, 1998). 
Another important factor was the decline in public investment, which fell (for the period 1980-
1990) from 12-13% of GDP to less than 6%. 
According to Jones (2002) the South African economy would have to achieve an investment 
ratio of 25% in order to sustain the growth rates necessary to create sufficient employment 
opportunities in the formal economy. Without this level of investment unemployment will 
increase. While it is accepted that foreign direct investment can help growth, it is limited to a 
maximum sustainable level of around 2-3% of GDP. Ultimately, then, it is the level of national 
savings that will determine the resources available for creating employment. Mokate (2000) 
concurs that the critical issue is the extent of government saving required in order to create 
employment in South Africa. 
3.3.1.3 The Budget Deficit 
One of the key indicators of fiscal stance in South Africa is the budget deficit, as measured by 
the difference between government revenue and expenditure, as a percentage of GDP. Referring 
to (Figure 12) the budget deficit in South Africa, with the exception of the years 1974-1975 and 
1978-1979 and between 1992-1993 and 1993-1994, has been small, and at times in surplus. The 
large deficits in the 1970s may be attributed to the significant surge in apartheid-related 
expenditure and the cost of security and defence (Annett, 1996). In the early 1990s the increase 
in the deficit was caused by an increase in expenditure, which was not offset by an increase in 
revenue. 













                  Source: South African Reserve Bank, Quarterly Bulletin, Various. 
The need to fund social upliftment and public investment saw government capital expenditure 
increase from 1.7% of GDP in the 1991-1992 fiscal year to 2.8 and 3.9% in the fiscal years 
1992-1993 and 1993-1994, driving government expenditure up from 29.2% of GDP in the 1991-
1992 fiscal year to 33.1 and 34.6% in the fiscal years 1992-1993 and 1993-1994, when revenue 
as a percentage of GDP remained constant (Department of Finance, 1997). 
The trend in fiscal policy in South Africa had been very restrictive throughout the 1980s, and 
especially in 1990. This was followed by an abrupt reversal in policy stance, which was more 
‘relaxed’ after 1993. Since 1995 fiscal policy has been tightened considerably, broadly in line 
with the prescriptions of GEAR. GEAR takes the view that if the government deficit is 5% or 
higher, private investment would be crowded out.  
Mokate (2000:60) underscores the fact that there are differing points of view amongst 
economists about whether or not deficit spending leads to ‘crowding out’ or ‘crowding in’ of 
private investment. Government expenditure may actually ‘crowd in’ private investment. Mokate 
gives the example of expenditure in rural areas: infrastructure and human resources would likely 
increase the amount and profitability of private investment opportunities. The recent surpluses 
largely reflect the prescriptions of GEAR. The results of these efforts were passed onto the 
private sector in tax cuts, while budget deficits were reduced to under 2% in 2002. 
3.3.2 Key Drivers of the Economy 
 Figure 13 analyses the sectoral contributions of various sectors to the GDP for South African 
economy. The aim of this analysis is to examine whether the financial sector is an important 
contributor to GDP and growth, relative to other key sectors (e.g., manufacturing, agriculture, 
mining and quarrying), of the economy. Through rank analysis (i.e., ranking the various sectors 
in terms of their contribution to GDP), it was found that the financial sector increased in 
importance from being number 6 in 1960 to number 1 in 2004, hence indicating the importance 
of the sector in relative terms in the national economy. In relation to other sectors of the 
economy, it is the only sector that displayed considerable improvement in terms of its 
contribution to GDP. It can be inferred that the financial sector is a dynamic sector of the 
economy. Also worth mentioning here is the fact that though mining has always played a very 
vital role in the economy of South Africa, its contribution in relation to others (such as 












Figure 13: Trends in Percentage Sector Contribution to GDP (1965-2005) 
   
 
Source: South Africa Reserve Bank 
3.3.3 Overview of the Financial Sector in South Africa 
There are two levels of formal financial sector in South Africa, the institutional and market 
levels. At the institutional level are the banking and non-banking financial intermediaries 
whereas at the market levels are the stock market, the bond market, the money market and the 












3.3.3.1 The Banking Sector in South Africa 
At the apex of the banking system is the South African Reserve Bank, which is the primary 
monetary authority and custodian of the country’s gold and foreign exchange reserves, inter alia. 
The primary functions of the Reserve Bank are to protect the value of the rand and to control 
inflation. While in principle it is independent of government control, in practice it works closely 
with the National Treasury and assists in the formulation and implementation of macroeconomic 
policy. 
The Reserve Bank regulates money supply by influencing the interest rates charged on loans to 
other institutions. Until 1975 the Reserve Bank enforced fixed interest rates on long-term 
government securities, but thereafter it allowed transactions at market-related prices. Direct 
control over deposit interest rates quoted by banking institutions was abolished in 1980. 
However, it still exercises considerable indirect control through its own repo rate. 
The private banking sector was dominated by commercial banks until the 1950s when banking 
services began to diversify. Before the 1950s commercial banks had avoided services such as 
personal loans, property leasing, and credit-card facilities, but since then new institutions such as 
discount houses, merchant banks, and general banks emerged to meet this demand. Commercial 
banks started to increasingly enter into medium-term credit arrangements with commerce and 
industry. They acquired interests in hire-purchase firms and leasing activities and expanded their 
operations into insurance and even invested in manufacturing and commercial enterprises.  
What is clear though is that the growth of the banking sector was only very moderate in the 
1970s. The assets of the commercial banks and the building societies, the largest mobilisers of 
capital in the banking sector, grew at a slower rate than GDP, at 15,3 per cent and 14,5 per cent 
respectively compared with 17,1 per cent by the GDP. At the beginning of the decade the 
banking sub-sector was struggling to recover from the effects of the Stock Exchange crash of 
1969 and a heroic increase in GDP of 11,4 per cent in 1969 (12 per cent in the financial year 
1969-70). Growth decelerated rapidly, when the oil price introduced the cost push inflation that 
triggered a sharp increase in the inflation rate. South Africa's government proved unable to 
control it and the country embarked upon a period of double digit inflation that was to last for 
over a generation. Nor even the rise in the price of gold could reverse this trend other than 
momentarily. Indeed, the deceleration was further reinforced by the Soweto riots of 1976. The 
financial sector contribution to growth grew by 3.1 percent annually in the 1960s declined by 2.6 












modern economy, with the GDP growing at a faster rate than the financial sector, was the result 
of the rising gold price boosting GDP at a time when inflation and interest rate ceilings were 
hurting the economy. 
During the late 1980s building societies that had listed holding companies on the then 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (since 2005 now called JSE Limited) and had commercial and/or 
general banking arms increasingly challenged the ‘big five’ commercial banks i.e., First National 
Bank (formerly Barclays), the Standard Bank of South Africa, Nedbank, Volkskas and Trust 
Bank. The Deposit taking Institutions Act of 1991 brought South Africa in line with 
internationally recognised standards for capital requirements by formalising the overlapping of 
functions between the banks and the building societies that had existed for more than a decade 
and building societies were effectively abolished (Verhoef, 1994). 
In the 1990s the banking sector went through consolidation and re-organisation. Four of the 
bank’s leading financial institutions i.e., Allied Bank, United Bank, Volkskas, and Sage Banks, 
merged to create the largest banking group in the country, Amalgamated Banks of South Africa 
(ABSA) in February 1991. The banking industry underwent further reorganisation in the mid-
1990s, in part to establish banking services in poor communities that were neglected under the 
previous apartheid government (Verhoef, 1992b). 
3.3.3.2 The Stock Market 
At the apex of the market level of the financial sector is the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). 
Founded in 1887 initially to fund the development of mining companies in the wake of the 
discovery of gold in the Witwatersrand in 1886, the JSE has a long history. Clearly, the 
development of the stock exchange was demand-driven rather than being a deliberate 
government policy (supply-leading approach) to set up an exchange as is being advocated by the 
World Bank for many countries in Africa. Crucially, it was set up by private mining 
entrepreneurs looking for innovative ways to raise finance. Hence its development resembles the 
postulations of the demand approach argued by Rajan and Zingales (1998). This is in contrast 
with the more recent African stock exchanges promoted by governments in the 1990s, for 
instance, those for Ghana, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. These 
exchanges were established following the World Bank economic adjustment policies so as to aid 












Though considerably developed, the JSE Securities Exchange South Africa is classified as an 
emerging market. Emerging markets have been traditionally referred to as less-developed (LDC) 
markets by academics. The term ‘emerging market’ was coined in 1981 in an effort to increase 
its appeal to institutional investors (Errunza, 1997). The JSE is characteristically an emerging 
market. In the past, the main barriers to foreign investment in the South African market were 
legal barriers and those relating to specific emerging market risks such as liquidity, political, 
economic policy, and currency risk. External factors that temporarily submerged the JSE in the 
mid-1980s until the early 1990s were international sanctions and the government response of 
introducing foreign exchange controls.  
3.3.3.3 Non Bank Financial Institutions 
Under the 1964 Banks Act, apart from the commercial bank, South Africa formally recognised 
other deposit-taking institutions as banks (Marlin, 1968). These institutions included hire 
purchase, savings and general banks. As a group, these various institutions not only competed 
among themselves for loanable funds, but also with other financial intermediaries, including 
commercial banks. 
On the other hand, depositors with the near banks as the case was with building societies were 
unable to withdraw their deposits by means of checks, although the 1964 Banks Act did spell this 
out. Some of these institutions performed some of the functions of commercial banks and 
operated with extensive branch network. 
Like the building societies, the ‘near bank’ encouraged people to transfer their bank accounts to 
them, and allowed them free withdrawal of their deposits. While section 21(2) of the 1964 Banks 
Acts seemed to be designed to prohibit free withdrawal of the time deposits, the wording of the 
Act left some loopholes, namely specification by the bank that the deposit can be withdrawn 
sooner than the declared time frame, at the discretion of the bank  (South African government, 
1964). Individual accounts were restricted under the 1964 Bank Act to a maximum of Rands 
6,000 in the case of savings deposits. Consequently, the return flow of these institutions as a 
group and consequent non-bank credit multiplier were small compared to commercial banks. 
3.3.4 Direct Controls, 1965-1980 
From the mid-1960s the South African monetary authorities increasingly made use of direct 
measures such as credit ceilings in their attempt to curtailing overspending and dampening 












high cash reserve and especially liquid asset requirements also restricted the banks’ activities. 
These restrictions encouraged the development of grey markets in which companies and 
individuals increasingly made use of the direct lending, bypassing the banking system in an act 
of so called disintermediation.  
During the 1960s and 1970s, the SA Reserve Bank made use of direct controls over the ability of 
banking system to supply money and credit, especially variable liquid asset requirements and 
credit ceilings, in order to influence domestic liquidity and inflation rate (Franzen, 1983). The 
SA Reserve bank controlled short-term deposit rates and determined the duration of the hire 
purchase agreements. During this period South Africa had no secondary bond market. In fact 
credit ceilings were in force from 1965-1972 and again from 1976-1980, while cash reserves, 
especially liquid assets requirements were implemented to restrict some of the activities of 
banks. As already indicated in the previous sections, for domestic residents, outward movement 
of capital was tightly controlled. A dual exchange rate system was in put in place where the 
market determined exchange rate were only applied to non-residents, who were free to move 
their capital (Moll, 1999). There were additional control measures in place during this period 
1967-1980 such as ceiling on advances, exchange controls as well as consumer credit controls 
(Botha, 1997). The repression of financial sector system led to financial disintermediation where 
transactions of institutions were performed ‘off-balance-sheet’ (Moll, 1999). This line of 
argument is consistent with Fourie et al., (1995) who argued that the restrictions encouraged 
development of ‘grey markets’ in which companies and individuals increasingly made use of 
direct lending, bypassing the banking system in an act of disintermediation. 
Inflation also accelerated considerably from the early 1970s. Since interest rates partly controlled 
by the authorities were not allowed to compensate depositors fully for inflation, savers started to 
shift away from depository savings with banking institutions to other, more inflation proof 
savings instruments, which often offered attractive tax breaks. The banks’ balance sheets 
therefore grew less rapidly than, for example, those of near banking. Under these circumstances 
few banking institutions were established. Notably, interbank discount House Limited started 
doing business in 1972. 
3.3.5 Deregulation of Financial Sector, 1980-1989 
With increasing adherence to free market principles since 1980, the credit and interest rate 
ceilings applicable to South African banks were abolished and their cash reserve and liquid asset 












limited competition between the banks) was terminated in February, 1983, while the substantial 
numbers of new banks were allowed to start operations. The outcome of this policy shift was 
that, the balance sheet of banking sector increased sharply. Furthermore, competition amongst 
the banks and between the banks and building societies increased too. This led to a decline on 
their profit margins and higher interest rates compounded this problem. As a result of the reform, 
the number of banking institutions under supervision of the Registrar of Banks rose from 50 in 
1980 to 60 in 1989.  
3.3.6 Institutional Realignment, 1989-1993 
By the late 1980s South African banks were faced with intense completion which led to a fall on 
the profit margins of the banks. In addition banks were also faced with high costs of modern 
technology and losses due to loan exposures. As alluded to earlier, there was intra-bank 
completion and as the business of banks and building societies converged, a basis for equitable 
competition between them was instituted by bringing them together under the same legislation 
called Deposit Taking Institution Act of 1990 with the exception of the relatively small mutual 
building society sector, which continued to operate under a separate Act.  
In view of this banks started to strengthen their positions, with less emphasis on the expansion of 
their balance sheets and more emphasis on quality business. During this period, a considerable 
number of mergers and takeovers took place. Notable among them were: the mergers which 
involved the Nedbank and the South African Permanent Building Society in NedPerm Bank in 
1989, and of United, Volkskas and Allied in ABSA in 1991. 
During this period 1989-93 five major banking groups had developed, namely the ABSA, 
Bankorp, First National, Nedcor and Standard Bank group. In 1992 ABSA gained control over 
Bankorp thereby reducing the concentration of the big banks to four. The combined asset 
portfolio of ABSA and Bankorp came to 33 percent, while that of the four after the merging of 
the two (ABSA and Bankorp) came to 95 percent of the total assets of the financial industry. At 
the end of 1991 South African financial sector industry constituted 51 banks. This number 
reduced to 40 in 1993 and the reason for this was realignments which involved mergers reduced 
in the banking industry. 
3.3.7 Legal Framework 
The first Currency and Banking Act of the Union (Act No. 31 of 1920) referred to banks only in 












withdrawal on demand by check.  However, under the Banking Act of 1942 the people’s banking 
was defined as an association established for the purpose of enhancing thrift banking. In view of 
this, a deposit receiving institution was simply viewed as a residual that is a person accepting a 
deposit, not being a commercial bank.  
The above legal Acts were followed by the Bank Act of 1965 which subjected all classes of 
banking instituted which had mushroomed earlier (except discount houses) to the same financial 
requirement. In view of this a new classification of banking institutions was mooted, namely 
commercial, savings, hire purchase and general banking based on the relative importance of the 
banking business conduct. The sharp increase in the financial institutions in the 1970s made it 
difficult to classify them. The difference between these institutions became so indistinct that the 
Registrar with the Financial Institutions Amendment Act No. 103 of 1979 reclassified the two 
types of institutions as general banks. Later through the Financial Institutions Amendment Act 
No. 106 of 1985, the government revoked the distinction between commercial banks, general 
banks and merchant banks, and all other banks, with the exception of only discount houses, were 
classified as banks. The deposit taking institutions Act No. 94 of 1990, consolidated and revised 
the Banks Act, 1965 (Act 24 of 1965), and Building Societies Act, 1986 (Act 82 of 1986), and 
finally they also repealed the distinction between banks, discount houses and equity building 
societies. In 1993 the Deposit taking Institutions Act was renamed the Banks Act, No 94 of 
1990. 
3.3.8 Monetary policy  
The new monetary policy of South Africa in the early 1960s was enacted in the hope that the 
former orthodox treatment of commercial banks, as differing basically from all other deposits-
receiving institutions, had lost much of its validity. The new policy rejected the idea that 
commercial banks are unique in the sense that they alone can create money and therefore the 
supply of loanable funds independently of the public’s savings. 
An effected monetary policy in South Africa under the Act depended on four conditions, 
according to Gerhard de Kock (1965): First, the economic situation must be correctly diagnosed, 
with short-term tendencies indicated reasonably accurately. For this to take effect, up-to-date and 
reliable economic data must be collected and interpreted. The hypothesis of economic tendencies 
must be tested continuously against the facts as they become known and must be changed 
whenever necessary. Errors of monetary policy particularly on timing must be attributed to faulty 












Second, there must be an intelligible presentation of the case for action. That is, policy makers 
cannot be expected to understand why monetary action is necessary, if the case for it is clad in 
technical terms. 
Third, monetary policy and interest rates must be flexible. Monetary policy should be adjusted 
speedily to changes in economic conditions. The fact that economic activity is subject to cyclical 
fluctuations and that in a relatively ‘open’ economy like South Africa’s broad savings occur in 
balance of payments, is well known. The flexibility would therefore appear to be necessary for 
interest rate policy. Interest rate stability is not an objective to pursue at all times, since it is 
general economic stability which should be a main objective, and variation in interest rates can 
be stabilising.  
Finally, maximum reliance should be placed on free competition, using the interplay of supply 
and demand in the market to regulate the cost and allocation of credit. The approach in the 1964 
Bank Act did not force the various deposit-taking institutions into predetermined, highly 
specialised moulds. Banking institutions under this policy had to combine all their activities 
under one umbrella if they so wished. This approach was premised on the belief that a sounder 
development of banking structure would be obtained by allowing the financial sector a 
considerable amount of freedom to develop along lines they deemed fit. Strong support for 
flexible and competitive approach taken in the 1964 Banks Act came from the Canadian Royal 
Commission on Banking and Finance which stressed the importance of having a competitive and 
creative financial system. 
3.3.8.1 Monetary policy (1965 to 1980) 
Although in the initial stages of 1964 under the Banks Act, monetary policy was designed to 
permit continuous competition between financial institutions within a framework of allowing 
overall monetary control, the first year of the operation of the Act, 1965, turned out to be a more 
inflationary one than was envisioned by the policy makers. 
For instance, direct controls and the general approach to monetary policy, including adjustment 
to Bank rate, did not achieve the desired outcome of low inflation as measured by the changes in 
the consumer price index (CPI). Inflation accelerated between 1965 and 1980: “inflation 
established itself firmly between the levels of 10 and 20 percent, and the natural development of 
financial markets was suppressed by the need for direct controls over banks and other financial 












direct controls, in respect of inflation it should be split into sub-periods: up to 1973, when 
inflation was at single digits, and from 1974 to 1980, when South Africa suffered sustained 
double-digit inflation, which continued into 1980s. 
Between 1965 and 1973, the Bank rate moved between 5.75 percent and 6.25 percent, with an 
average of 6 percent. At the same time the minimum overdraft rate of banks were no longer fixed 
at a constant margin above Bank rate, although a semi-informal link between Bank rate and the 
prime rate of banks was retained until 1982 (Stals, 1996). The link was subsequently 
reintroduced, inter alia, because the actual rediscount rate charged for SA Reserve Bank 
accommodation frequently differed from the official Bank rate, implying that the minimum 
lending rate rather followed other money market rates. Bank’s minimum lending rate averaged 
about 8 percent during the first sub-period (1965 to 1973), but varied between 6 percent and 9 
percent. On the other hand inflation was at an average annual rate of about 4.6 percent, but 
accelerated sharply from 1968 to the end of this sub-period, implying that the average real 
minimum lending rate was about 3.4 percent. Monetary policy therefore supported relative price 
stability during this sub-period, but failed to address the acceleration in inflation. This is 
confirmed by the fact that the domestic inflation problem already received attention by the mid-
sixties, as well as by the analysis of sub-period below. 
Increase of inflationary pressure gave rise to a conference which was held in 1966 to deal with 
this issue (Richard, 1967). Six papers were considered at this conference and their debates on 
inflation are recorded in the conference proceeding (Van der Horst, 1967). 
At this conference, Hobart (1967) stated that the main strength of the inflation of our time was 
that we expected it to continue. This view was supported by others who included Samuels (1967: 
292), who stated that “once the market’s expectations are broken, the problems of the transaction 
to a non-inflationary era will become progressively easier. Reflecting on this conference some 40 
years later, the reaction is that the issue remain the same, only the names of the conferences 
considering them has changed. 
In the second sub-period (1974-1980), inflation accelerated to a level of 10 percent per annum 
and remained at that level for a sustained period of time up until 1992. Between 1974 and 1980, 
banks’ minimum lending rates moved between 8 percent and 12.25 percent, with an average of 
10 percent. As was the case in the first sub-period, the minimum overdraft rate of banks was no 












retained. Bank rate averaged about 8 percent during this sub-period, but moved between 5.75 
percent and 9 percent. Inflation was at an average annual rate of 12.1 percent, but continued to 
accelerate sharply towards the end of this sub-period, implying that the average real minimum 
lending rate was about minus 4.1 percent. Monetary policy, therefore, did not contain inflation 
during this sub-period, while direct controls resulted in the adoption of interest rates which were 
too low in comparison to general rate of increase in price level. 
The major policy changes associated with 1981 discussed in the next section (i.e., the movement 
from direct controls to a market-oriented monetary policy associated with the appointment of the 
De Kock as governor of the SA Reserve Bank in 1981) were announced by De Jongh in 1980. 
The policy shift was that credit ceiling would be abolished with effect from 1st of September 
1980 (De Jongh, 1980). 
3.3.8.2 Monetary policy (1981–1994) 
The period 1981 to 1994 was characterised by a return to more market-oriented ‘indirect’ 
monetary policy. The liquid asset system was abandoned in favour of a cash reserve system, and 
open market operations became a key instrument of monetary policy. In this way, monetary 
policy shifted from controls that operated directly on the balance sheets of banks to measures 
that influenced bank balance sheets indirectly via changes in the balance sheet of the central 
bank (Verhoef, 1994).  
The re-orientation of monetary policy in the early 1980s was led by the government-appointed 
Commission of Inquiry into the Monetary System and Monetary Policy in South Africa (referred 
to as the De Kock Commission after the name of the chair, who in 1981 became governor of the 
Reserve Bank)9. The commission was established in 1977 and although its final report was not 
published until 1985, its recommendations began to take effect in policy from 1979. 
Until 1985, the monetary reforms were accompanied by the liberalisation of the balance of 
payments. The shift away from direct controls and the associated rationing of foreign exchange 
was an integral component of the reforms proposed by the De Kock Commission. Increasing 
political instability, which came to a head in 1985, led to a drop in foreign investor confidence 
that, in turn, precipitated a debt crisis. The crisis forced the authorities to abandon the balance of 
payments reforms immediately. Moreover, the crisis initiated a period lasting until the 
democratic elections of 1994 in which persistent capital outflows dominated macroeconomic 
                                               












policy. From 1985 to 1994, monetary policy was often influenced and sometimes dominated by 
political crises and the associated pressures on both the balance of payments and fiscal policy. 
The De Kock Commission identified four ultimate objectives of monetary policy: the relative 
stability of the general price level; the stability of the external value of the rand, together with the 
balance of payments equilibrium; ‘optimal’ real economic growth; and high and stable levels of 
employment. 
The first objective was given priority, although it was recognised that the ranking of the four 
objectives might change from time to time in response to short-term considerations. Late in the 
period, the first two objectives were given special status. Stals, who became governor in 1989, 
increasingly came to refer to the objectives of the bank as the maintenance of the “internal and 
external value of the rand”. This narrower view was endorsed by the new government, following 
the 1994 elections, and was officially adopted in the new constitution agreed in 1996.  
A strong signal of the shift toward a more market-oriented monetary policy came in 1980. In 
March, the authorities abolished deposit rate controls (Verhoef, 1994). It was recognised that 
these controls had prevented banks and building societies from competing for call funds and kept 
deposit interest rates below market-clearing levels. Six months later, in September 1980, the 
ceilings on bank credit to the private sector were removed. 
The move to market-oriented monetary policy was reinforced in 1981/82, when the authorities 
abandoned the longstanding liquid asset system of monetary control in favour of a cash reserve 
system (Jacobs, 1982). The ineffectiveness of the liquid asset system had been recognised as 
early as 1965, as discussed earlier. But it was only following the work of the De Kock 
Commission and the shift in monetary policy internationally that the need for effective monetary 
control attracted sufficient political support to enable fundamental reform. 
By 1980, successive upward revisions to the liquid asset requirements had brought the minimum 
ratios to 58%, 35% and 5% of banks’ short-term, medium-term and long-term liabilities to the 
public (for ‘large’ banks and only slightly lower for other banks). Even in combination with 
credit ceilings, these requirements proved inadequate to the task of controlling banks’ liquidity 
and credit creation.  
Gidlow (1995a) identifies several important weaknesses in the system. One was lags in reporting 












implementing new requirements, the cumulative effect of which was to render timely policy 
responses all but impossible. Another was the inability of the system to force an overall 
contraction in the level of credit, rather than simply limit its growth. A related and important 
weakness was the ‘ratchet’ effect. This resulted from the fact that balance of payments surpluses 
led to increases in the liquidity base while deficits were not generally allowed to lead to 
contractions of liquidity. 
The authorities adopted a classic cash reserve system, whereby the central bank influenced the 
level of banks’ cash balances by altering their cost (through changes in interest rates) rather than 
their level directly. This was a necessary result of the discount house system, under which banks 
could offset any attempt to reduce their cash balances by withdrawing call money from the 
discount houses; the discount houses in turn had virtually unrestricted access to accommodation 
at the Reserve Bank (Gidlow, 1995a). 
Under this new system, short-term interest rates became the crucial operational variable of 
monetary policy. The authorities sought to control the growth of the money supply by using 
interest rates to limit the demand for money. This contrasted with the ‘supply side’ practices 
being followed at the time in the United States, United Kingdom and elsewhere, whereby the 
authorities sought to control the cash base directly. Control over interest rates was affected 
through the Reserve Bank’s role as lender of last resort. 
Since 1973, the interest rate charged for accommodation at the Reserve Bank had been linked to 
the current market rate for treasury bills. The bank was willing to rediscount treasury bills for 
discount houses without limit at 0.5% above the latest tender rate, for periods of 7 to 14 days. In 
addition, discount houses could obtain overnight loans on the security of short-term government 
stock at 2.5% above the tender rate. 
The Reserve Bank abandoned this system in favour of bank-set and differentiated rediscount 
rates for eligible short-term securities in December 1983. The central role of the discount rate 
under the new cash reserve system heightened the need for direct control of the discount rate. 
Moreover, the mechanical link between the rediscount rate and prevailing market rates was seen 
to put upward pressure on interest rates. When the money market was ‘in the bank’, market rates 
tended to rise toward the bank’s rediscount rate, which led, in turn, to an upward shift in 












The role of the discount rate as the focus of monetary policy was reinforced in 1985, when the 
Reserve Bank reintroduced the ‘bank rate’ as the basic rate for rediscounting treasury bills. The 
bank rate became the reference point for monetary policy and for the financial system generally. 
When banks are not making use of the discount window (not ‘in the bank’), the bank rate defines 
the ceiling for the treasury bill rate. When the market is ‘in the bank’, the bank rate sets the floor 
for treasury bill rates and, more generally, for short-term interest rates throughout the financial 
system. In this way, the authorities are able to exert a significant degree of control over the level 
of interest rates generally. 
In the course of the 1980s, accommodation policy changed fundamentally with the end of the 
special role of discount houses. Since their creation in the late 1950s and early 1960s, discount 
houses had served as market makers in short-term financial instruments and, more importantly, 
had become the principal conduit for provision of Reserve Bank accommodation to the banking 
system. Although both of these functions were endorsed by the De Kock Commission in its final 
report, other factors were leading to a secular decline in the role of the houses. The shift to a cash 
reserve system and the decline in liquid asset requirements had decreased the role of banks’ call 
deposits with the discount houses. In addition, banks’ money market operations increased in 
sophistication, with the development of an overnight market for bank loans to corporations and 
of an active inter-bank market. 
From January 1985, banks were given direct access to the Reserve Bank accommodation in the 
form of overnight loans. In early 1989, recognising that the discount houses had ceased to 
provide an important conduit for accommodation, the Reserve Bank granted banks the same 
access to the discount window as discount houses (at the bank rate). Discount houses were 
brought under the Deposit-taking Institutions Act of 1990 and, in the early 1990s, were 
transformed into banks. 
In 1993, there was another important change to accommodation policy when the Reserve Bank 
ceased to provide funds to the market by rediscounting treasury bills (at the bank rate), bankers’ 
acceptances (at the ‘bankers’ acceptances’ rate or BA rate) and other money market assets. 
Instead, it provided overnight loans on the basis of collateral in the form of treasury bills, 
Reserve Bank bills, Land Bank bills and government stock with remaining maturities of less than 
three months. The Reserve Bank offered a second tier at the discount window, accepting longer 












In order to exercise effective monetary control, the authorities needed to be able to compel banks 
to make use of the accommodation facilities at the Reserve Bank’s discount window. It became 
the central aim of open market operations to create a money market ‘shortage’ that obliged banks 
to obtain refinancing at the Reserve Bank. This contrasts with the role of open market operations 
in systems such as that of the United States, where the aim is to achieve a targeted effect on the 
level of cash balances. 
In contrast with their limited effectiveness under the liquid asset system in the 1970s, open 
market operations became a crucial instrument of monetary policy in the 1980s. Open market 
operations, in the traditional sense of purchases or sales of government debt instruments by the 
monetary authorities, increased markedly in scale in the 1980s. But, as discussed in more detail 
in the section below, such purchases and sales are just one of a range of instruments used by the 
monetary authorities to influence the money market shortage. The operational side of monetary 
policy focused on the use of these instruments with the aim of making the Reserve Bank’s 
discount, or refinancing, policy effective. 
The transition to the cash reserve system, which began in 1981/82, was completed only at the 
end of the 1980s. The cash reserve system enables the effective control of banks’ cash balances 
only if one of two conditions is satisfied. One is that banks are restricted in their ability to 
convert other liquid assets into cash with the central bank. The other is that they are able to do so 
only at interest rates that are sufficiently high to curb demand for cash balances to the desired 
level. Since the Reserve Bank did not seek to control the supply of cash balances to the banking 
system, the effectiveness of the cash reserve system rested on the maintenance of an appropriate 
discount (or refinancing) rate so as to achieve the desired effect on banks’ demand for cash 
balances. It is for this reason, as already noted, that the bank rate became the focus of monetary 
policy. 
The pattern of real short-term interest rates over the period suggests that the second condition 
was often not satisfied in the first half of the period. Real interest rates were persistently negative 
for much of the 1980s, starting the decade at -9% (during the gold boom), reaching -7% in early 
1983 and dropping to as low as -9% again in 1986. 
Real interest rates turned consistently positive for the first time in July 1983, some five months 
after the abolition of the dual exchange rate system called the ‘financial rand’. The termination 












remained subject to exchange controls for capital transactions, non-residents could now freely 
buy and sell South African securities and other assets. The link between this liberalisation of the 
capital account and the shift to positive real interest rates was underscored when the return to 
negative real interest rates in July 1985 was shortly followed by the re-imposition of the financial 
rand, in response to the debt crisis mentioned above. 
In early 1988, real interest rates again turned positive and have essentially remained positive 
since that time. The shift to consistently positive real interest rates was consolidated in 1989, 
when Stals became governor of the Reserve Bank. Stals proceeded to maintain positive real 
interest rates through the recession of the early 1990s, which proved to be the most severe 
contraction in the post-war period. This marked the first time since the 1960s that positive real 
rates had been maintained during the downward phase of the cycle. 
Table 15: Indicators of Financial Development prior to 1994 












1970 57.9  3.7 4.1 - - 
1975 57.1 0.56 0.6 12.5 14,873 3,092 
1980 48.9 0.46 -10.2 13.7 29,655 3,763 
1985 51.6 0.55 1.1 16.3 75,411 3,681 
1990 51.1 0.54 4.7 14.3 168,341 6,366 
1993 45.5 0.57 2.7 9.7 229,804 7,455 
Source: World Bank and South Africa Reserve Bank Quarterly Bulletin 
The shift to sustain positive real interest rates signalled the beginning of an inflation stabilisation 
effort by the monetary authorities. Given the strong orientation of policy toward monetary 
aggregates, it is perhaps unsurprising that stabilisation focused exclusively on the money supply 
rather than alternative nominal anchors. The authorities’ continuing confidence in the centrality 
of monetary aggregates to the transmission mechanism, on the one hand, and the wide-ranging 
controls on the capital account of the balance of payments, on the other, ruled out the nominal 
exchange rate as a rival focus for stabilisation. The tightening of monetary policy reinforced by 
the deep recession led, from the middle of 1992, to a sharp and sustained fall in inflation (see 
Table 15). 
3.3.8.2 Market-Oriented Policies Post 1994  
After 1994, the Banks Act No 94 of 1990 was amended by the Banks Amendment Act No 26 of 












trade with South Africa during the early 1990s and modern banking trends, such as the 
establishment of cross-border interests by banks and the need for reciprocal treatment by foreign 
and domestic supervisory authorities, that it was appropriate for the SARB to allow foreign 
banks to conduct the business of a bank in South Africa through branches. The Banks Act 
effectively prevented the establishment of branches by foreign banks (SARB, 1994: 63-64). 
Since the coming into effect of the Banks Act of 1990, 31 foreign banks opened approved local 
representative offices in South Africa. 
The Banks Act provided for the establishment, by a foreign bank, of a representative office or 
branches of foreign banks in South Africa. Prior to November 1996 section 34 did not provide 
for the Registrar of Banks to obtain sufficient information from such representative office to 
enable him to discharge of his duties in terms of the minimum supervisory standards set by the 
Basle Committee on Bank Supervision. Stringent conditions to conduct the business of a bank by 
a foreign institution by means of branches were subsequently set out in the Government Gazette, 
first in 1996 and again in 2000 (Government Gazette, No. 17115 of 1996 and No. 21936 of 28 
December 2000). The prudential requirements included that a foreign institution had to maintain 
a minimum net assets of US$1 billion, or net assets of its own of (SARB, 1992) and this number 
increased to 33 in 1993 (SARB,1993). 
Furthermore the Act provided for the establishment, by a foreign bank, of a representative office 
or branches of foreign banks in South Africa. Prior to November 1996 section 34 did not provide 
for the Registrar of Banks to obtain sufficient information from such representative office to 
enable him to discharge of his duties in terms of the minimum supervisory standards set by the 
Basle Committee on Bank Supervision. Stringent conditions to conduct the business of a bank by 
a foreign institution by means of branches were subsequently set out in the Government Gazette, 
first in 1996 and again in 2000 (Government Gazette, No. 17115 of 1996 and No. 21936 of 28 
December 2000).  
The South African Department of Bank Supervision has actively contributed towards the 
activities of the Basle Committee on Bank Supervision and subsequently also became a signatory 
to the Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision of 1997 (SARB, 1997). This was 
imperative given the proliferation of financial activities across and into the South African border, 
either by South African banks in other parts of the world, or by foreign banks entering the South 












The Core Principles were endorsed by the IMF and World Bank in 1997 and by the International 
Conference on Banking Supervision in October 1998. The Core Principles determined that 
banking supervisors had to have the authority to address compliance with banking legislation by 
institutions under their jurisdiction (SARB, 2005). New regulations were therefore passed in 
South Africa to compel representative offices of foreign banks to subject themselves to on and 
off site inspection to establish adherence to relevant legislation (Government Gazette, No. 
22939, 2001). 
3.3.9 Experience with the Reforms on Institutional Development 
The changes in the Banks Act, No. 94 of 1990 paved the way for the internationalisation of 
South African banks. In the period 1994-2004 the number of foreign banks authorised to 
establish representative offices in South Africa rose from 31 to 61 in 2000, but then dropped to 
46 in 2004. These representative offices did not engage in bank operations, but provided a 
presence for foreign banks interested in entering the market or supplying vital economic and 
trade information to clients. The majority of the foreign offices in 1992 were representative of 
European banks: seven from the Spanish speaking countries, seven from France, eight from 
Germany, two each from Britain and African countries, three from Switzerland and one from 
Israel (SARB, 1992). By 2000 banks from the USA, China, Japan, Taiwan, India Canada and 
Norway had joined the ranks of foreign representative offices in South Africa (SARB, 2000). 
The actual involvement in banking activities commenced with the permission to foreign banks to 
open branches in South African and conduct bank business in 1993. The number of branches of 
foreign banks rose from 4 in 1995 to 15 in 2004. The first banks to open branches were, ABN 
Amro Bank, Bank of Baroda, Citi Bank, Commerzbank Aktiengesellschaft, Credit Agricole 
Indosuez, ING Bank N.V. Morgan Guaranty Trust Company and Société Généralé (SARB, 
1997). 
As a result of opening up the financial sector to the rest of the world, between 1993, when 
foreign banks’ branches were permitted to conduct banking business in South Africa, and by 
2004 the total assets of foreign banks’ branches as a proportion of total assets of all banks 












Table 16). This asset growth came off a low base, but nevertheless represented growth at a rate 












Table 16: Bank Total Loans and Advances R’billion (1993-2004) 
Year Bank Total Loans & 
Advances 
Foreign Bank loans 
and advances 
Foreign as a % of 
total 
1993 241 4 1.8 
1994 284 5 1.7 
1995 329 5 1.6 
1996 393 16 4.2 
1997 464 23 5.0 
1998 539 30 5.6 
1999 598 32 5.4 
2000 656 39 5.9 
2001 790 67 8.4 
2002 883 76 8.6 
2003 958 79 8.3 
2004 1,104 97 8.7 
Source: D1900 Bank returns to SARB 
This impressive performance could be explained by the nature of the business of the foreign 
branches. These foreign banks’ branches were primarily engaged in investment business to the 
corporate sector, which is the higher yielding business in the market. The major interest rate 
differentials between South African short-term as well as long term interest rates and the interest 
rates of her major trading partners (see Table 17), explain the strong incentive for foreign 
banking institutions to enter the lucrative market for corporate finance. 
The democratic elections of 1994 marked the beginning of a new phase in monetary policy. The 
triggering factor behind the monetary policy shift was the transformation of the balance of 
payments position. South Africa experienced large, continuous outflows on the capital account 
of the balance of payments following the debt crisis of 1985. The political transition signalled by 
the elections led immediately to capital inflows. These new inflows had a direct impact on 
monetary policy, as the resulting increases in liquidity required much more active intervention 
by the authorities. 
But it is the indirect impact of these inflows that has proved of lasting significance. The return to 
a positive balance of payments position has enabled the government systematically to liberalise 
the capital account, in parallel with a broader liberalisation of trade and other policies. The shift 
away from rationing in the foreign exchange market has, in turn, had three lasting effects on 
monetary policy. First, it has reduced the usefulness of monetary aggregates as intermediate 
targets of monetary policy, forcing a shift to a broader range of intermediate targets. Second, 












heightened the importance of the exchange rate as an intermediate target. Finally, the shift has 
highlighted the limits of the discount window policy based on the bank rate as the reference 
point for monetary policy. 
Table 17: Short Term Interest of South Africa & foreign banks, 1985-2005 
Year RSA USA Euro Zone 
1990 18.59 8.15 9.52 
1991 17.04 5.84 7.30 
1992 14.4 3.68 5.36 
1993 11.64 3.17 4.53 
1994 10.96 4.63 3.31 
1995 13.73 5.99 3.31 
1996 15.35 5.39 3.33 
1997 15.49 5.62 3.83 
1998 16.72 5.50 2.97 
1999 13.01 5.36 4.39 
2000 10.11 6.45 4.26 
2001 9.73 3.73 3.32 
2002 11.59 1.70 2.34 
2003 10.94 1.17 8.49 
2004 7.60 1.57 9.25 
Source: Bureau for Economic Research, University of Stellenbosch, Quarterly Reports 
It is difficult to understate the change in the balance of payments position that occurred 
following the 1994 elections. Although the capital inflows since that time have been reversed on 
several occasions, notably during the rand crisis of 1996 and the crisis in Southeast Asia in the 
second half of 1997, the net inflows have been positive since 1994. (The shift from outflows to 
inflows was particularly pronounced in long-term capital flows. These flows accelerated in 1995 
following the abolition of capital controls on non-residents.) 
The shift towards liberalisation in the orientation of economic policy, which began in fits and 
starts during the early 1990s, became entrenched under the post-apartheid government. The stage 
was set for broad liberalisation by the 1993 agreement, undertaken by the transitional 
government preceding the elections, to a comprehensive ten-year programme of tariff reduction 
and simplification under the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 
The reversal in the balance of payments position allowed the new government to embark on a 
broad programme of exchange control reform. The first major step came in March 1995, when 
the government announced the end of the dual exchange rate system called the ‘financial rand’. 












exchange rate system had been in place since the early 1960s. Its abolition meant that capital 
transactions by non-residents were now free of restrictions. Barely four months later, the 
government embarked on a second major reform of exchange controls, and began to relax the 
controls on outward investments by institutional investors through an ‘asset swap’ mechanism. 
These controls were subsequently liberalised further, allowing such institutions to invest a 
certain fraction of their annual cash flow in foreign assets. 
The March 1997 budget was widely regarded as signalling the final phase of liberalisation. 
Controls of foreign investment transactions by individual residents were liberalised up to a limit 
of R200,000, and those by companies up to a limit of R30 million (R50 million for investments 
into Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) countries). More generally, there was a 
shift in approach from a comprehensive set of capital controls on residents to a substantially 
liberalised regime in which only certain limited classes of transactions would remain subject to 
controls. Notably, the limit for registered capital account transactions with the Reserve Bank was 
raised from R2,000 to R40,000, a move that exempted more than 60% of previously registered 
transactions. 
The key monetary policy challenge facing the Reserve Bank is how to manage the sharply higher 
volume and greater volatility of cross-border capital flows that have resulted from the political 
transition and the lifting of capital controls. The increase in volatility was underscored soon after 
the elections when the 1994 fourth quarter outflow of R1.1 billion was followed by an inflow of 
R5 billion in the first quarter of 1995, a swing equivalent to 1.5% of GDP. 
The surge in capital inflows and the heightened volatility have had a direct impact on domestic 
monetary conditions. Underlying this linkage has been the commitment by the Reserve Bank to 
stabilise the real effective exchange rate, a commitment that has been a key element of Reserve 
Bank policy since the late 1980s. The bank has pursued this objective using a combination of 
large-scale foreign exchange intervention and open market operations to sterilise the resulting 
money creation. 
3.3.10 Effect of Reforms on other Financial Variables Post 1994 
The M2 monetary aggregate is usually defined as narrow money (M1) comprising transferable 
deposits and currency outside deposit money banks, plus quasi-money comprising time, savings 
and foreign currency deposits of deposit money banks. The ratio M2 to GDP can provide a 












in line with the development of financial systems; the range of savings instruments spreads and 
liquidity increases but will then tend to fall again as other non-deposit based forms of savings 
instruments develop. Table 18 shows the evolution of the ratio for South Africa over the 1994-
2004 period.  
Table 18: Indicators of Financial Development prior to 1994 












1994 45.2 0.58 5.5 8.9 268,926 15,487 
1995 46.6 0.60 6.9 8.7 316,709 4,225 
1996 47.5 0.61 10.3 7.3 367,213 21,190 
1997 49.9 0.65 11.3 8.6 419,872 33,593 
1998 53.2 0.69 13.1 6.9 489,893 42,275 
1999 54.4 0.71 10.4 5.2 532,520 42,639 
2000 52.3 0.71 5.2 5.3 590,063 42,086 
2001 53.0 0.75 5.7 5.7 674,047 31,667 
2002 51.6 0.75 4.7 9.2 703,381 58,194 
2003 53.3 0.81 9.9 5.8 838,300 45,770 
2004 53.6 0.87 5.2 1.4 954,024 42,643 
Source: World Bank 
† Figures are in millions of Rands 
The ratio of M2 to GDP was volatile prior to 1994, averaging about 37 percent of the GDP. In 
the period since 1994 to 2002, this ratio has risen quite significantly and averaged 47 percent of 
gross domestic product. The ratio has risen at this time to reflect greater access and new entrants 
to the banking systems. 
• The Ratio of Bank Deposits to GDP 
The ratio of bank deposits to GDP provides an illustration of the extent to which local savings 
are being effectively mobilised. This ratio is typically very low in African countries; for 
example, in the case of Mozambique it represents only 22% of GDP. The trend in data between 
1986 and 1993 clearly show that the ratio was volatile but maintained an upward trend averaging 
54 percent. Thereafter it maintained an upward trend, averaging 61 percent in the period 1994 to 
2004 (Table 18). It therefore suggests that since 1994, local short term savings have been better 












• The Ratio of Domestic Credit to GDP 
The private/public sector split of domestic credit can provide an indication of the role of the state 
in the financial and real sectors of the economy. Similarly, on the asset side, the ratio of domestic 
credit to GDP can give an indication of financial depth and the degree to which the formal 
banking sector plays a role in South Africa. Data in Table 18 shows the evolution of the ratio for 
the country. The ratio has been increasing since 1994. 
During the 1970-80 period, total domestic credit as a proportion of GDP averaged 59 percent. 
The amount that was allocated to the private sector was 50 percent of GDP. State involvement 
(which attracted an average of 9 percent of total credit to GDP) was important in South Africa at 
this time, reflecting the risky investment climate in the country, the effect of sanctions and 
disinvestment, and the reluctance of banks to lend, given the already large non-performing loans 
to public enterprises of the banking system. Between 1980 and 1993, total domestic credit 
declined a little to 54 percent of the GDP. The ratio of private sector credit to GDP was 51 
percent at this time. This reflects low government borrowing at this time. Since banking sector 
reforms accompanied economic liberalisation, total credit in the economy has risen since 1994. 
Between 1994 and 2002, total domestic credit increased to 62 percent of GDP. This increase is 
accounted for by increased extension of credit to the private sector (59% of GDP) especially 
taking into consideration that fiscal deficit decreased significantly from about 6 percent of GDP 
to just over 2 percent around this time.  
3.3.11 Interest Rates Indicator of Financial Development 
Developed financial systems should produce positive real interest rates that reflect peoples’ 
positive rate of time preference and growth opportunities in an economy. This is an outcome of 
both neoclassical growth models and of more recent financial sector endogenous growth models. 
It is also a key argument of financial sector protagonists, like McKinnon and Shaw. In addition 
to being positive in real terms, interest rates should adequately reflect economic expectations. 
For example, nominal interest rates should be able to accommodate changes in expected 
inflation. Thus, both the level and flexibility of interest rates are essential.  
In lagging economies, returns are widely dispersed because of market fragmentation, with many 
projects yielding negative returns in real terms. As initial liberalisation leads to positive real 












stimulate greater financial savings, significantly increasing monetisation of the economy and the 
degree of financial intermediation. 
• Real Interest Rate on Time Deposit in South Africa 
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s interest rates were fixed in the country and progress made 
towards liberalising interest rates began in the 1990s, and interest rates have been relied upon to 
a greater extent to conduct monetary policy. Strict interest rate controls provide nominal interest 
rate stability, but only at the ‘expense’ of real interest rate instability, if inflation is variable. The 
only way to achieve low nominal interest rate stability, without creating damaging real interest 
rate volatility, is to achieve a low stable rate of inflation. Market determined interest rates are 
often an early sign of financial sector reform and liberalisation. The real deposit interest rate is 
the most important financial market price. A fundamental precondition for substantial financial 
deepening is that it should be positive. 
 Figure 14: Real Interest rate   
 
             Source: South African Reserve Bank 
Fragmented markets in lagging economies often produce negative real deposit rates, which 
discourage savings in financial assets. During the 1970-80 decade, the real interest rate was 
largely negative, averaging -3.94 percent. This followed a decreasing trend though it was still 
negative during the 1980-90 decade, averaging - 1.08 percent. This trend was reversed following 
South Africa’s successful political transition such that, during 1994 to 2001, real interest rates 
became significantly positive and averaged 5.6 percent (Figure 14). This might explain why long 












3.3.11.1 Interest Rate Spread 
Real returns may reflect significant dispersion between interest rates because of information 
asymmetry and high transaction costs, a symptom of the poor physical, technical, tax, and 
regulatory infrastructure. The range of price dispersion decreases as the financial system 
develops. Development of mechanisms (like effective company and securities industry laws and 
regulations) to eliminate information asymmetry, creation of new institutions (like credit-rating 
agencies) to produce higher quality information, use of technology to improve the processing 
and dissemination of information (including prices), adoption of efficient business practices, and 
market organisation in the financial sector, together with ongoing deregulation, facilitate further 
development over time. Markets for complex financial instruments, like derivatives, that require 
a sophisticated infrastructure base, emerge as the development process progresses. 
       Figure 15: Trends in Interest rate spread 
 
                 Source: South African Reserve Bank 
Financial sector deregulation forms part of a wider set of economic reforms in lagging 
economies. Abolition of centralised controls over prices, resource distribution, and trade flows 
and the freeing of nominal interest rates and exchange rates fundamentally alter the economic 
and financial risk exposures of financial institutions and companies, generating a demand for 
effective risk management products that cover liquidity and price risk. Only advanced financial 
systems have the infrastructure to provide them. These risk management products also reduce 












3.3.11.2 Transaction Costs Indicator of Financial Development 
Financial systems require low transaction costs (especially low credit intermediation costs) to 
support the optimal financial deepening and minimise the amount of scarce economic resources 
absorbed by the financial sector. Therefore, an important objective of financial sector 
development is the minimisation of the cost of collecting savers’ deposits and transferring them 
to bank loan recipients, willing to pay a required return, with an acceptably low probability of 
default. Bank interest rate margins are often used to estimate them. Ideally, intermediation costs 
should take full account of interactions between bank operating costs and interest rate spreads, 
amongst other factors. 
                   Figure 16: Trend in the spread of interest rates 
 
                Source: South African Reserve Bank 
One would expect interest rate liberalisation to be seen in declining spreads between short-term 
deposit and lending rates, as spreads are an important indicator of competitiveness and efficiency 
of the financial (banking) system. In the case of South Africa interest rate spreads rose from 
about 3 percent in 1970 to about 8 percent in 1981 due to the oligopolistic nature of banks in 
South Africa (Figure 16). Following the lifting of control on interest rate ceilings in the early 
1980s, interest rate spread became low and rose following the 1985 debt standstill and the biting 
effects of economic sanctions on the banking sector. 
Following a series of changes in the banking sector in the 1980s which saw the withdrawal of 
Standard Chartered Bank and Barclays Bank from South Africa, and the sale of their assets to 
local banks, and the consolidation of local banks such as the Amalgamated Bank of South 












This is very much in line with the average of the interest rate spread (4%) during the 1985 
and1993 period and 3.9 percent during the 1970 to1984 period. The entry of new banks and the 
introduction of financial instruments have not significantly impacted on interest rate spread in 
South Africa. This further amplifies evidence of domination of the banking sector by a few 
(four) big banks namely ABSA, Standard Bank, Nedcor and First Rand bank. 
3.3.11.3 Long-Term Deposit to GDP ratio 
The evolution of long term deposits in relation to GDP reflects the degree of confidence in the 
overall economy. The evolution of this ratio is captured in Figure 17). 
                     Figure 17: Trends in the Ratio of long-term deposit to GDP 
 
                 Source: South African Reserve Bank 
There has been a declining trend in this ratio since the 1970s, reflecting the influence of political 
uncertainties. During 1979 and 1984, the ratio of long term deposits to GDP averaged 19 
percent. From 1985 to 1993, this trend worsened as the ratio fell to 11 percent. Thereafter it 
stabilised at very low levels averaging 6 percent. Disinvestment thus took its toll on long term 
deposits in South Africa. This situation hasn’t changed much since the advent of democracy and 
the ratio has actually levelled out at around 6 percent since 1994. This implies that whereas long 
term investors are still to commit strongly into the South African economy, the trend of 
disinvestment has been stemmed. 
3.3.10.8 The Ratio of Coins and Notes to (M1) and (M2) 
This quantity index is one of the measures that can be used to indicate the degree to which the 












to be high as financial sector development is low and economic and financial transactions are 
predominantly on ‘cash and carry’ basis. With increased development of the financial sector, 
there is increase in the use of cheques and electronic transfers and debit cards such that this ratio 
progressively declines and becomes low. This quantity index is therefore inversely related to the 
index of the degree of the electronic money which is discussed later. 
Coins and notes as a proportion of demand deposit have been declining since the 1970s. As a 
proportion of M1, it declined from about 25 percent in 1979 to 14 percent in 1990. During 1985 
to 1993, coins and notes represented 14.8 percent of demand deposit in the country. This ratio 
averaged 10 percent of M1 during 1994-2002 (Figure 18). 
                  Figure 18: Trends in the Ratios of Coins and Notes to M1 & M2   
 
                Source: South African Reserve Bank  
When the ratio of coins and notes to narrow money is expanded to include savings, the analysis 
extends to broad money and it is intended to examine whether the same trend is maintained. In 
lagging economies this ratio is expected to be high as savings are low and the financial sector is 
not sufficiently developed to provide instruments for attracting new and maintaining old savings. 
In the case of South Africa, coins and notes as a proportion of broad money has declined over 
this period. This suggests that the level of financial sector development in South Africa is 
deepening. In the 1985-1993 period, this ratio averaged 6.3 percent. The ratio fell to 5.2 percent 













This section has discussed financial development in South Africa during the 1965-2004 period, 
using various quantitative indices of measures of financial variables. It has been suggested that 
notes and coins are becoming progressively less important in relation to other measures of 
money and in the overall economy. This might suggest a move towards the cashless economy 
with its attendant implications for economic security for the poorer segment of South Africa who 
depend mainly on cash-based transactions. 
There has been a trend of increasing credit allocation to the private sector as well as the ability of 
banks to extend mortgage loans. Short term savings have been better and more effectively 
mobilised than before, the exact corollary of the performance of long-term saving. The trend of 
disinvestment by long-term investors has been stemmed. Since democracy, limited efforts have 
been made to further develop the financial sector and the banking sector has been unsuccessful in 
introducing new non-deposit financial products to attract more savings from the wider 
population. The entry of new banks and the introduction of financial instruments have not 
significantly impacted on interest rate spread in South Africa.  
3.4 Zambia 
In the past four decades since independence, economic growth in Zambia’s GDP growth has 
averaged 1.5 percent in the 1970s, 1.4 percent in the 1980s, and 0.3 percent in the 1990s before 
picking up in the early 2000s. Most of the poor growth results can be attributed to a combination 
of past government policy not being conducive to private sector growth, including the creation of 
a vast array of administrative barriers, and the resultant low levels of investment. In particular, 
this outcome reflects the decline in the mining sector, which has not been offset by growth in 
other sectors of the economy. Over the period (1964-2004), per capita GDP actually declined by 
an average 1.6% per annum. 
This section examines how financial policies have shaped the evolution of the banking sector in 
Zambia since independence. The aim is to explore a number of related hypotheses. First, that 
interventionist policies were either ineffective in changing the way that banks allocated credit 
and/or had a negative impact on the strength of the banking system. For instance that interest rate 
controls led to disintermediation in conditions of high inflation when real rates were highly 
negative and that, attempts by government owned banks to extend loans to meet development 
objectives undermined their solvency, while administrative controls had little impact on the 












Second, that prudential regulation was not accorded sufficient priority with adverse 
consequences for financial fragility in the banking system, especially when locally owned private 
sector banks were set up in the 1980s and early 1990s. Third, reforms are difficult to implement 
effectively and probably have a limited impact on the efficiency of resource allocation by the 
banking system, especially in conditions of macroeconomic instability. The major constraints to 
improving efficiency are institutional in character and cannot be rectified quickly. 
The rest of this section is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses briefly some macroeconomic 
developments in Zambia since it attained its independence from Britain in 1964. Section 3 details 
the main components of financial sector policies during the period of interventionist economic 
policies in Zambia, and assesses the impact of financial repression on the financial depth of the 
economy. A key facet of the government’s financial policies was the establishment of a major 
government owned bank, the Zambia National Commercial Bank (ZNCB). The financial sector 
reforms which were started in the 1980s are described and assessed in Sections 4. Section 5 
considers the liberalisation of financial markets and its impact on deposit mobilisation and 
allocative efficiency, while Section 6 examines the reforms which took place in the 1990s and 
thereafter assess their impact on financial development. Section 7 will discuss the conclusions of 
the thesis. 
3.4.1 Economic Background 
At independence in 1964, Zambia inherited a strong mining-based economy. It deteriorated in 
the mid-1970s following a sharp decline in copper prices, compounded by the oil shock. The 
country’s failure to make positive policy changes in response to the declining economic 
environment further worsened the situation. Instead, foreign borrowing was increased to 
minimise the decline in living standards. Zambia recognised during these early years the need to 
diversify her economy and reduce over-dependency on mining exports. The preferred strategy 
was import substitution industrialisation that was import-dependent. This encouraged firms to 
produce for the domestic market but did little to build the requisite capacity to export. With little 
foreign exchange being earned amidst the entry during the 1990s of highly competitive consumer 
imports, the industrialisation strategy failed, leading to increasing unemployment (Situmbeko et 
al., 2004). 
The economic shocks after 1973 led to large declines in GDP. Between 1973 and 1984, real 
GDP fell by an average of 1.5 per cent a year. This was a total fall in real per capita GDP of 35 












and the collapse of copper export prices, Zambia had to undertake heavy external borrowing. 
Total external debt increased from US$800 million in 1970 to US$3.2 billion by 1980 (World 
Bank, 2003). Most of this debt was owed to bilateral creditors. Long term multilateral debt was 
US$400 million in 1980. This meant a rise in the ratio of debt to GDP from 43.7 per cent in 1974 
to 94.7 per cent in 1977 (Bonnick, 1997). The debt crisis in Zambia meant it had to resort to 
more comprehensive programmes with the IMF and World Bank in order to gain access to the 
resources. Following negotiations beginning in 1981, an Extended Fund Facility with the IMF 
and Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) with the World Bank were agreed in 1983. 
3.4.2 Other Macroeconomic Trends for Zambia Prior to Reforms 
In the mid-1980s, per capita GNP in real terms was one-third less than in 1964 when Zambia 
became independent. The rate of inflation was about 15 percent per annum during the late 1970s, 
but picked up momentum and reached 50 percent in 1986. The balance of payments had been 
strained since the price of copper fell in the mid-1970s, but the pressure mounted over time. The 
foreign debt increased considerably and the government was not able to service it fully for a 
number of years. Arrears in payments had mounted, including payments to the IMF and the 
World Bank.  
Furthermore, Zambia had suffered from a variety of exogenous shocks: deterioration in the terms 
of trade, harvest failures caused by drought, transport dislocations in the wake of Rhodesia’s 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence, and military activities related to Zimbabwe’s freedom 
struggle. Assessing the quantitative significance of all of these disturbances is not possible, but 
the impact of adverse terms of trade movements can be calculated. 
3.4.2.1 Terms of Trade 
Zambia is almost unique in having one commodity, copper, play an overwhelming role in its 
exports. It supplies 85 to 90 percent of foreign exchange earnings, and Zambia is extremely 
vulnerable to the instability in world copper prices and to their recent very low level. On the 
import side, Zambia is typical of many oil-importing, low-income countries.10 The unit value of 
imports rose very sharply after 1973 and then again in 1979 as a result of the hike in energy 
prices. This index was also affected by the unprecedented inflation in OECD countries in the 
1970s, and by the fact that exporters to Zambia charged increasing mark-ups on prices in 
                                               
10 Capital goods accounted for 39 percent of total imports in the early 1970s, intermediates for 37 percent 












anticipation of delays in obtaining payments. All these factors culminated in a disastrous 
deterioration in the Zambia’s terms of trade during 1974-78 (see  Figure 19). 
      Figure 19: Terms of Trade for Zambia 
 
     Source: World Bank Data files 
Egregious policies (such as failures to use price mechanism in managing aggregate demand and 
in securing a sensible allocation of resources) compounded the devastating impact of exogenous 
shocks. The framework of incentives was distorted by the emergence of large gaps between 
‘efficiency’ and prevailing prices, many of which were under government control. Many of these 
government interventions and the establishment of numerous parastatals, aimed at achieving 
well-meaning objectives, generated very serious adverse side-effects and led to large 
misallocation of resources. 
Figure 20 provides a historical perspective of the management of aggregate demand. Political 
independence witnessed a massive increase in both consumption and investment. These 
expansions did not create any financial imbalances since GDY (total production adjusted for the 
terms of trade) exceeded GDE (consumption plus investment) up to 1970. The following year 
saw a major deterioration in copper prices. The surplus on the current account of the balance of 
payments was eliminated. Terms of trade losses beginning in 1975 (see  Figure 19), which 















Figure 20: National Account Indicators1 (1960-1980) 
Million Kwacha (1980 Prices) 
 
• Gross domestic expenditure (GDE) = total consumption + investment. 
• Gross domestic income (GDY) = gross domestic product (GDP) plus/minus  
      gain/loss due to changes in terms of trade. 
• Source: World Bank (1987b). 
The government had to make a strategic choice between restoring financial balance by curtailing 
aggregate demand and maintaining the level of demand by resorting to extraordinary sources of 
finance. GDE was reduced significantly, mainly by curtailing capital formation. This did not 
restore financial balance, however. Zambia had to borrow on hard terms from foreign 
commercial banks and supplier’s credit agencies (see Figure 21). It also had to draw on the IMF. 
Figure 21: Balance of Payment Indicators, 1970-1980 
 












The same problem of financial imbalance in the context of the government budget is portrayed in 
Figure 22. In 1975, budget deficits started becoming very large. The government borrowed 
heavily from the domestic banking system in 1977 and 1978. Such borrowings averaged 10 
percent of GDP in 1975-79, compared to 3 percent in 1970-74. Correspondingly, inflation, 
measured by the cost of living index, rose at a rate of 16.5 percent per annum during 1975-79, 
compared to 5.6 percent per annum in the earlier period. 
                     Figure 22: Budget Deficit and its Financing, 1972-86 
 
a) NFC is Net Foreign Capital (including grants) which comprises borrowing from foreign  
governments, international development institutions, and other foreign borrowing  
(see line DIII of source). 
b) BFLB is Borrowing From Local Banks and is the total of government borrowing from deposit  
money banks and monetary authorities of central government. It is in a net basis. 
c) Budget deficit of central government = total expenditure - current revenue (excluding  
grants). 
 
        Source: Government Finance Statistics Yearbook. IMF (various years). 
By the late 1970s, this pattern of adjustment and financing had left Zambia with an onerous 
legacy of over-indebtedness and rapid inflation. Clearly, the government had mismanaged 
demand. It had made judgments about economic prospects, particularly about the recovery of 
copper prices that had turned out to be wrong. The strong preference for reducing investment 
rather than consumption had left in its wake a host of problems in the real economy, namely, 
delays in replacing old assets and postponement of needed new projects. 
Managing aggregate demand in an environment of instability was not easy. Zambia's exports, for 
example, fluctuated on average by 13 percent per annum from trend during 1965-79. 












ante was extremely difficult. For example, World Bank projections of international copper prices 
turned out to have sizeable errors. 
These difficulties, notwithstanding, Zambian policymakers had to choose between contra-
cyclical reserve management and a stance of letting the terms of trade dictate the state of the 
economy. The evidence is that they did not (or could not) insulate the economy from the marked 
fluctuations in export revenues. During 1966-81, the simple correlation coefficient between 
exports and imports was 0.65 and that between exports and reserves was 0.08. Windfall gains in 
the years of export boom were not used to augment reserves; instead they spilled over into extra 
imports. Simulations suggest that import instability caused partly by export fluctuations could 
have been reduced by 50 percent if policymakers had managed reserves contra-cyclically using 
the simple extrapolation method of determining export trends. 
3.4.2.2 Price Controls 
The government displayed a strong preference for administrative controls, as against price policy 
instruments, both in managing aggregate demand and in allocating resources.  
 Figure 23: Nominal and Real Effective Exchange Rates (1970-86)  
 
Source: Bank of Zambia 
Throughout the 1960s and the 1970s, Zambia had a passive exchange rate policy. The kwacha 
was pegged first to the U.K pound and then in 1971 to the U.S. dollar. In 1976, the currency was 
devalued by 20 percent and pegged to the SDR. Another devaluation of 10 percent followed in 
1978. These moves brought about a depreciation of the real effective exchange rate by about 20 
percent during the 1970s (see Figure 23). Despite this depreciation, the government had to rely 












Commerce and Industry, and administrative allocation of foreign exchange by the Bank of 
Zambia. These arrangements proved to be time consuming and contributed significantly to the 
misallocation of resources. The problem of rationing foreign exchange became even more 
difficult in the early 1980s when the kwacha appreciated in real terms. 
Prior to the financial reforms, the entire structure of interest rates was controlled by the Bank of 
Zambia and changes were infrequent. Deposit rates, for example, remained in the 3 to 5 percent 
range up to 1975, and then moved up slowly to 7 percent by 1980 (Figure 24). 
Figure 24: Nominal and Real Interest Rates on Commercial Bank 
Deposits (1966-1986) 
 
   Source: IMF data (Developing Country Studies Division, Research Dept) 
In real terms (that is, after deflation by the consumer price index), interest rates were actually 
negative in many years, thereby penalising savers. Interest rates had very little impact on the 
allocation of credit. After the government's financial position deteriorated sharply following the 
decline in the price of copper, the Bank of Zambia had to accommodate government needs and 
restrict credit to the private sector. Monetary policy became hostage to the budget deficit. 
3.4.2.3 Foreign Exchange and Credit 
The price of foreign exchange and credit remained too low during this period, necessitating their 
rationing by administrative means. As might have been expected, these misalignments meant 
that Zambian economic development tended to be both capital and import intensive. 
Import intensity had deep historical roots. In the pre-independence period, a high level of 












exports of goods and non-factor services (GNFS) constituted 58 percent of GDP and imports 
(GNFS) averaged 42 percent. Zambia was a very ‘open’ economy and the very attractive copper 
prices (in real terms) of that time yielded substantial rents, permitting relatively high levels of 
imports. More than a quarter of these imports consisted of consumer goods. The remaining 
imports were divided more or less equally between capital and intermediate goods. 
As the balance of payments came under pressure, sustaining these high import levels became 
increasingly difficult. Sharply raising the price of foreign exchange by engineering a substantial 
real depreciation of the kwacha would have sent a clear, strong signal throughout the economy to 
economize on imports and to develop new export items. This did not occur. Imports contracted 
moderately and in a haphazard manner. There was little incentive to diversify the structure of 
exports and copper exports could not be sustained. The reduction of the import ratio between the 
early 1960s and 1978-80 was only 3 percent while the export ratio fell by 18 percent. 
3.4.3 The First Structural Adjustment Programme 
The 1980s marked the first phases of implementing Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) 
amidst a stagnating economy. The implementation was, however, often piecemeal and failed to 
fundamentally alter the economic structure. In particular, the design and implementation of SAP 
often failed to sufficiently address the poverty challenges that increasingly became evident as the 
structural changes took hold. GDP growth in the 1983-86 adjustment period was zero, inflation 
rose and the budget and trade deficits widened (Bonnik, 1999). The World Bank argued that 
“inflationary pressure continued to build since the expenditure-switching expected from the 
exchange rate policy was not adequately supported from both the monetary and public sectors 
via tight monetary and fiscal policy. As such reductions in absorption could not filter through to 
supply-side effects operating through exports” (World Bank, 1994). In other words, there was 
high government budget deficit which was not resolved by stringent monetary policy. 
Structurally, Zambia’s economy has changed little in spite of the above changes and consistent 
high economic growth has been elusive. Over the period 1980 to 1990, the country’s economic 
growth was the second lowest in the Southern African Development Community (SADC).  
Over the period 1990 to 1990, it had the least average annual growth rate in the SADC region at 
one percent. This was also below the sub-Saharan Africa rate of 2.4 percent. Consequently, real 












                Figure 25: Trends in Real GDP growth & Real GDP per capita (1965-04) 
 
             Source: World Development Indicators: online data 
The major failure of economic policies in Zambia has been the inability to diversify the export 
base of the country from copper to other commodities. When copper prices therefore plummeted 
in 1975, it resulted not only in lower export revenues but also in substantial losses in public 
revenue and in general output.  
The policy responses to this crisis were inadequate. In the face of lower foreign exchange 
availability, the government borrowed heavily from abroad in the belief that the crisis was 
temporary (FSDP, 2004). Since Zambia was in the medium income category then, it borrowed 
from the multilateral institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF at non-concessionary 
terms. This is how the country came to find itself as one of the most indebted and poor in the 
world, owing about $6.3 billion or $741 on per capita basis. This was about 2 times the size of 
the GDP. Since about half of her debt was to the multilateral institutions whose terms were not 
renegotiable, Zambia found itself in a position it could not renegotiate the debt repayment. 
Another inadequate response to the balance of payments problems was in the foreign exchange 
rate management area. In the 1970s and 1980s, many developing countries did not accept the 
exchange rate as a potent instrument for balance of payments policy. This was due to the belief 
that devaluing a currency merely increased inflation without substantially improving the balance 
of payments situation. This view was also held in Zambia. 
With a fixed exchange rate and rising domestic inflation, it was not long before the currency 
became overvalued. This combined with the industrial policy then that encouraged import 












and dependent on imported raw materials. In turn, this deepened the foreign exchange crisis 
further. Rationing of foreign exchange was made even harder and probably more subjective as 
well. Firms complained that they were operating at very low capacity due to limited foreign 
exchange availability. Others threatened that they would lay off workers. 
In the midst of this, economic growth was mostly elusive and when it occurred, it was not 
sustainable. The black market in both foreign currencies and commodities flourished. This 
economic environment worked to the benefit of rent seekers rather than producers, thereby 
intensifying the distortions against production. By 1985, the authorities came to the conclusion 
that the system had become moribund and that it required drastic action to reform it. This is how 
the reform program of 1985 to 1987 came into being. 
3.4.4 Financial Policies (1964-1991) 
After attaining independence in 1964, the Zambian government practiced an interventionist 
approach to the economy which involved nationalisation of companies such as mines and other 
manufacturing institutions. The nationalisation process begun in 1968 with 28 companies, and 
this was followed by the policy of nationalising the mining sector in 1969 (Fundanga et al.,
1997; White, 1998).  The above strategy, motivated by economic nationalism and the desire to 
redress political and economic inequalities, entailed state led import substituting industrialisation 
and extensive government controls over resource allocation.   
Despite the above reforms, economic performance however was very poor it was severely 
affected by the steep fall in the price of copper from the mid 1970s, while the interventionist 
policies led to inefficiencies and structural rigidities which impeded adjustment to external 
shocks. A series of IMF stabilisation programmes were implemented, beginning in 1976, in an 
attempt to tackle the economic crisis, but, apart from a short period during 1985-87, the 
government persisted with the main components of the interventionist strategy until the late 
1980s/early 1990s (Fardi, 1991; Jones, 1994). The financial system in the mid 1960s was 
dominated by foreign commercial banks which mainly served the interest of foreign and 
expatriate businesses. The general thrust of financial policies after 1968 was to enable 
government to exert greater control over the financial system and to ensure that credit allocation 
was more supportive of the government’s overall economic strategy. Financial policies consisted 
of three main strands: nationalisation of foreign financial institutions, establishment of 
government owned banks and development finance institutions, and administrative controls over 












3.4.4.1 Repression of Financial Sector 
With respect to the financial sector, the banking sector was not severely repressed. Instead of 
nationalising the banks, the government did create its own three banks including Zambia 
National Commercial Bank (ZNCB) which was established by the government in 1969. Because 
ZNCB had the monopoly over all the banking business of parastatals it became Zambia’s largest 
commercial bank in terms of assets (Fundanga et al., 1997). Its objectives included the provision 
of credit to Zambians and the extension of bank branches into the rural areas (Musokotwane, p 
12). The government however realised that ZNCB was not going to manage to expand rapidly 
enough to meet the expectations placed on it, and in 1971 announced plans to nationalise all the 
foreign financial institutions, including the commercial banks (Harvey, 1991). 
The aim of nationalisation was to control the economy and to prevent capital flight (Mwanawina 
et al., 2002). Most of the non bank financial institutions were nationalised and amalgamated to 
form financial parastatals such as the State Insurance Corporation and Zambia National Building 
Society (Musokotwane, pp 8-9). But with one exception the banks were never nationalised 
because the owners threatened to withdraw their expatriate management and the Zambian 
government was not convinced that it could manage the banks without them (Harvey, 1993). 
Instead, several other banks and non bank financial institutions were set up by the government to 
serve various purposes. For instance, Indo-Zambia Bank was established in 1984 as a joint 
venture between the government and three state owned Indian banks, and in 1987 the Zambia 
Export and Import Bank was founded to supply trade finance. Development finance institutions 
were set up to provide concessional and/or long term finance to priority sectors with funds 
mobilised from the government or external sources. These included the Zambia Agricultural 
Development Bank and Agricultural Finance Company, which were amalgamated to form the 
Lima Bank in 1987, and the Development Bank of Zambia. 
3.4.4.2 Interest Rate and Other Administrative Controls 
The third strand of the government’s financial policies consisted of the imposition of 
administrative controls over financial institutions. By the end of the 1970s an all embracing 
system of controls had been constructed, with price controls for major commodities, government 
intervention in credit allocation through the Zambia National Commercial Bank, import controls 
(as foreign exchange currency became scarce after 1975) and an overvalued  exchange rate with 












With the exception of interest rates however, direct administrative controls over resource 
allocation in the banking system were not extensively employed by the government. This could 
have been due to lack of detailed sectoral credit guidelines, for example. However, the 
government did attempt to channel more credit towards Zambians by requiring banks to seek 
permission from the Bank of Zambia (BOZ) before lending to foreign companies and by 
imposing lower maximum gearing ratios on foreign borrowers than Zambian borrowers. This 
failed to induce a major expansion of lending to private sector Zambians, and in an attempt to 
rectify this, the government established a credit guarantee scheme for small scale industries in 
1987 (Musokotwane, pp 20-24). 
The lack of more extensive administrative controls to direct the pattern of bank lending was 
probably for two reasons. First, foreign exchange controls already provided the authorities with a 
powerful tool for directing resource allocation in the economy. Given the severe constraints on 
foreign exchange availability, firms with access to foreign exchange would generally have been 
creditworthy borrowers while those without would not: hence foreign exchange allocation 
exerted indirect influence over credit allocation and obviated the need for more direct credit 
controls. Second, given the weaknesses of the domestic private sector, the bias against 
agriculture in pricing policies and the economic crisis which afflicted Zambia from the mid 
1970s, banks would almost certainly have had great difficulty in identifying creditworthy 
borrowers had they been instructed to lend to those sectors favoured by government rhetoric, 
notably agriculture. 
To further the objectives of extending banking into rural areas the central bank of Zambia (BOZ) 
imposed a requirement on the commercial banks that, after their first four branches had been 
established along the line of rail, any establishment of additional branches for the bank along the 
line of rail was to be accompanied by opening up of a rural branch (Musokotwane, pp 20). 
Beginning in the mid 1960s, the deposit and lending rates of the commercial banks were 
controlled by the BOZ which maintained a policy of low interest rates in order to minimize 
borrowing costs. Until 1984 commercial bank deposit rates were held within a range of 3.5 per 
cent and 8.5 per cent and lending rates between 7 per cent and 13 per cent (Musokotwane, pp 33 
and 55). In addition a preferential rate was stipulated for agricultural lending from 1978. 
Nominal rates were generally held below the rate of inflation, which averaged 10 per cent during 












Table 19: Nominal interest rates and inflation 
Year Treasury Bill Rate Savings Deposit Lending Rate Inflation 
1970 3.1 3.5 7.0 2.2 
1975 4.0 4.0 7.5 10.1 
1980 4.5 7.0 8.5 11.7 
1985 13.2 14.8 19.2 37.4 
1990 26.4 23.5 37.5 109.5 
1991 38.5 31.5 44.5 93.4 
1992 46.5 41.5 55.8 191.3 
1993 135.1 78.9 116.6 187.1 
Source: Musokotwane (n.d.: 55 and 57); IFS 
There was an increase in both inflation and nominal interest rates from the mid 1980s onwards. 
The implementation of a stabilisation programme led to a small rise in administered interest rates 
in 1984 and the decontrol of interest rates and introduction of a Treasury bill auction in 
September of the following year. Lending rates rose sharply thereafter – to around 30 per cent in 
1986 – although because this was accompanied by an acceleration of inflation real interest rates 
remained negative. Interest rate controls were re-imposed in May 1987 following the breakdown 
of an IMF supported adjustment programme, and held below 20 per cent for the remainder of the 
decade. The government adopted a new IMF supported adjustment programme in 1989 under 
which interest rates were again raised, although they remained far below prevailing inflation 
rates which had by this time reached levels in excess of 100 per cent per annum. During the 
1990s interest rates were again raised and then liberalised (Mulaisho, 1994).  
3.4.5 Financial Liberalisation 
A full structural adjustment programme was introduced between 1983 and 1987. Through it the 
bank reforms were also implemented in 1985 and these involved liberalisation of interest rate, 
reduction in subsidies and elimination of price controls (White, 1994). The most fundamental of 
these reforms involved removing controls on foreign exchange allocation in preparation for 
action system. Although as argued by White (1994), the auction system only accounted for about 
one fifth of total forex transactions, this rate was taken to be the official rate and resulted into a 
depreciation of the local currency from K2.2 per dollar prior to the introduction of the action 
system to K21 per dollar shortly before the action system was suspended. 
The action system was blamed as the cause of higher inflation and that it allowed the rich to 
benefit by importing goods which ordinarily people could not afford. This also culminated into 












people, the government backed down, paving the way to the formal abandonment of reforms in 
1987. The forex auction was abolished and the Kwacha was fixed to the revalued rate of K8 to 
the dollar and administrative allocation mechanism called FEMAC introduced. Furthermore, 
other administrative controls on prices and interest rates were re-imposed (White, 1994).  
In addition to the exchange rate reforms, prices for food products were liberalised in 1983, some 
of the subsidies were suppressed, urban wages were blocked, and recruitment in the public sector 
was halted. In 1985, further measures were taken in the sphere of international trade: import 
quotas were lifted, and tariffs were aligned on international standards. However, the government 
stopped this first attempt at liberalising the economy on May 1, 1987, in response to serious civil 
unrest. A new attempt at liberalising prices was conducted in 1989, also resulting in urban riots. 
Further liberalisation only occurred after 1992, when the new government took over power. 
3.4.5.1 The Impact of Initial Reforms on Financial Development and Growth 
Until the second half of the 1980s negative real interest rates did not have adverse effects on the 
financial depth of the economy – the M2/GDP ratio increased from 29.2 per cent in 1970 to 34.6 
per cent in 1984 – probably because they were not sufficiently negative to provide a serious 
deterrent to the holding of monetary assets. In addition foreign exchange controls prevented the 
major institutional actors in the economy (most of which were the parastatals) from holding 
foreign currency as a substitute for domestic financial assets (Adam, 1995). From the mid 1980s 
onwards however inflation accelerated, averaging 68 per cent during 1985-90, and this led to 
much more sharply negative real interest rates. By the end of the 1980s the economy’s financial 
depth was diminishing rapidly: the M2/GDP ratio fell from 33.7 per cent in 1988 to 21.5 per cent 
in 1990 (see Table 20). 
Table 20: Indicators of financial development in Zambia (1970-1993) 
Year M2/GDP Bank deposit/GDP 
1970 29.2 20.3 
1975 31.2 24.2 
1980 29.6 24.3 
1985 29.7 24.8 
1990 21.5 17.4 
1993 14.2 11.0 
Source: International Financial Statistics 
With respect to growth of the economy, the system of controls did not help revive growth, as 












GDP per capita continued to decline from US$391 in 1985 to US$361 in 1990 respectively). In 
addition to the deterioration in economic performance, poverty among households increased 
markedly with those households below the poverty line increasing from 49 percent in 1980 to 67 
percent in 1991 (Mutukwa et al., 1994). During the first part of 1989 as a prelude for resumption 
of talks with the IMF and World Bank undertook some reforms which included: food coupons to 
reduce the cost of food, 63 percent devaluation of the local currency and decontrol of many 
prices (White, 1994). 
3.4.6 Financial Reforms (1991-2004) 
Apart from the relatively short period from September 1985 to May 1987 when interest rates 
were temporarily decontrolled, financial sector reforms have only recently been implemented. 
Financial reforms have comprised two main components: financial liberalisation which included 
the liberalisation of foreign exchange markets and interest rates in 1992-93, and reforms to the 
system of prudential regulation and supervision of financial institutions, which included the 
enactment of new banking legislation in 1994. A third component was the de facto liberalisation 
of access to banking licences which enabled the number of local banks to expand rapidly during 
1991-94, although to what extent this was a deliberate policy decision is unclear. The reforms 
have not yet included measures to restructure distressed public sector banks, but given the scale 
of ZNCB’s non performing loans, this is likely to be necessary in the near future. This and the 
following section examine the financial reforms implemented in Zambia and present an 
assessment of their efficacy (which must inevitably be very tentative given that the reforms are 
so recent). Financial liberalisation is discussed in this section while in the following section we 
examine the reforms covering the period 1991-2004. 
Financial liberalisation was undertaken in Zambia in conditions of acute macroeconomic 
instability. Central bank financing of a very large fiscal deficit led to a 95 per cent increase in 
broad money and a consumer price inflation rate of 93 per cent during 1991. Interest rate 
controls during 1991 limited the maximum lending rate to 46 per cent and the savings deposit 
rate to 33 per cent: hence real interest rates were substantially negative. Although the fiscal 
deficit was reduced in the following year, inflation accelerated to 193 per cent by the end of 
1992. 
3.4.6.1 Interest Rates 
The financial policy objectives of the government in 1992 were to reduce inflation and to move 












rates were adjusted upwards: the maximum lending rate was raised to 53 per cent by June 1992. 
Meanwhile a market determined exchange rate was introduced, with foreign exchange controls 
substantially liberalised and banks allowed to deal in foreign currency: this led to a sharp 
depreciation of the exchange rate during 1992. In September 1992 bank interest rates were 
decontrolled, and a Treasury bill auction was introduced in January 1993 which allowed 
Treasury bill rates to be market determined (White, 1994). The latter brought about a steep rise 
in treasury bill rates – 91 day treasury bill yields rose from 47 per cent in December 1992 to 
181.8 per cent in June 1993 – and this pushed up bank deposit and lending rates: savings deposit 
rates rose to 78.9 per cent and lending rates to 116.6 per cent in 1993 (see Table 19). Inflation 
and nominal interest rates began to subside in the second half of 1993 after the government 
adopted a cash budget for its primary expenditure (i.e. all expenditure other than debt servicing). 
The inflation rate was reduced to 100 per cent and the 91 day Treasury bill yield fell to 85.4 per 
cent in March 1994 (White, 1994). 
The objectives of financial liberalisation include boosting deposit mobilisation and enhancing the 
efficiency of credit allocation. Liberalisation did not boost deposit mobilisation: deposits as a 
percentage of GDP fell from 17.9 per cent in 1991 to 10.4 per cent in 1994, although they had 
been on a downward trend since the late 1980s. One of the reasons why financial liberalisation 
failed to halt the trend towards financial shallowing in Zambia was probably that the removal of 
foreign exchange controls allowed economic agents to legally hold foreign currency assets. Bank 
deposits may also have been diverted into treasury bills as Treasury bill yields surpassed bank 
deposit interest rates during 1993 and 1994 (Adam 1995). Higher deposit rates would have made 
domestic currency deposits more attractive to savers than they had been prior to interest rate 
liberalisation, but they remained well below the rate of inflation until 1994. Relative to 
alternative financial assets, liberalisation probably made bank deposits less attractive to savers in 
Zambia. 
It is not clear whether liberalisation enhanced the efficiency of credit allocation in the banking 
system. The combination of very high nominal lending rates and inflation greatly increase the 
risks of bank intermediation for both the banks and their borrowers, making it likely that both 
loan demand and the willingness of banks to supply credit will be curtailed (Harvey and Jenkins 
1994). Evaluating loan applicants is especially problematic in such conditions, so that even if 
liberalisation allowed banks to adopt more explicitly commercial criteria in allocating and 












volume of creditworthy borrowers to which the banks could lend was limited, especially because 
the formal sector was still dominated by parastatals, many of which have experienced acute 
financial difficulties. 
There is a case for arguing that financial liberalisation was premature, and that it should have 
been delayed until the fiscal deficit and monetary growth had been brought under control. The 
arguments for this are twofold. First, lower nominal interest rates would have reduced the risks 
of loan defaults by borrowers, and by implication helped to protect the loan portfolios of the 
banks. Second, if liberalisation did undermine the monetary base and therefore increase the 
velocity of circulation of money by inducing agents to substitute non monetary for monetary 
assets, reducing inflation would have been made more difficult and would have required a 
greater deceleration in the growth of money supply, and therefore imposed a larger burden on 
fiscal contraction (Adam 1995). 
3.4.6.2 Exchange Rates 
Zambia has, for most of the time, followed a fixed exchange rate regime except for the period 
between 1985 and 1987 when the exchange rate was determined by an auctioning mechanism. 
The current structural adjustment period (since 1991) began with a fixed exchange rate which 
was adjusted weekly on the basis of the Kwacha's purchasing power parity. Since there was also 
a retention market exchange rate (in which the exchange rates were determined by market 
forces) co-existing with the official rate, there was in effect a dual exchange rate regime. 
The exchange rate regime changed drastically in October 1992 when the bureaux de change 
became operational (Mutukwa et al., 1994). After 3 months of their establishment, the 
government decided to merge the official exchange rate, which all along had been controlled, 
with the bureaux de change cum retention market exchange rate. The daily official rate was 
henceforth to be determined by the weighted average of the bureaux de change rates. The rates 
were merged because the government believed there should be a single market determined 
exchange rate. Also, the major foreign exchange earner, the Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines, 
which also happened to be the major consumer of imports, felt that it was being treated unfairly 
because its Kwacha receipts were at the cheaper official rate and yet its suppliers priced their 
goods at the bureaux cum retention market exchange rates which were more expensive. 
The Kwacha depreciated quickly to reach around K560 per US dollar in May 1993 from K359 at 












from its earlier depreciation, reaching about K350 to the US dollar by the beginning of October. 
This turn about was largely attributed to the tight liquidity situation that existed, with reserve 
money growing much slower from June to September compared to the first half of the year. 
Another indication of the tight liquidity has been the lower growth rate of the money supply 
from an average of about 8 percent per month between January and May to only 2.1 up to 
October. Finally, the high real interest rates have also led to less borrowing from the banks 
which in turn have reduced the demand for foreign exchange, thereby contributing to the 
kwacha's appreciation (Mwanza et al., 1994). 
3.4.6.3 Foreign Exchange Liberalization 
Another key area of reform has been foreign exchange liberalisation to the extent of full 
convertibility. As alluded to earlier, Zambia had for most part of the era after 1975 faced acute 
foreign exchange shortages which resulted in industries operating below capacity. The 
abandonment of the 1985 program in which an auction system allocated foreign exchange the 
new Foreign Exchange Management Committee that was established rationed foreign exchange 
among the competing needs. The preference for allocating foreign exchange was given to 
manufacturing firms, especially those using local raw materials, and to farming. 
This system of allocating foreign exchange proved to be inefficient. Against this, an Open 
General License Import System (OGL) was introduced in 1990. This system initially operated on 
the basis of a positive list whereby an item included on the list committed the central bank to 
providing foreign exchange to each importer for its procurement. The number of items on the list 
was continuously increased until, in 1992, it was finally decided to drop the positive list and, 
instead, have a negative list of only 11 items which would not qualify for importation under the 
OGL arrangements (White, 1994). 
Although foreign exchange allocation under the OGL system worked better than it did under the 
foreign exchange management committee, it was far from being perfect because the exchange 
rate was still controlled. This, on a number of occasions, resulted in pipelines of foreign 
exchange approvals which could not be timely funded. Exporters of non-traditional commodities 
and importers who were willing to buy foreign exchange from them under the foreign retention 
market facility, however, were able, most of the time, to access foreign exchange quickly. 
In October 1992, bureaux de change opened. Exporters of goods and services were free to sell 












their foreign exchange from the bureaux, just as they were free to do so from commercial banks. 
As a result, exchange control on current account transactions were virtually removed save for 
those on a small number of restricted items like arms and ammunition. In theory there still 
existed quantitative restrictions on how much foreign exchange could be bought per transaction 
in addition to restrictions on capital transactions. In practice however, it was impossible to police 
the restrictions. 
The supply of foreign exchange improved substantially after the merger of the retention, bureaux 
de change and the official exchange rates in December 1992 especially after June when the 
monetary conditions tightened up. It was this mark of confidence later towards the end of 1993, 
apart from the confidence that the exchange rate was likely to remain stable in future that 
encouraged the authorities to finally eliminate exchange control in January, 1994. 
3.4.6.4 Liberalisation Regarding Entry to Financial Market 
Furthermore, the financial sector reforms implemented after 1991, led to the opening of several 
banks, many with poorly qualified staff and insufficient capital. The number of banks increased 
from six, before the reforms, to twenty-five in December 1994, with 188 branches (Maimbo, et 
al., 2003). During the same period, the Central Bank of Zambia reduced the statutory reserve 
ratio from thirty percent to three percent. The ensuing liquidity surge, and insider lending, 
imprudent foreign exchange operations and high levels of non-performing loans created 
difficulties in several institutions. There were thirteen bank failures in the late 1990s, costing the 
government in excess of K90 billion. Several failures remain unresolved. In response, the 
Central Bank of Zambia tightened up the regulations on capital requirements and foreign 
exchange trading, and increased the statutory reserve ratio to eleven percent in 2000, and 17.5 
percent in 2002. This ratio was cut to fourteen percent in October 2003, in order to foster the 
reduction of the lending rates. This move was consistent with the Bank of Zambia policy of 
increasing its reliance on indirect (market-based) monetary policy instruments, rather than direct 
regulation of the financial sector (FSDP, 2004). 
3.4.6.5 Institutional Reforms 
Major reforms to the system of prudential regulation and supervision of the financial system 
began in 1994. As in many other African countries the prudential framework put in place during 
the colonial period and the early years of independence was not adequate to effectively regulate 
the banking system, especially as the latter evolved during the 1980s. There were serious 












a number of banks in later 1990s also put a test on this prudential regulation and exposed their 
weakness. 
What is clear though is that prior to the economic reforms of the 1990s, the BOZ’s main role was 
in ensuring compliance with government imposed regulations. Prudential regulation was not a 
priority, and bank inspections concentrated on checking that banks complied with foreign 
exchange and interest rate controls as well as statutory liquidity requirements (Bank of Zambia, 
1994). The BOZ also acquired an equity stake in ZNCB, which clearly would have compromised 
its role as the bank regulator had the latter been taken more seriously. To some extent the lack of 
emphasis accorded to prudential regulation was justifiable until Bank of Credit and Commerce of 
Zambia and Meridien Bank were set up in the early 1980s, the banks operating in Zambia were 
either owned by well established foreign banks or the government and thus reasonably secure in 
terms of the safety of deposits. It was also the case that the controlled economy provided a 
relatively safe environment for bank lending. 
However with the advent of BCCZ and the local banks, a much more purposeful approach to 
prudential regulation and supervision was required. The fact that reforms to the prudential 
system were delayed until 1994 has almost certainly cost the taxpayers heavily as a result of the 
Meridien collapse and may have resulted in further costs if many more of the local banks had 
failed. The potential fragility among the local banks is at least partly attributable to the fact that 
the revisions to the banking legislation were not enacted until three years after a more liberal 
attitude to bank licensing was adopted. Substantial new entry into the banking industry was 
allowed before adequate prudential legislation and supervisory capacities had been put in place. 
Between 1965 and 1994 the legislative framework governing the banking industry was contained 
in the Banking Act and Bank of Zambia Act (Chapters 700 and 699 of the Laws of Zambia). 
Various aspects of these Acts impeded effective prudential regulation.  
First, the authority to license banks, and to withdraw licenses, lay not with the BOZ but with the 
Registrar of Banks appointed by the Ministry of Finance (MOF). Second, the Banking Act did 
not provide the BOZ with the authority to issue or update regulations pertaining to prudential 
requirements. One consequence of this was that the minimum capital requirement to set up a 
bank, which had been set in the Banking Act at Kw2 million (worth $3 million in 1971), 
remained unchanged until 1989 by which time it was worth $150,000. It was then raised to 
Kw20 million and remained at that level until the banking legislation was finally revised in 1994, 












$30,000. Third, the Banking Act was unclear as to what was required of directors and managers 
of banks applying for licenses in terms of qualifications, experience, etc., and on what grounds 
applications could be rejected. The deficiencies in the licensing regulations allowed banks 
lacking strong capital and managerial resources to be set in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
The Banking Act did set out capital adequacy standards relating capital and reserves to liabilities 
minus liquid assets, and specified that minimum transfers should be made from profits into a 
reserve fund. But the capital adequacy provisions were largely meaningless in the absence of 
appropriate regulations regarding provisioning for doubtful debts and non-accrual of unpaid 
interest. Hence a bank which was technically insolvent could appear well capitalised. Important 
omissions in the Banking Act were the lack of any references to insider lending and loan 
concentration. Moreover building societies, Post Office Savings Bank and other financial 
institutions established by a written law of Zambia were explicitly excluded from the Banking 
Act. 
The banking legislation was revised with the enactment of the Banking and Financial Services 
Act (BFSA) in 1994. The BFSA gave the BOZ more legal independence from the ministry of 
finance (MOF). In this regard the Registrar was placed under BOZ control although the MOF 
must be consulted on licensing and other matters. It is more flexible than the previous Banking 
Act with the BOZ (or the MOF on the recommendation of the BOZ) having the authority to issue 
prudential guidelines and regulations (e.g. in regard to capital adequacy) and to demand regular 
data from financial institutions relating to prudential matters. The BFSA is also far more 
comprehensive in terms of both the type of financial institutions covered and the requirements 
demanded of these financial institutions and their directors. 
The BFSA covers all financial institutions in Zambia. In granting licenses to financial 
institutions the Registrar must take account of the financial resources, experience and character 
of applicants and proposed directors. The minimum paid up capital for a bank has been raised to 
Kw1.25 billion ($1.3 million). The BFSA imposes restrictions on loan exposure and insider 
lending, although the latter is less restrictive than in other banking legislations on the continent. 
It also imposes restrictions on shareholder concentration and, by stipulating that a majority of 
board members should not be officers or employees of the bank, provides for some degree of 












The BFSA gives the BOZ authority to take a range of measures, from issuing directives 
stipulating remedial action to revoking a bank’s license, against banks that conduct unsafe or 
unsound practises or infringe provisions of the BFSA. In serious cases (e.g. when a bank refuses 
or is unable to comply with orders from the BOZ) the BOZ can appoint a curator to oversee the 
restoration of sound practises in the bank. In this regard the curator can recommend that the bank 
be wound up if it was found that it cannot be restored to a safe operating condition. Where the 
BOZ believes a bank to be insolvent it has the power to take possession of the bank and appoint 
a receiver. 
Alongside the legislative revisions, measures have been initiated to strengthen supervisory 
capacities at the BOZ. A four year capacity building programme was started in 1994 to recruit 
and train bank examiners, a priority given that the supervision department is currently seriously 
understaffed. 
3.4.7 Negative Effects of Financial Reforms  
Following the reforms in the financial sector system, it is clear that the Zambian financial sector 
has not achieved its intended goals, and that it plays only a limited role in the economy (Table 
21). Symptoms of these limitations are the lack of financial intermediation, low market liquidity, 
high interest rates, high bank costs, absence of long-term lending, underdevelopment of the 
secondary markets and low public confidence. There is also limited access to financial services 
in the rural areas, and for the low and middle income earners (Martinez, 2006). The ratio of M2 
to GDP in Zambia has been around fourteen to twenty eight percent, which is in the middle 
range for the sub-Saharan African region (in the early 1980s, M2 reached 35 percent of GDP). 
However, private sector credit was only six percent of GDP in 2001, one of the lowest ratios in 
the region. In contrast, public sector credit, at fourteen percent of GDP, was relatively high by 
sub-Saharan African standards. Moreover, Zambian banks hold more foreign assets than banks 
elsewhere in Africa. Bank earnings depend heavily on fees, the margin between the loans and 
savings rates, loans to blue chip companies and foreign exchange and government securities 
trading.  
The deposit to GDP ratio has been low and stagnant averaging around 12 percent of GDP 
throughout 1990s and part of 2000s. This is a clear sign of financial stagnation taking place in 












which indicates that only a small population in Zambia is banked. Even the credit allocation to 
the private sector is very expensive and scarce. 









1990 8.9 26 3.9 15.5 -8.3 
1991 7.3 28 3.6 12.6 -7.2 
1992 - 19 5.4 10.8 -2.5 
1993 4.8 14 7.5 9.3 -5.6 
1994 6.3 16 7.1 10.1 -6.8 
1995 8.4 18 6.4 11.5 -3.8 
1996 9.5 18 6.0 13.0 -5.4 
1997 8.0 17 6.3 12.8 -4.1 
1998 7.0 18 6.5 13.8 -8.0 
1999 7.4 20 6.2 14.2 -4.0 
2000 8.6 25 5.7 16.3 -7.0 
2001 7.3 15 5.5 17.1 -8.0 
2002 6.3 21 5.2 16.8 -6.3 
2003 6.8 20 5.5 16.6 -6.6 
2004 8.1 21 5.3 16.7 -3.3 
Source: World Development Indicators 
The FSDP attributes the imbalances to high inflation, crowding out of the private sector by the 
government, the lasting impact of the failure of several institutions and the regulatory 
shortcomings of the Bank of Zambia, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Pensions 
and Insurance Authority, the Zambia Competition Commission and the Patents and Companies 
Registration Office. Zambian financial institutions are exposed to high risks due to the 
economy's dependence on copper, the accumulation of public sector arrears and the potential 
volatility of the interest rates and exchange rates (FSDP, 2004).  
3.4.8 Positive Effects of Financial Reforms 
As indicated earlier, the primary object of financial sector reforms was principally to improve on 
financial service delivery and facilitate the development of monetary policy. There are 
indications, however as we have discussed above, that the outcomes have been, for some aspects 
of the reform package, far less successful than anticipated. Here we discuss the extent to which 
reform objectives were achieved in terms of sectoral performance. The situation can be summed 












                      Figure 26: Trends of Money Supply & Inflation (1990-2004) 
 
                  Source: Bank of Zambia Annual Reports 
At the beginning of the last decade, a predominant concern was to bring down inflation by 
controlling growth of the money supply and soaking up liquidity. Consistent with the 
liberalisation approach, this was to be accomplished increasingly through interest rates and open 
market operations. Lending rates became positive in real terms, currency in circulation declined 
relative to GDP, and inflation fell to 17% by the end of 2004 (Figure 26 and Figure 27).  
                      Figure 27: Trend in Inflation and Real GDP growth Rate (1990-2004)  
 
                  Source: Bank of Zambia Annual Reports 
An impressive growth in real GDP has also been achieved, where negative trends in real GDP 
growth rate were reversed. The economy improved from -8.6% in annual growth rates recorded 












2000s. However, to ascribe this impressive performance in real GDP growth rate only to 
financial sector reform would be dubious. In 1993, three years after the reforms were started, real 
GDP grew by 6.80 percent where as it dropped to -8.6, -2.85, and -1.86 percent in 1994, 1995 
and 1998 respectively (the first years of reforms).  
The channels through which the reform would have led to improved growth have been shown to 
deteriorate during the first years of the reform. Financial savings, efficiency, credit flow to the 
private sector became poorer during the reform period. Thus, forces outside the financial sectors 
system can be partly contributed to the growth in real GDP (e.g., agriculture, wholesale and trade 
and manufacturing industry). 
3.4.9 Summary 
The Zambian economy was subject to extensive government intervention during the 1970s and 
1980s which made a major contribution to the long term decline of the economy. Interventionist 
policies were extended to the financial sector, with government owned banks set up, foreign non 
bank financial institutions nationalised and interest rates controlled. Despite this, the banking 
system survived reasonably well, at least until the second half of the 1980s. Zambia did not 
experience severe financial shallowing as occurred, for instance, in Uganda and Ghana; nor did 
the main government owned bank (ZNCB) accumulate huge losses as did its counterparts in 
many other African countries. Moreover the foreign banks retained a significant share of banking 
markets and continued to provide retail and corporate banking services. 
The damage done by interventionist policies to the banking system was limited for two reasons. 
First, inflation was moderate until the mid 1980s, so that even though real interest rates were 
negative, holdings of monetary assets did not suffer rapid erosion in their real value. Second, the 
main policy channel through which resources were allocated in the economy was not the banking 
system but the system of foreign exchange controls. This provided some form of protection for 
the banks against having to extend credit to un-creditworthy borrowers to meet developmental or 
political objectives, in part because it obviated the need for the government to impose detailed 
sectoral credit guidelines on the banks. In addition, given the scarcity of foreign exchange, 
access to foreign exchange provided borrowers with a degree of monopoly power which would 
have boosted their creditworthiness. 
The resilience of the banking system to the mismanagement of the economy began to be eroded 












interest rates became highly negative. Devaluation and the reduction in trade protection 
intensified the financial difficulties of the parastatal sector, with adverse consequences for the 
quality of ZANACO’s loan portfolio, which was dominated by loans to parastatals. The growth 
of local private sector banks, many of which were undercapitalised, added to the fragility in the 
banking system, especially because prudential legislation and supervisory capacities were 
deficient. 
Political constraints obstructed the adoption of a comprehensive and consistent structural 
adjustment programme in Zambia, and as a result financial reforms were delayed until the early 
to mid 1990s. Financial markets were liberalised in 1992/93 and new banking legislation was 
enacted in 1994 to accompany measures to strengthen supervisory capacities. The enactment of 
the Banking and Financial Services Act has considerably strengthened the legislative framework 
for prudential supervision although the personnel resources of the bank regulators are currently 
very weak. Financial sector reforms are undeniably necessary to improve both the efficiency and 
















This chapter starts with the brief motivation of the analytical framework linking finance and 
growth. This is followed by the introduction of the data used in the study and then proceeds to 
review our adopted research methods. The methods adopted in this thesis draws heavily on 
recent developments in time-series econometrics. Thus, the analysis is applied in the context of a 
vector error correction (VECM) and Toda-Yamamoto framework. The chapter also includes a 
discussion of how the orders of the VAR are determined, plus an explanation of how the 
intercepts and trends are specified in the models.  
The chapter also covers the various statistical structures used to analyse a mixture of 
representations of the various processes. The various representations are useful for different 
purposes such as, identifying the Granger-causal chain and its strength. In addition to indicating 
the time profile of shocks to either the individual variables or the whole system the causal 
inference between financial development and economic growth is analysed using the systems of 
equations. The model framework used in this thesis uses the long-run structural modelling 
approach, the implementation of which is the major technical innovation in this study. The 
chosen approach permits the estimation and testing of more than one co-integrating relationship 
subject to identifying and over identifying restrictions on the long-run (or co-integrating) 
relations. To test for the robustness of the results from VECM we employ a complementary 
framework based on Toda-Yamamoto methodology framework. 
From this brief outline the rest of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 4.2 presents the 
theoretical framework linking finance and growth. Section 4.3 discusses the augments for 
applying unit root test in time series data. Section 4.4 discuses the econometric modelling 












4.2 Analytical Framework 
4.2.1 Background 
This section motivates the empirical analysis by reviewing the theoretical foundations underlying 
the principle that capital inflows lead to higher economic growth, as well as the view that the 
level of domestic financial development is a factor in the link between capital inflows and 
economic growth. The relationship between capital inflows and growth is first examined in the 
context of a simple endogenous-growth model. This framework highlight the various channels to 
growth emphasised in this thesis: that capital flows can promote growth by increasing the 
domestic investment rate, by leading to investments that are associated with positive spillovers, 
and by increasing domestic financial intermediation. It also shows how the existing level of 
development of the financial system plays a role in determining the extent to which capital flow 
influence growth.  
4.2.2 Analytical Framework 
The intuitive reasoning for the existence of financial sector development influence on economic 
growth is quite complex though in a nutshell one would say financial sector system is an 
institution that uses real assets to cause real economy. This thesis therefore uses the endogenous 
growth theories to describe the relationship between financial sector development and economic 
growth. McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) developed the first generation of these theories from 
the framework of the neoclassical growth theory (Winkler, 1998). Neo-classical growth theory 
has several disadvantages in this context. The most crucial one is the fact that according to the 
neo-classical growth theory a change in saving or investment has an effect only in long-run 
which implies that the level of real per capita income is affected but not the rate of growth. 
Hence, financial sector development affects income per capita only in equilibrium but on the 
path of development the growth rate is unaffected.  
This approach is counter-intuitive and incompatible with empirical facts. Numerous researchers 
such as (Barro, 1991; Levine & Renelt, 1992; Asilis, 1992; Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 1995; 
Fielding & Miezen, 1997) conclude that there is strong positive correlation between real per 
capita income and the rate of investment and saving. The new growth theory describes 
technological development endogenously as a byproduct of physical or human capital 












Today the endogenous growth theory is reigning and the existence of the relationship between 
financial sector development and economic growth is set beyond the doubts of many economists. 
The matters of direction, robustness and, of course, causation still provokes interest. In this case 
building of our theoretical groundwork is based on the determination of the transmission 
mechanism between financial sector and real economy. To do so, we defined the main functions 
of the financial sector. In this regard the general aim of financial sector is intertemporal, 
interpersonal transfer of resources (Winkler, 1998; Grandmont, 1985). More specifically, 
financial sector helps firms to overcome the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection and 
this reduces the costs of external financing (Rajan & Zingales, 1998) and transaction costs in 
general (Levine, 1997). 
The positive effect of financial sector development on economic growth is modelled with 
information gathering, resource allocation and rising liquidity (Greenwood & Jovanovich, 1990), 
rising productivity (King & Levine, 1993a), reducing of monitoring costs (Diamond, 1984; Boot 
& Thakor 1997; Holmström & Tirole, 1997, Blackburn & Hung, 1998). In Greenwood and 
Jovanovich model financial intermediaries help agents to choose projects with higher returns. 
Without financial intermediaries agents could not invest in these projects because of the lack of 
the information and low liquidity of the project (Greenwood & Jovanovich, 1990). 
This liquidity rising mechanism involve dual effect on savings. It is assumed that higher liquidity 
brings along higher investment returns and lowers uncertainty (Levine, 1997). Higher returns 
cause income and substitution effect, which means that agents can invest less to earn the same 
income because of the higher returns, but the opposite effect, is that consumption will be 
substituted with savings because of the higher productivity of the capital. Reduction of the 
uncertainty has also dual influence on the savings. Lower variance of the earnings causes a drop 
of the risk premium in the agents required rate of return, which enables more projects to be 
accepted. This results in rise of investment demand, rise in interest rate and increased savings. At 
the same time agents considering lower risks may reduce precautionary savings and this can 
result in drop in overall savings. As shown here it is not certain whether savings rate will fall or 
rise as a result of the increase in liquidity. This argumentation undermines the credibility of the 
liquidity rising models. 
Furthermore, it has been argued that higher liquidity in the stock market may not encourage 
investment into higher return projects. Higher liquidity makes the sale of stocks easier and 












Problems with corporate governance endanger effective allocation of resources and reduce 
productivity (Levine & Zervos, 1998). 
The work by Jappelli and Pagano (1994) has laid the ground work for the theory that describes 
negative relationship between financial sector development and economic growth. The reasoning 
underlying this relation comes straightforward from the endogenous growth model. If agents 
cannot borrow the desired amount, aggregate saving will be higher than in the presence of the 
perfect capital markets. In more detail Jappelli and Pagano look at the credit rationing towards 
households. Being liquidity-constrained households cannot borrow effectively against their 
future earnings and so they save more. Increased savings means growing investments, which in 
the framework of endogenous growth leads to higher growth rate.  
On the other hand proponents of financial development argue that liquidity constrained 
households have less incentives to accumulate human capital. Agents simply choose working 
instead of learning (De Gregorio & Guidotti, 1993; De Gregorio, 1993). This causes the lower 
economic growth in the framework endogenous growth (Barham, et al., 1995; Cartiglia, 1997). 
4.2.3 How can Financial Development affect Growth? 
Pagano (1993) presents a simple endogenous growth model to explain how financial 
development may affect growth. A similar model is referred by Thiel (2001), in his review on 
finance and economic growth.  
The link between finance and economic growth is very complex and may run through various 
transmission channels. Financial development might: reduce the loss of resources required to 
allocate capital (funnelling saving to firms); increase the savings ratio (affect the saving rate); 
improving the allocation of capital (raise capital productivity). In this thesis the relationship 
between finance and growth is captured using the model equation (1).  
Thus equation (1) is what forms the basis our econometric modelling and in the general form it is 
specified as: 
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where:  is the ratio of investment to g.d.p. (i.e., capital formation),  is credit by the 












control variables include:  which represents real interest rates,  openness of the 
country and  for uncertainty. 
4.3 Unit Root Tests & Order of Integration 
A brief outline why testing the time series data is important before applying the test of interest is 
outlined in this section. As it has been argued in literature the conventional definition of co-
integration is given by Engle and Granger (1987): “The components of the vector  are said to 
be co-integrated of order d, b denoted ~ !"#, " % 0, ! % 0, if (1) all components of  are  !#; (2) there exists a vector ' ( 0#so that )  ' · ~ ! + "#, " % 0. The vector , is called 
the co-integrating vector.” A more flexible concept is suggested by Campbell and Perron (1991) 
who do not exclude stationary variables from the vector  However, such an allowance only 
makes sense if  contains at least two integrated variables which can co-integrate (i.e., form a 
linear combination at a lower degree of integration. When applying economic equilibrium 
models empirically, stationary linear combinations are of special interest because they tell us to 
which level an otherwise random-walk like variable should converge given certain levels of the 
other variables in the co-integration space. As many economic time series are often found to be 
integrated of order one (Nelson and Plosser, 1982), others to be stationary (e.g. interest rate 
spreads) and still others even tend to be integrated of order two in some countries, (Juselius, 
1993).  
In view of the above observation, checking for the order of integration of a time series is a 
natural start to co-integration analysis because it allows us to know whether the variables are 
integrated in levels (in case of - 1# variables) or the first differences of a variable (when it is 
- 2#) should be used to compose the long-run relationships.  
The objective of this section consist a review of an appropriate test that the entity or at least a 
sufficient number of the time series to be included in our model are integrated of order 1 and can 
therefore be used in a vector error correction framework involving their levels and first 
differences. The order of integration is tested for by one method the augmented Dickey-Fuller 
unit root test. This test procedure asserts the variable is - 1# in the null hypothesis. 
4.3.1 The Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test 
Idea and specification issues: In the simplest version of the Dickey-Fuller test (DF test) a unit 
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where 45  6527 and 8~! 0, 9:#, and by then testing the Hypothesis ;<: 45  0 against the 
alternative ;7: 45 > 1. Under the null, the t-values of 45 do not follow a standard t-distribution 
but a Dickey-Fuller distribution (Dickey and Fuller, 1981). Actually, applying standard critical t-
values would result in over-rejection of the null. The reason for this deviation from the standard 
t-distribution is that the tests based on the DF-distribution are similar, e.g., the test equation for 4 contains more deterministic elements than the data-generating process (d.g.p.) for 4 in rder 
to ensure that the null and the alternative hypotheses be nested by the test (Harris, 1995). Thus 
equation 3 above can serve as a valid test equation only if the initial value 4< of the d.g.p. and 85 
equal zero.  
In this case a deterministic trend has to be incorporated into equation 3 if the economic time 
series at hand contain a deterministic trend in levels. The question whether this is the case or not 
can be addressed by sequential testing, with the help of economic theory or by visual inspection. 
These two methods are briefly sketched in the following paragraphs. 
Perron (1988) suggests a test sequence which aims at determining both the order of integration 
and the most probable deterministic structure of a time series. Starting with a DF test equation 
including trend and intercept, 
∆  0? 	 @? 	 ?2
 	            (4) 
first the null of a unit root (against the alternative of trend stationarity) and then the joint 
hypothesis of a unit root and no trend are tested. If the latter is rejected whereas the former is not, 
the deterministic trend is accepted as an element in the d.g.p. of  .The d.g.p. and the DF test 
equation thus have the same design (‘exact test’ as it is called by Harris (1995)). As a 
consequence, the critical values of the standard normal distribution can now be taken to evaluate 4AB because the deterministic trend asymptotically dominates the stochastic trend (West, 1988). 
The null of non-stationarity might now be rejected more easily. However, if the joint F-test on 
the deterministic and the unit root is not rejected, it is concluded that there is no deterministic 











The analogous testing sequence is then applied to the model described in equation 8 (unit root 
against the alternative of mean stationarity) with the joint hypothesis being formulated with 
respect to the intercept instead of the trend. It might turn out in the F- est that even the intercept 
is zero, then, Fuller’s (1976) critical values D̂ for a test equation without deterministic elements 
(unit root against the alternative of stationarity around zero) should be used. The motivation for 
dropping unnecessary nuisance parameters is that the critical values of the DF distribution 
become smaller with each additional deterministic element so that overloading the model with 
unjustifiable deterministic parameters leads to under-rejection of the null. The procedure stops 
whenever the null of a unit root is rejected. 
There are several objections against the use of the sequential testing procedure just described. 
First, a general size problem can result from sequential testing by the potential accumulation of 
wrong test decisions, e.g., when the F-tests rejects although the nulls are true. Second, the use of 
standard normal distribution is misplaced as soon as the deterministic of the d.g.p. do not match 
the one of the test equation. To rely on the result of the F-test involves a risk: If the true d.g.p. 
does not contain a deterministic trend, its presence in the test equation introduces a downside 
bias in the estimate of 4B thereby making a rejection of the null of non-stationarity more 
probable (Harris, 1995). In this case it is not clear whether the rejection of the null in the F-test 
really stems from the presence of a deterministic trend or whether the process is in fact 
stationary. Clearly, the F-test cannot solve the DF test’s problem of low power against a trend-
stationary alternative. Third, if the true value of 6B is close to but smaller than one, convergence 
to the asymptotic test distribution is slow. Thus, in small samples the DF distribution may be a 
better approximation (Banerjee t al., 1993).  
To sum up, sequential testing is not appropriate to solve the huge uncertainty surrounding the 
true nature of the d.g.p. in economic time series. This is why a pragmatic mixture of economic 
judgement and visual inspection is adopted in our analysis. 
4.3.2 Motivation for the Choice of the Test Method 
Testing for causality in the contest of stable VAR models involves testing whether some 
parameters of the model are jointly zero. The ‘older’ approaches utilised techniques such as the 
standard Granger (1969) or the Sims (1972) method which uses the non-stationary data. It is 
shown, however, that the use of non-stationary data in causality tests can yield spurious causality 
results (Park and Phillips, 1989; Stock and Watson, 1989). Hence most causality studies since 












co-integration analysis, mostly following the Johansen (1988; 1991) procedure, and formulate a 
Vector Error Correction (VEC) model in order to capture both long-run and short-run sources of 
causality between the variables. An alternative method is that of Hsiao (1981), which 
presupposes the use of unit root and co-integration tests but applying the standard Granger test 
rather than a VEC model, in cases when no co-integration is found; Yoo (2006) has applied this 
method among others.  
As unit root and co-integration tests are known to have low power and size properties in small 
samples (Cheung and Lai, 1993; Harris and Sollis, 2003), there has been an increasing drift 
towards the use of methods which do not require that the variables be pre-tested for stationarity 
and co-integration. Such methods are the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) approach due to 
Pesaran and Shin (1999) and the Dolado-Lütkepohl and Toda-Yamamoto methods, which 
involve a modified Wald test in an augmented vector autoregressive model (Dolado & 
Lütkepohl, 1996; Toda & Yamamoto, 1995). Hypothesis tests can be carried out with these 
methods irrespective of whether the variables involved are stationary or not and regardless of the 
existence of a co-integrating relationship among them. Altinay and Karagol (2005) and Lee 
(2006) are among those who have applied one or more of these methods.  
In principle, the selection of causality test method should not affect the results as long as the time 
series properties of variables are accounted for appropriately. However, it has been found that 
asymptotically equivalent methods do not necessarily demonstrate similar properties in small 
samples of between 25 and 35 observations, which is the actual sample size in most causality 
studies. In this respect, Pesaran and Shin (1999) have shown that the ARDL model is more 
rigorous in small samples than co-integration methods; and Zapata and Rambaldi (1997) have 
demonstrated that the modified Wald tests employed by the Toda-Yamamoto and Dolado-
Lütkepohl methods have lower power than the Johansen-based VEC approach in multivariate 
models with sample size of 50 or less. Therefore, we need to keep in mind these observations or 
findings when comparing and interpreting the outcome of our causality test results in chapter 
five which are based on VECM and Toda-Yamamoto methods. 
4.4 Econometric Modelling 
4.4.1 Co-Integrating Analysis 
The analysis applies VAR (Vector Autoregressive) time-series analysis techniques to the datasets 
of Kenya’s, South Africa’s and Zambia’s financial and growth relationship. Co-integration 












provide an important framework within which links between economic theory and econometric 
applications can be explored. In particular it serves to capture the economic notion of long-run 
equilibrium economic relationships.  
Co-integration techniques are also powerful when modelling the behaviour of data series that 
display stochastic trends. This is because the existence of a co-integrating relationship between 
two or more non stationary variables counters the ordinary least squares (OLS) problem of 
spurious regressions and regression estimates have been shown to be super-consistent in this 
context. Engle and Granger (1987) demonstrated that if two variables are shown to be co-
integrated, then the possibility of no causation in the Granger sense (not structural sense) is ruled 
out; and causality must exist at least in one direction, either unidirectional or bi-directionally.  
From the theory of finance and growth we expect at least three long-run relationships to be 
present. The first one relates to growth. The second type of the relationship relates to the 
investment function and last but not least the third co-integrating vector relates to financial 
development proxy. The argument for these three relationships is based on the probability that 
while financial development indirectly affects real per capita income, feedback effects are also 
present from real per capita income and gross fixed capital formation to financial development. 
Following on this, a detailed discussion of the statistical model applied to this approach is 
discussed in the following sections. 
The co-integration analysis applied in this study is based on the technique pioneered by Engle 
and Granger (1987) and extended by Johansen (1988, 1991) and Johansen and Juselius (1990, 
1992) and many others. It is a full-information Maximum Likelihood Estimation method and it 
allows the estimation of both long and short-run relationships without having to difference the 
data. In testing for the presence of these relationships amongst the variables included in the data 
set, the Johansen and Juselius procedure is employed. Although the Johansen technique is well 
known a brief outline of the method is given here to shed some light on how the procedure is 
applied in this study. 
The Johansen and Juselius (JJ) tests of co-integration are conducted through say, a FG order n-
dimensional vector of I !# time series variables  with an autoregressive representation, which 

















               (5) 
where   
is an V Χ 1 vector of - 1# or stochastic variables integrated to the same order. Γ, Ψ and Π 
represent V Χ V coefficient matrices of short and long-run adjustments to the changes of the 
process, respectively. Δ is the difference operator, and 6 denotes the longest lag length so the 
VAR is the 6G order, C is a constant or drift, and Y~Z! 0, ∑#, is a vector of white noise 
errors. \ is a vector of non-stochastic variables designed to capture the time trend ] and any 
other dummy variables should they be needed. In our co-integration tests the lag length 6 in the
above model has been chosen on the basis of the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and 
Schwarz Information criterion (SC). Model (9) will be used as a benchmark model within which 
all the subsequent hypotheses are tested, since in the unrestricted form it corresponds to an - 1# 
model. All higher models used in this research are nested in this model. 
Important in the context of this study is the variable Π which captures information about the 
long-run relationships between the variables of interest. As such it is the rank  ^# of Π# which, 
indicates the number of co-integrating vectors. Johansen (1991) shows that if )~- 1#, the 
following restrictions on equation 9 has to be satisfied. If,  Π# has a zero rank, then no stationary 
linear combination can be identified and the variables in  # are non co-integrated, meaning that 
they can wander arbitrarily far from each other.  
There are a few things to note at this juncture. First, lack of co-integration implies no long-run 
equilibrium among the variables. Second, it is important to note that the term equilibrium means 
different when applied by economic theorists as opposed to econometricians. To economic 
theorists the term equilibrium refers to equality between desired and actual transactions. 
Whereas, the econometric use of the term makes reference to any long-run relationship among 
stationary variables. This means that co-integration does not require that the long-run 
relationship (i.e. equilibrium), be generated by market forces. However, if _ has the reduced rank 
^, where 0 ` ^ ` V + 1 , then _ can be decomposed into two V a ^ matrices ' and b such that 
_  'bc. The matrix bc consists of reduced rank ^ linearly independent stationary combinations 
or co-integrating vectors (long–run relations), whilst ' can be interpreted as a matrix of vector 












co-integrating relationships bd. In such a case some of the elements of ' must be non- zero, that 
is, there must be Granger causality involving the levels of the variables in the system to keep the 
elements of  from diverging boundlessly. Thus, not only can the existence of an equilibrium 
relationship be determined; but also the relative speed of adjustment of each co-integrating 
vector to disequilibrium shocks can be estimated. The elements of b are estimated using the, full 
information maximum likelihood approach.  
The attractiveness of the Johansen and Juselius multivariate co-integration technique is that it 
makes use of the information incorporated in the dynamic structure of the model, whilst at the 
same time it estimates the entire space of the long-run relationships amongst a set of variables, 
without imposing any normalisation on the dependent variable a priori. In this case the joint 
analysis of the finance and growth causality issues using the Johansen and Juselius multivariate 
co-integration analysis allows for possible interactions between the financial development and 
economic growth variables. It must be stressed however, that a co-integrating vector is not 
unique, when more than one long-run relationship is found to exist in the system of equations. 
4.4.2 Long-Run Structural Modelling 
In a multivariate context, such as the one given by the finance and growth models, a vector error 
correction model subject to deficient rank restrictions on the long-run multiplier matrix, Π, may 
contain multiple co-integrating vectors termed co-integration rank. In such a case, the individual 
co-integrating vectors are under-identified in the absence of sufficient linear restrictions on each 
of the vectors and as such lack any meaningful economic interpretation. It is because of this 
potential difficulty that the use of VAR analysis has been criticised as being devoid of any 
economic content.  
In order to circumvent this potential indeterminacy one needs to impose appropriate a priori just 
identifying restrictions and over identifying restrictions, preferably obtained from the long-run 
equilibrium implications of suitable underlying economic theory. Restrictions can either be 
coefficient restrictions, or symmetry restrictions, or both. For example, one can impose 
homogeneity and zero restrictions in order to identify the structural model from an estimated 
VAR. Long-run structural modelling endeavours to achieve this end by estimating theoretically 
meaningful long-run relationships through testing both just identifying and over-identified 
restrictions on the co-integrating vectors based on the relevant theories (in this case the financial 












discriminate between the vectors by incorporating long-run structural relationships suggested by 
theory in an otherwise unrestricted VAR model (Garrett et al, 1999). 
In a simple case where ^ + 1, typically the one restriction needed to identify the co-integrating 
relation can be viewed as a normalising restriction, which could be applied to the coefficient of 
any of the integrated variables which enter the co-integrating relation (by fixing its coefficient to 
unity) without changing the likelihood function. However in the more general case where ^ % 1, 
the number of such ‘normalising’ restrictions must be at least equal to ^ linear independent 
restrictions on each of the co-integrating vectors, which needs to be supplemented with further ^: + 1 a priori restrictions. The log-likelihood ratio statistic to test over-identifying restrictions is 
asymptotically distributed as a chi-squared  :# variate with degrees of freedom equal to the 
number of over-identifying restrictions  e# namelyV + ^: % 0. A large value of :# on  e# 
indicates that over-identifying restrictions are not consistent with data. Estimation of the model 
subject to all the (exact and over-identifying) restrictions, thus enables a test of the validity of the 
over-identifying restrictions and hence of the economic theory, to be carried out. The long-run 
structural modelling approach described in Pesaran and Shin (1997) and Pesaran, Shin and Smith 
(1996), is applied in this study so as to just test the variables to be restricted in each co-
integrating space. 
4.4.3 Pesaran, Shin, Smith ARDL Technique 
To find out whether a unique long-run relationship between finance and growth and also for ease 
of reference on the variables to be normalised this thesis also employs the autoregressive 
distributed lag (ARDL) co-integration procedure introduced by Pesaran et l. (1996). To begin 
with, we test for the null of no co-integration against the existence of a long-run relationship. 
Unlike other co-integration techniques (e.g. Johansen’s procedure) which require certain pre-
testing for unit roots and that the underlying variables to be integrated are of order one, the 
ARDL model provides an alternative test for examining a long-run relationship regardless of 
whether the underlying variables are  - 1#, - 2#, or fractionally integrated.  
As mentioned above, an important problem inherent in the system-based tests for co-integration 
is the precondition that it must be known with certainty that the underlying regressors in the 
model are - 1# processors. However, given the low power of unit root tests, there will always 
remain a certain degree of uncertainty with respect to the order of integration of the underlying 












Smith (1996) to test for the existence of a linear long-run relationship, when the orders of 
integration of the underlying regressors are not known with certainty. The test is the standard 
Wald or F statistic for testing the significance of the lagged levels of the variables in a first-
difference regression. The involved regression is an error-correction form of an autoregressive 
distributed lag (ARDL) model in the variables of interest.  
More specifically, in the case of an unrestricted ECM, regressions of y  on a vector of fg. The 
procedure first requires estimating the following model derived by Pesaran, Shin and Smith 
(1996.): 
∆4  h<i · ] 	 j427 	 C77, ] + 1 	 C::] + 1 	 k 	 Cll, ] + 1








                 (6) 
with j and C as the long-run multipliers, y and z as short-run dynamic coefficients,  F, {# as the 
order of the underlying ARDL-model (p refers to 4, { refers to ), ] as a deterministic time 
trend, l as the number of ‘forcing variables’, and | uncorrelated with the Δ and the lagged 
values of  and 4. 
In the second step, one has to compute the usual F-statistic for testing the joint significance of j  C7  C: ··· C}  0. However, the asymptotic distributions of the standard Wald or F-
statistic for testing the significance of the lagged levels of the variables are non-standard under 
the null hypothesis that no long-run relationship exists between the levels of the included 
variables. Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1996) provide two sets of asymptotic critical values; one set 
assuming that all the regressors are - 1#, and another set assuming that they are all - 1#. These 
two sets of critical values provide a band covering all possible classifications of the regressors 
into - 0#, - 1#, or even mutually co-integrated. 
A third step is required in this case in order to use the appropriate bounds testing procedure. The 
test proposed by Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1996) is consistent with this. For a sequence of local 
alternatives, it has a non-central :-distribution asymptotically. It has been argued that this is 
valid irrespective of whether the underlying regressors are - 0#, - 1# or mutually co-integrated. 












computed in the second step is compared with the upper and lower 90, 95 or 99 percent critical 
value bounds  ~ and ~#. As a result, three cases emerge. First, if ~ % ~, one has to reject j  C7  C: ··· C}  0 and conclude that there is a long-term relationship between y and the 
vector of  fg. Second, if ~ > ~, one cannot reject either j  C7  C: ··· C}  0 or the 
hypothesis that a long-run relationship does not exist. Finally, if ~~ > ~, the inference has to 
be regarded as inconclusive. The order of integration of the underlying variables has to be 
investigated more deeply in that case.  
4.4.4 Johansen VECM Technique 
The motivation of employing this technique in this thesis is based on Engle and Granger (1987) 
who demonstrated that once a number of variables say  nd  are found to be co-integrated, 
there always exists a corresponding error-correction representation. This means that changes in 
the dependent variable are a function of the level of disequilibrium in the co-integrating 
relationship (captured by the error-correction term) as well as changes in other explanatory 
variable(s). 
The consequence of ECM is that either ∆ or ∆4 or both must be caused by Y27 (the 
equilibrium error) which is itself a function of 27, 427. Intuitively, if  and 4 have a 
common trend, then the current change in  (say the dependent variable) is partly the result of 
 moving into alignment with the trend value of 4 (the independent variable). Through the 
error-correction term, the ECM opens up an additional channel for Granger-causality (ignored by 
standard Granger, 1969; and Sims, 1972; tests) to emerge. The Granger-causality (or 
endogeneity of the dependent variable) can be evidenced either through the statistical 
significance of the t-test of the lagged error-correction term(s) or the F-test applied to the joint 
significance of the sum of the lags of each explanatory variable. The non significance of both t-
test(s) and F-test(s) in the VECM indicates econometric exogeneity of the dependent variable. 
In addition to indicating the direction of causality amongst variables of interest, the VECM 
approach allows us to distinguish between short-run and long-run forms of causality. When the 
variables are co-integrated, then the short-term deviations from this long-run equilibrium will 
feed back on the changes in the dependent variable in order to force the movement back towards 
the long-run equilibrium. If the dependent variable (say, the finance or growth) is driven directly 
by this long-run equilibrium error, then it is responding to this feedback. If not, it is responding 












The F-tests of the differenced explanatory variables provide an indication of the short-term 
causal effects, where as the long-run causal relationship is implied through the significance or 
otherwise of the t test(s) of the lagged error-correction term(s). These terms contain the long 
term information since it is derived from the long-run co-integrating relationship(s). The 
coefficient of the lagged error-correction term is, however, a short-term adjustment coefficient 
and represents the proportion by which the long-run disequilibrium (or imbalance) in the 
dependent variable is being corrected in each short period. Non significance or elimination of 
any of the lagged error-correction terms affects the implied long-run relationship and may be a 
violation of the assumed theory. The non-significance of any of the differenced variables which 
reflect only the short-run relationship, however, does not involve such violations. This is because 
theory typically has little to say about short-term relationships (Thomas, 1993) and this is 
certainly the case in our study as demonstrated by the abundance of short-term theories and the 
contradictions in the empirical results. 
The application of VECM is important. For instance if the variables are co-integrated, then 
causality tests which incorporate differenced variables will be misspecified unless the lagged 
error-correction term is included (Granger, 1988; Toda and Phillips, 1993). Second, standard 
tests which establish stationarity by mechanically differencing variables eliminate the long-run 
information embodied in the original level form of the variables. The VECM derived from the 
co-integrating equation(s) below overcomes these problems by including the lagged error-
correction term which reintroduces the long-run information lost through the differencing 
procedure and opens up an additional channel of Granger causality. 
This forms an important statistical innovation in this research given that it accounts for short-
term dynamics whilst still preserving the long-run structural. If this relationship is not taken into 
account then previous studies may have missspecified an important variable when assessing 
short term lead-lag dynamics and also allows us to assess the dominant information attributes in 
the market place. The VECM allows long-run information incorporated in the variables to obey 
equilibrium constraints whilst short-run information is allowed to have a more flexible dynamic 
specification. 
4.4.5 Application of Johansen ML approach 
The Johansen procedure as pointed out in literature is a multiple equation method that permits 












enables one to carry out the testing of the co-integration relationships in a multivariate VAR 
Model. 
To briefly illustrate this point let us take the following model which includes seven variables: V^!F   V, VFe4, V!, V, VV], VFVl#, and consider the following 
autoregressive representation where V^!F is treated as a dependant variable: 




                 (7) 
Where  = V^!F, V, VFe4, V!, V, VV], VFVl, Γ and Π representing 
short and long-run coefficients and C is a constant term. We note too that Π is a F Χ F matrix. 
The rank ̂  of matrix Π is equal to the number of co-integrating vectors. The hypothesis of co-
integration in this regard is the hypothesis of the reduced rank of Π: 

 #: ,f     
                       (8) 
where ' and Error!  Bookmark not defined. b are F a ^ matrices of the full rank. The b in this 
case refers to the co-integrating parameters and ' measures the speed of adjustment towards the 
long-run equilibrium and its called a loading factor. 
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          (9) 
From the theory point of view regarding co-integration analysis, it has been found that if there 
are more than one co-integrating vectors in the model, then we have a problem of identification. 













 ¤h7  1; h:  0; h  0"7  0 ":  1 "  07  0 :  0   1¥                      (10) 
In addition to the just identification restrictions outlined above, one may impose further 
restrictions on the model in order to test for over-identifying restrictions on b and '. 
In this case using the Johansen procedure entails estimating equation (7) by employing the 
maximum likelihood (ML) technique and testing the null hypothesis of no co-integration, that ;<:    y|#of ^ co-integrating relationships, |27  §x,  and where ̂ is the rank of the 
matrix  0 > ^ > F#, y is the matrix of weights with which the variables enter co-integrating 
relationships, and is the matrix of the co-integrating vector. As stated by Harris (1995), this 
procedure could lead one finding independent co-integrating vectors in the system of equation. 
The question then is how is this implemented? 
The presumption is that the answer lies in the Johansen methodology which keeps to the 
following steps: (1) determine the order of the underlying VAR, (2) decide whether to include 
deterministic terms in the VECM, (3) estimate the VECM and determine the rank of , (4) 
impose the just identifying restrictions on b, (5) test over-identifying restrictions on b and (6) 
test direction of the relationships.  
From this brief outline above the following features motivates the application of the co-
integration and error correction modelling in the analysis data of this thesis. For instance, the 
methodology holds the promise of several intuitive implications. First, if the variables are co-
integrated, then in the short-run, deviations from the long-run equilibrium will feed back into 
changes in the dependent variable(s) in order to force the movements back towards long-run 
equilibrium (i.e., short-run causality). Second, if the dependent variable (say the real per capita 
income) is driven directly by this long-run equilibrium error, then it is responding to this 
feedback. If not, it is responding only to short-term shocks to the stochastic environment. Third, 
the existence of long-run causality or the endogeneity of the dependent variable can be 
demonstrated through the statistical significance of the t- est of the lagged error correction term 
and/or the F-test applied to the joint significance of the sum of the lags of each explanatory 
variable. In other words, the F-tests of the differenced explanatory variables, provide us with an 
indication of any short-term causal effects, whereas the validity of the long-run relationship is 












contain the long-term information since it is derived from the long-run co-integrating 
relationship(s). 
The coefficient of the lagged error correction term however, has the interpretation of being speed 
of adjustment parameters and represents the proportion by which the long-run disequilibrium in 
the dependent variable is being corrected in the short term. The larger the error-correction terms 
the greater the response of that variable to the previous period’s deviation from the long-run 
equilibrium. At the other extreme, non-significant values of any of the lagged error correction 
terms imply that the variable(s) in the system of equation are unresponsive to the last period’s 
equilibrium error. Such an extreme scenario affects the implied long-run relationship and may be 
a violation of the underlying theory. On the other hand, the non-significance of any of the 
differenced variables, which reflects only the short-term relationship, does not involve any 
theory violations, because theory especially economic theory, typically offers very little 
information on short-term relationships (Thomas, 1993). 
The VECM therefore plays the simultaneous role of indicating the direction of Granger causality 
or the endogeneity of dependent variables as well as allowing us to distinguish between long-
term and short-term dynamics of variables in the co-integrating system. Thus a known novelty of 
error correction techniques can be illustrated in testing various economic issues which are 
especially elusive with respect to the causal direction. For example, Masih and Masih (1998) 
have used a multivariate formulation of VECM techniques in order to test for the existence of 
causal chains implied by major hypothesis in theory. Below the attention is drawn to the VECM 
model which is applied in our analysis for causality. 
4.4.6 Model Specification (VECM) 
The model specification in this study is based on the model used by Craigwell and Downess 
(2001) in their study entitled: ‘The Finance-Growth Nexus: A Multivariate VAR. Analysis of A 
Small Open Economy’. The model consists of only three equations out of the whole VAR model 
because the interest of the study is to test both the direct and indirect causal inference between 
financial development and economic growth. Based on this the thesis does not seek to test the 
causality relationship with the other variables. The other point to note is that the other variables 
have been included in the model as control proxies. In this preferred model the indirect 
relationship is what makes our VAR model to have three co-integrating vectors. Thus to test for 
causality equation 11 is specified using stationary variables. Consequently our preferred model 
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                               (13) 
where: ̂ !F is the real per capita income,  stands for the gross fixed capital formation or 
investment, Fe4 and ! represent the credit offered to the private sector by the commercial 
banking system and efficiency of financial intermediation respectively.  is defined as the 
financial uncertainty, while V] is real interest rates. Finally, ]  is defined as the error 
correction term. 
To estimate the above models we applied the following equation for which the variables are as 
outlined above: 
^!F  h< 	 h7^!F 	 h: 	 hFe4 	 h! 	 h 	 hV] 	 h FVl 












If it is assumed that the series in levels have unit roots and are co-integrated, the above Vector 
Error Correction Model (VECM) in (13, 14 & 15) can then be estimated. The causality in this 
case would entail imposing restrictions on the coefficients of the lags of the variables of interest. 
If say we want to test that a given Financial development proxy (e.g.,F 4) does not cause ^!F 
in the above equation (13), the null hypothesis is expressed as: 
;<: ẍ  0 
where: x are coefficients of the all lagged values of ΔFe42x,    1,2, k , # in the first row of 
the VECM. This entails testing the hypothesis that Fe4 does not Granger-cause ^!F. The 
same kind of analysis is made on the second equation of the system where we test the hypothesis 
that ̂ !F does not Granger-causes . The null hypothesis in this case is: 
;<: ẍ  0 
To test the hypothesis that financial development does not Granger cause real per capita income 
one could use the deletion method or the WALD test. In our case we apply the WALD test 
method it doesn’t matter. The rejection of the null hypothesis will simply imply that the causality 
inference does exist between the variables being tested. 
As a way of checking out the consistency our empirical results, this causal relationship will also 
be looked into using the methodology proposed by Toda and Yamamoto (1995). This method is 
outlined below together with the model specification in matrix form. 
4.4.7 Model Specification (Toda-Yamamoto)  
The VECM discussed in the previous section permits inference on both short-run and, long-run 
linkages. While this has been proposed in the recent literature (see King, Plosser, Stock and 
Watson, 1991; Mosconi and Giannini, 1992; Toda and Phillips, 1993) and exhibits highly 
desirable properties both from a theoretical and empirical point of view, this formulation does 
have its drawbacks in that it is implicitly dependent upon pre-tests of integration and co-
integration as mentioned in the previous section.  
Furthermore, it is noted that there is significant reliance on pre-tests to provide an accurate report 
of the co-integration ranks. As we have already noted, even in the case where the error-
correction term is appropriately derived, there is an additional step to augment this term in the 
original VAR formulation. Thus, the VECM formulation may involve implicit non-linear 












may involve size distortions due to rank deficiency. The basic necessity of this additional step of 
embedding an error-correction term arises from the need to re-capture the long-run information 
lost through differencing the variables entering the VAR. One way to circumvent this problem is 
to posit a VAR in which variables appear purely in their level form. However, while Sims, Stock 
and Watson (1990) do propose the asymptotic theory to validate appropriate Granger causality 
tests in level VARs, here there is also a pre-requisite that the system be co-integrated. Such tests, 
in particular the most popular being due to Johansen (1991), do tend to be sensitive to nuisance 
parameters and suffer from finite-sample biases (see Toda & Yamamoto, 1995). 
Only recently has Toda and Yamamoto (1995) proposed a complementary procedure which 
allows causal inference to be conducted in level VARs that may contain integrated processes but 
does not involve rigorous attention and strict reliance upon integration and co-integration 
properties of any or all variables in the system. In essence, this procedure circumvents some of 
the pre-test biases that practitioners may be confronted with in VECM and other modelling 
formulations involving unit root and co-integration pre-testing.  
The procedure of Toda-Yamamoto is simple and convenient to apply and permits linear as well 
as nonlinear tests of restrictions. These restrictions themselves would then imply long-run causal 
inference since, unlike ordinary difference VARs, this formulation involves only variables 
appearing in their levels. Toda and Yamamoto (1995) propose estimation of a levels’ VAR of the 
form: 
4  4<47 	 k 	 4©]© 	 ª7427 	 ª}42} 	 k 	 ªFe42w 	 |                      (15) 
where ]  1, k , « and F ¬  l 	 !# consisting of 4fg that are - !# which may be  !, "#. The ªfg are coefficient matrices but hypothesis testing of restrictions will preclude the terms 
ª}U7, k ªw which are assumed to be zero. In matrix notation, this may be written as: 
4c  ΓΛ 	 Φ¯c 	 Ψ°c 	 Εc                   (16) 
where Γ  ²4<, k , 4©³, Λ   D7, k , D´# with D   1, ], k , ]©#c, µ   ª7, k , ª}#  7, k , ´#, with  42}c , k , 42}c #f. Toda and Yamamoto (1995) then show that the test of 
hypothesis ;<:  µ#, where µ  e µ# is a parameter vector which may be tested by a Wald 
statistic which is asymptotically chi-square with m degrees of freedom, subject to F ¬ l 	 !. 












   µ#f¶~ µ#·Γ27ΕfΕf¸ a fQ a#27ºF Φ#f¼ Φ#                                 (17) 
where ½  ½¾  ½¾° °f½¾°#27°f½¾ and ½¾  -´ + Λ ΛfΛ#27Λf, where -´ is a « a « identity 
matrix. 
Effectively, this implies that all one needs to do is to determine the maximal order of integration ¶! ¿h#¼ that we may believe the model to incorporate and ascertain the lag structure, and then 
construct a VAR with variables appearing in their levels with a total of F  l 	 ! ¿h# lags. 
However, at the inference stage, linear or non-linear restrictions should only be tested on the first  l# lags since the F + l lags are assumed zero and ignored. The over-parameterization of the 
model is done intentionally, and the procedure will be valid as long as the order of integration 
does not exceed the true lag-length  l# of the model11. According to Toda and Yamamoto 
(1995), the Wald statistic is shown to be valid in a wide variety of cases, regardless of any 
component in 4 being stationary (around a linear trend) - 1#, - 2#, non co-integrated or co-
integrated of an arbitrary order12.  
Based on the above brief review, our second set of empirical analysis will be based on the 
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                                 (18) 
where: A’s are seven by seven matrices of coefficients with Ë< an identity matrix. 
                                               
11 Note, however, that this is most unlikely to be the case in most empirical works. If d=1, then the procedure will always be valid 
since k=1. The one exception is in the case where d =2 and the true lag-length k=1. 
12 The Toda-Yamamoto procedure is similar to one proposed by Dolado and Lutkepohl, Humoldt Univ Mimeo (1994), which is 
also applicable to systems regardless of whether or not they are co-integrated. The approach is to basically augment a VAR(p) 













To test the hypothesis that Granger no-causality from say credit  Fe4# to growth ^!F#, we 
test  
;<: '7 7:#  ': 7:#  ' 7:#  0 
where ': 7:#are the coefficients of Fe427, Fe42:, and Fe42 respectively in the first equation 
of the system equation 1 where the system is being estimated as a VAR(4). 
The existence of causal relationship from credit to growth can be established through rejecting 
the above null hypothesis which requires finding significance of MWALD statistic for the group 
of lagged independent variables identified above. A similar testing procedure can be applied to 
the other equations such as where credit, investment and wedge are dependant variables. For 
instance to test the alternative hypothesis that no Granger causality from growth to credit exists, 
we test the following hypothesis: 
;<: '7 7:#  ': 7:#  ' 7:#  0 
where 'x 7:# are coefficients of ̂!F27, ^!F2:, and ̂ !F2respectively in the second 
equation of the system Equation 1 where the system is being estimated as a VAR(4). 
While this method does circumvent some of the problems associated with pre-test bias from tests 
required for the VECM or Sims, Stock and Watson (1990) procedure, the issue of over-fitting the 
model does in itself entail a loss of power. Since the procedure is valid asymptotically, efficiency 
will also be affected in particular cases where the true lag-length may be as small as one, and 
augmenting additional lags in a small-sample VAR may prove to be costly in terms of 
parsimony. This, though, will not occur frequently in applied work using data with frequency 
greater than annual and orders of integration not exceeding two. 
It is with these caveats in mind that in this study the second procedure will be applied as a 
complement to the VECM already proposed. In adopting the methodology as a complementary 
tool, the model employing a VAR in levels will add an extra dimension to the analysis in 
addition to providing us with another facet to assess the general robustness of the results 
generated from the VECM. Moreover, as Toda and Yamamoto (1995) remarked “...we are not 
suggesting that this method should totally replace the conventional hypothesis testing that are 












as complementing the pre-testing method that may suffer serious biases in some cases.” In this 













Analysis and Results 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter reports the results and implications of applying the models introduced in the 
previous chapter. Before tests on the relationship between finance and growth in so far as the 
direction of causality is concerned we conducted a number of preliminary tests. These include 
the unit root tests, PSS F-test, lag length test, co-integrating vector tests and last but not least the 
stability test. The test results presented in this thesis are in summary form, given the number of 
countries investigated and the large volumes of results generated. To that end the findings of 
some tests in this study are commented on but not fully reported. 
The remainder of this chapter is therefore organised as follows. This chapter analyses the time 
series properties followed by causality tests using two different methods. Thus, section 5.2 
analyses the time series properties of all the variables for modelling of finance-growth causal 
relationship of three sub-Saharan countries, Section 5.3 present the Pesaran, Shin and Smith PSS 
F-test and their results. Section 5.4 briefly discusses the VECM and in particular the issue of 
why the error correction term is so important. Section 5.5 to 5.7 presents the VECM test results 
for Kenya, South Africa and Zambia respectively. Finally, section 5.8 presents the Toda and 
Yamamoto results for all the three countries. 
5.2 Data Motivation, Source and Description 
The study applies a multivariate empirical analysis within a VAR model framework to examine 
the relationship between finance and growth for three sub-Saharan countries over a period of 39 
years. Our analysis is based on seven variables that we define below.  
The countries considered are: Kenya, South Africa, and Zambia. In each case the real data which 
is based on annual figures is applied. The adopted models relate to real per capital income, 
growth fixed capital formation, credit to the private sector by the commercial banks, wedge rate 
(i.e. difference between deposit and lending rates), financial uncertainty, real interest rates and 












Models applied in this section thus permit the testing of both the supply leading and demand 
following of causality based on the significance of the relevant coefficients in the co-integrating 
relations. The gross fixed capital formation, credit and wedge are included in our models because 
they have been identified as a major source of capital which leads to the growth of the economy 
(See Luintel & Khan, 1999, McKinnon, 1973 and Shaw, 1973). An increase in the credit and 
efficiency of financial market can cause an increase in capital from savers to the sectors of the 
economy where they are mostly wanted and can efficiently be used. As a result, the growth of 
the economy is expected to grow. The economy may also be found to cause the development of 
financial market if the economy can induce the institutions to do so via the proper policy 
framework, macroeconomic stability and demand for the financial products. 
Coming back to the issue of data, we note the following: first, all our data is based on yearly 
intervals. Second, the time series available for all the three countries covers the sample period 
1965 to 2004. And lastly, a number of other variables could not be included in our study such as 
the stock turn over as a percentage of GDP, black market premium and exchange rate. This was 
due to the fact that individual country datasets on these variables are more limited and have 
somewhat shorter sample periods. For instance, Zambia’s stock market was only established in 
1995 and Kenya’s case though established long before independence lacks data. The data 
included in our models was obtained from the World Development Indicators International 
Financial Statistics and Penn World Tables and we outline their definitions below as follows: 
5.2.1 Financial Development Indicators 
Financial development is usually defined as a process that marks improvement in quantity, 
quality, and efficiency of financial intermediary services. This process involves the interaction of 
many activities and institutions. Consequently, it cannot be captured by a single measure. In this 
study we employ two measures of financial development for the purpose of testing the 
robustness of our findings. 
According to Galetovic (1996), he divides those previously used financial development measures 
into three categories. The first category simply looks at interest rates, arguing that financially 
repressed economies generally exhibit very low, or even negative, real interest rates. We do not 
believe that interest rates constitute a satisfactory proxy for financial development since their 












Galetovic (1996) concludes that the second and third categories, intended to reflect the size of 
the financial system and the distribution of credit flows, respectively, are more relevant 
measures. The size of the financial sector may be measured, as in King and Levine (1993b), as 
the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP. Another possibility is to use the money multiplier as an 
indicator of the financial system’s capacity to create money and hence its financial depth. King 
and Levine (1993b) also use the ratio of domestic deposit money bank assets to total domestic 
bank assets arguing that the central bank generally performs other functions than investment 
financing. The latter approach would clearly be inappropriate in this context since most of the 
Reserve Banks in the three study countries performed many functions normally associated with 
commercial banks during the 19th century. Thus, despite the fact that all these measures provide 
a good first approximation of financial development, we think it is possible to find better 
measures of the financial system. 
King and Levine (1993b) assume that credit provided to the private sector generates increases in 
investment and productivity to a much larger extent than do credits granted to the public sector. 
They also argue that loans to the private sector are scrutinised more carefully and that the 
improved quality of investment emanating from financial intermediaries’ evaluation of project 
viability are more significant for private sector credits. Variables such as the ratio of financial 
sector claims on the private sector to either total domestic credit or real GDP are therefore likely 
to give a good approximation of the availability of funds to potential investors. Thus, for our first 
financial development proxy we adhere to King and Levine’s (1993b) view and focus on the 
volume of credit granted by the financial sector to the private sector as a ratio of GDP. 
For the second measure of financial development the thesis employed the Wedge. This measures 
the competiveness of the banking sector system and in theory it is defined as the difference 
between bank deposit and bank lending rates. The motivation for using this proxy is that it is a 
good estimator for efficiency in the banking sector. For instance, when the wedge decreases due 
to transaction costs, this leads to the share of savings going to investments decreases. As 
postulated by the growth theory, economic growth is positively linked to the amount of 
investments; therefore, the decrease in transaction costs accelerates economic growth. This 
variable is thereby closely linked to the theoretical models of Blackburn and Hung (1998) and 













In previous studies of the impact of the financial system on economic performance, three 
different growth measures have been used, most commonly the per capita growth rate in real 
GDP (see Gelb, 1989; Roubini & Sala-i-Martin, 1992; King & Levine, 1993a, b; Demetriades & 
Hussein, 1996). Furthermore, since the study involves comparing three countries, the normalised 
proxy of income with respect to population is in this case the proper choice. When testing the 
principal hypothesis, that the financial system has exerted an influence on the development of 
real GDP, the thesis restricts the analysis to testing for the impact on per capita real GDP. 
In addition to the real GDP per capita and the financial development indicator, we introduce a 
fourth variable to our VAR system, namely the share of gross fixed capital formation in GDP 
(GFCF). This variable is considered to be one of the few economic variables with a robust 
correlation to economic growth regardless of the information set (Levine & Renelt, 1992). 
Including the investment variable in our regressions enables us to identify the channels through 
which financial development causes economic growth. If financial development causes 
economic development given the investment variable, then this causality supports the 
endogenous growth theories that finance affects economic growth mainly through the 
enhancement of investment efficiency. Furthermore, an assessment of financial development 
causing economic growth through an increase of investment resources can be made, by testing 
the causality between financial development indicators and investment on the one hand and 
between investment and economic growth on the other. 
The following controls variables are included in the regressions: openness variable is included in 
the model regression to account for the effects of international trade.  Exports may positively 
affect growth if it increases the market for domestic product and generates foreign exchange 
reserves necessary to import capital goods. Imports can positively affect growth if increases in 
imports are associated with capital goods. However, openness can also affect growth adversely. 
The net effect can only be determined empirically. The variable we use to test this effect is the 
sum of imports and exports as a percentage of GDP. 
Real Interest rate  V]# is another control variable included in the model. Romer (1990) argues 
that with increases in the interest rate, agents discount future output relative to current output at a 
higher rate. This results in capital moving away from the production of knowledge-based goods 












To capture the instability of the financial sector, the financial instability proxied by  # was 
also included in the regression. Fedderke (2000) argues that investment is adversely affected by 
uncertainty. In view of this, we proxied for uncertainty a financial instability index. This is 
defined as the variance of the difference between the local interest and international interest rate 
(i.e., US $ rate).  
Due to the long time period covered, we introduce a number of dummy variables, all set at the 
value of 1 for the relevant period and 0 otherwise. The dummy variables used are listed in Table 
22. All dummy variables were entered outside the co-integrating space, thus reflecting changes 
in the drift of the variables. Dummy variables are not included unless the coefficient is 
significantly different from zero or they improve the residual properties.  
Table 22: Dummy variables 
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In each country two dummies were included. For instance, in the case of South Africa the two 
dummies included took care of two structural breaks that have had an effect on the investment 
rate and financial development variables and interest rate. We therefore applied the dummy of \«80 which took care of the structural break attributed to the financial liberalisation of the 
1980s. The other intervening dummy included in the model of South Africa is one which 













Regarding Kenya, two structural breaks were considered too. The first one was in 1974 while the 
second one was in 1994. The dummy \94 took care of the break attributed to a general decline 
in interest rates in 1994 and also an increase in cash ratio following the trade liberalisation 
activities and relaxation of the cash ratio. Dummy \74 was included in order to capture the 
shock due to oil prices which affected the country during the period of 1974.
In the case of Zambia, two dummies were also included in the regression model. These include !¿75 and !¿92. Dummy !¿75 is used to capture the world oil price shock which also 
affected Zambia too. The other dummy is included to capture the shock due to financial 
liberalisation which started in earnest in 1992.  
Apart from these six dummies no other deterministic variables were included because they were 
considered insignificant and we were mindful of the short sample size available. Subsequently 
and on the basis of our observation that the plot of the data over the period under study indicated 
no upward or downward trends in differenced form, and the a priori kn wledge on the finance 
and growth relationship, the VAR was estimated without a deterministic trend for the finance-
growth nexus. However no a priori restrictions on intercepts were assumed and the VAR was 
estimated with unrestricted intercepts to account for the constant in the equation. 
On the basis of these seven variables, co-integration analysis was carried out using the VAR 
modelling process starting with unit root test. 
5.2.2 Unit Root Tests 
The development of the concept of unit root and indeed co-integration has had an important 
impact on the time series analysis of economic data, particularly on econometric practice. Time 
series modelling requires the data generating processes of the series and structural relationship 
described by the model to be invariant with respect to time. If the underlying stochastic 
processes of the time series are non stationary, it would be difficult in modelling the series with 
an equation that has fixed coefficients estimated from past data. In addition as stated in chapter 
4, regressing non-stationary time series data against another can lead to spurious results and 
biased conventional significance tests.  
Thus, to test if a time series is stationary or not, this study applied the Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) test, which examines the hypothesis that the variable in question has a unit root. If the 












performing the regression analysis. By contrast, if the variables are found to be stationary, it is 
not necessary to proceed and test for co-integration since classical regression methods of 
estimation such as OLS are appropriate and can be applied to stationary variables in levels. 
Ultimately, if the variables are found to be integrated at different orders, it is possible to 
conclude that various subsets of variables under consideration may be co-integrated (only where 
there are more than two variables under consideration). However, further analysis would 
obviously be required to test this conjecture. 
With regard to the analysis of data, the first step taken was examination of the series through 
graphical inspection of their time series plots. These variables include real per capita product  ^!F#, real gross fixed capital formation  #, interest rates  !#, Credit to the private 
sector by the commercial Banks  Fe4#, financial instability # real interest rates  V]# and 
openness of the economy FVl#. The series are expressed in logarithms and are in annual rates 
of growth covering the period 1965 to 2004 as mentioned previously.13  
The graphical inspections of all the variables in levels clearly suggest that some of the series are 
linearly trended. Given that each variable seems to have a non-constant mean, it appears then 
that the variables are not stationary in levels, meaning that their distribution depends on time. For 
more details see the plots of the core variables under scrutiny in figure 13, 14 and 15 of the 
annex. 
Following graphical evidence it is always useful as a first approximation to data investigation to 
also test. This argument is based on the fact that most economists agree that graphical inspection 
is at times unreliable method to use to make inferences about unit roots and as a result formal 
testing procedures are usually employed (see, Harris, 1995).  
5.2.3 Testing for Unit Roots Using ADF Test 
Table 23 presents the results in both levels as well as differenced form using augmented Dickey 
Fuller (ADF) tests. In this Table T and NT stands for trend and no trend respectively. 
Result from all the seven variables in each of the three study countries shows that the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected for any of the variables under scrutiny. In addition, when 
differenced form of the variables is considered, the tests strongly reject the unit root which 
means that variables are integrated of order at the 5 percent confidence level.  
                                               












Table 23: Results of ADF Unit Root Test 
Country Variables Levels 1st Difference 
 Aug Dickey-Fuller statistic 
Kenya  T -2.67 NT -4.99 
  NT -3.43 NT -6.01  T -2.04 NT -7.25  NT -1.33 NT -5.42  NT 0.99 NT -7.44 
 FVl NT -1.49 NT -6.66 
 V] NT -3.31 NT -7.55 
South Africa   T 1.90 NT -3.69 
   T 3.24 NT -4.94  T 0.57 NT -5.44   NT -2.68 NT -6.19   T -1.86 NT -9.96 
 FVl  T -0.99 NT -4.67 
 V]  NT 2.89 NT -5.92 
Zambia   T -1.29 NT -6.40 
   T -1.34 NT -7.03  T -1.42 NT -4.95   NT -1.20 NT -9.52   T -1.71 NT -6.14 
 FVl  T -2.69 NT -6.77 
 V]  NT -2.91 NT -8.20 
       Note: Mackinnon (1991) critical values are -3.50 in levels and -2.92 for the 1st difference. 
However, it is important to note that in the entire seven variables, irrespective of the order of the 
augmentation chosen, both tests, i.e. the DF and the ADF statistics, are well below the 5 percent 
critical values. These unit root test results also corroborate well with the findings in most 
empirical studies. That is with most macroeconomic series, the variables under consideration in 
this study appear to be non-stationary in levels. Only in their first differences are they stationary.  
Thus, considering the fact that the data appear to be stationary in first differences, no further tests 
were performed on these series with regard to the issue of stationarity. 
In summary, the reviewed time series properties of data imply the following two issues: 
• First, taking all the results together, it is not plausible for the variables included in the 
three countries to exclude the possibility of a single unit root.  
• Second, the evidence that the variables are described by an - 1# process is strong and this 












the results of these unit root tests and the a priori knowledge that all the seven variables 
in each country, like the case is in most time series data are generally considered to be 
integrated of order one, the null hypothesis of stationarity (in 1st difference) was accepted 
for all variables under consideration, without any exception at all.  
Accordingly, the rest of the analysis in the VECM apart from those of PSS-Test and Toda-
Yamamoto proceeded under the assumption that the time series relevant for our co-integration 
tests are all integrated to the same order - 1# , which of course is a necessary condition in time 
series for testing for co-integration relationships.  
Prior to the estimation of the VECM using Johansen procedure we tested all our three models 
using Pesaran, Shin and Smith, (1996) methodology. This is necessary in order to find out if the 
system of our equations contains a unique co-integrating vector. If a unique co-integrating vector 
is found then the autoregressive-distributed lag (ARDL) method which was developed by 
Pesaran et al. could be used to model finance and growth relationship. However, if more than 
one co-integrating vector is found then the Johansen FILM VECM’s co-integration technique is 
applied. Below we briefly outline the PSS F-test and its test results. 
5.3 Pesaran, Shin, Smith (PSS) ARDL Results 
The application of the PSS ARDL technique as outlined in section 4.4.3 of chapter 4 of the thesis 
was applied in this analysis in order to select the so-called ‘forcing variables’. Besides, since the 
choice of the orders of the lagged differenced variables in the unrestricted ECM specification can 
have a significant effect on the test results, the log form of variables were estimated for the 
orders F  {  1,2. 
In modelling the finance and growth following PSS ARDL method, the analysis was strictly 
guided by the combination of theory as well as the empirical test findings. The estimations, like 
all other computations in this thesis, were carried out using the program Microfit 4.0 (see 
Pesaran and Pesaran, 1997).  
Data analysis gave information as to which type of the models fit Kenya, South Africa and 
Zambia’s data best. In so doing we also investigate whether a unique co-integrating vector in 
each model does exist. Tables 37, 38 and 39 report the empirical realisations of the F-statistics 
for testing the existence of a long-run relationship between financial development and economic 












correlation, functional form misspecification and for non-normal and/or heteroskedastic 
disturbances. The 90, 95 and 95.7 percent lower and upper critical values bounds of the F-test 
statistic that are dependent on the number of regressors on whether a linear trend is inclu ed or 
not, are originally given in Table B in Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1996) and usefully summarised 
in Pesaran and Pesaran, 1997. 
Results from the first model which presupposes that V^!F is determined by 
V^!F, V, VFe4, V!, V, VV], VFVl, !¿75 and !¿94 are presented 
below (see Table 24). In the second hypothesis V is determined by V^!F, V,
VFe4, V!, V, VV], VFVl, !¿75 and !¿94. Regarding the third equation of 
VFe4 it is determined by V^!F, V, VFe4, V!, V, VV], VFVl VV] and 
!¿94. 
Finally, V!   is determined by V^!F, V, VFe4, V!, V, VV],
lnopenk VV] and !¿94. 
Table 24: F-statistic values 
F-Statistics for co-integration relationship of Kenyan model 
 Critical value bounds of the F-Statistic with constant and trend 
  90% 95% 97.5% 
k I (0) I (1) I (0) I (1) I (0) I (1) 
9 2.192 3.285 2.467 3.614 2.723 3.898 
Calculated F-statistic:  
~_V^!F  V^!F\V, VFe4, V!, V, VV], VFVl, !¿75, !¿94  5.376# 
~_V  V\V^!F, VFe4, V!, V, VV], VFVl, !¿75, !¿94  4.7814# 
~çwèi VFe4\V^!F, VFe4, V!, V, VV], VFVl, !¿75, !¿94  2.5426#             ~çéêëìê V!\V^!F, VFe4, V!, V, VV], VFVl, !¿75, !¿94   1.3606#  
What emerges from the comparison of F-statistics with the critical values is that: 
 V^!F  5.376 % ~  3.614 indicating the presence of a long-run relationship, 
 V  4.7814 % ~  3.614 also indicating the existence of a long-run relationship. 












inconclusive about the existence of the long-run regarding the underlying variables. 
 Finally, V!  1.36 > 2.467  indicating the absence of long-run 
relationship.  
The results in (Table 25: F-statistic values) seem to suggest the existence of at least two co-
integrating vectors.  
With regard to the South African model the various F-statistics in Table 38 were compared with 
the critical value bounds provided by Pesaran et al., as follows: 
 V^!F  8.002 % ~  3.349 indicating the presence of a long-run relationship, 
 V  3.891 % ~  3.349 also indicating the existence of a long-run relationship. 
 VFe4  3.773 % ~  3.349 which also confirms the existence of a long-run relationship. 
 Finally, V!  1.958 > ~  2.163  indicating the absence of long-run    relationship.   
Table 25: F-statistic values 
F-Statistics for co-integration relationship of South African model 
 Critical value bounds of the F-Statistic with constant and no trend 
  90% 95% 97.5% 
k I (0) I (1) I (0) I (1) I (0) I (1) 
9 1.899 3.047 2.163 3.349 2.437 3.657 
Calculated F-statistic:  
~_V^!F  V^!F\V, VFe4, V!, V, VV], VFVl, !]80, !  8.002#  
~_V  V\V^!F, VFe4, V!, V, VV], VFVl, !]80, !  3.891#  
~çwèi VFe4\V^!F, VFe4, V!, V, VV], VFVl, !]80, !  3.773#             ~çéêëìê V!\V^!F, VFe4, V!, V, VV], VFVl, !]80, !   1.958#         
The results obtained above seem to suggest that in the case of the South African model we have 
three co-integrating vectors. 
Finally, in the Zambian case, the following long-run co-integration relationships are reported:  












 V  4.896 % ~  3.614  indicating the existence of a long-run relationship. 
 VFe4  3.687 % ~  3.614 which also substantiates the existence of a long-run relation. 
 Finally, the computed estimate of  V!  3.264 and falls between 
~  2.467 and ~  3.614 thereby indicating that the test is inconclusive about the existence of the long-run regarding the underlying variables. 
Table 26: F-statistic values 
F-Statistics for co-integration relationship of Zambian model 
 Critical value bounds of the F-Statistic with constant and trend 
  90% 95% 97.5% 
K I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) 
9 2.192 3.285 2.467 3.614 2.723 3.898 
Calculated F-statistic:  
~_V^!F  V^!F\V, VFe4, V!, V, VV], VFVl, !¿92, !¿75  3.546#  
~_V  V\V^!F, VFe4, V!, V, VV], VFVl, !¿92, !¿75  4.896#  
~çwèi VFe4\V^!F, VFe4, V!, V, VV], VFVl, !¿92, !¿75  3.687#             ~çéêëìê V!\V^!F, VFe4, V!, V, VV], VFVl, !¿92, !¿75   3.264#  
The conclusion drawn from the results presented in above (Table 26: F-statistic values) show 
that in the case of Zambia it appears there are at least three co-integrating vectors (CVs) present 
in the model. 
In summary using PSS F-test we find that in each model more than one long-run relationships 
existing. Consequently using this method of PSS ARDL failed to proceed with the test of 
causality relationship between finance and growth. This is because of the fact that no unique co-
integrating vector was found but instead there was a possibility two or three co-integrating 
vectors in each model (Pesaran & Shin, 1999).  
Despite this drawback with the PSS methodology it has however given us two most important 
leads: (1) an idea as to how many relationships we expect to have from each model and (2) 
which variables we have to treat as dependant variables. From this point of view and in order for 
us to identify the most economically meaningful relationship of causal inference between the 












when more than one co-integrating vector is identified. Thus, before proceeding with the test of 
causality using VECM we followed steps outlined in section 4.4.5 starting with test of the order 
of the VAR. 
5.4 Estimation of the Models 
Given the non-stationarity of all the seven variables for the countries considered, the vector of 
real per capita income, investment and credit is viewed as a system of possibly co-integrated 
variables (Engle & Granger, 1987). As such the number of co-integrating relationships between 
them was estimated. The Johansen maximum likelihood procedure (1992) was used to estimate 
the number of co-integrating vectors and to derive a likelihood ratio test for the null hypothesis 
that there are a given number of these relationships. In addition to basing our conclusion on the 
empirical results we also used the a priori information based on the theory of causal relationships 
between finance and growth. As the specific country approach was used to investigate the 
propositions under study because the findings are intended to benefit national policy makers, the 
results are reported on a country-by-country basis starting with the test of order of the VARs for 
all three countries. 
5.4.1 Tests for the Order of the VARs 
From the pre unit root tests conducted on all our series in section 5.2.2 we note that all the seven 
variables in each country’s model were found to be of order - 1#. In addition to the non-
stationarity of the variables we included a constant 8 in the underlying VARs. Dummies were 
also considered in all the three cases to capture the effects of the structural breaks as pointed out 
earlier in this chapter.  
In line with common empirical practice, the order of VAR l was chosen using the Akaike 
Information Criterion or the Schwartz Bayesian Information Criterion subject to the lag length 
choice passing the L.M test for the absence of serial correlation. For instance in all three 
countries, consideration of the Akaike Information Criterion generally suggested an optimal 
VAR order of 4, 2 and 3 for Kenya, Zambia and South Africa respectively, while the Schwartz 
Bayesian Information Criterion generally suggested a VAR of order 1 in all three sets. One 
important issue to note here is that we have to avoid over parametising the model and equally 
true is the argument that we have to avoid using a VAR with l  1. This is all based on the fact 
that we have small sample size and the choice of VAR of order 1 is not very useful as in this case 












So in the assessment of the order of the lag length we start with a lag order of 2 and check the 
residuals of the individual equations with respect to serial correlation. Knowing that this test has 
two versions, this study only employed one of them which is LM-test. Furthermore, the 
interpretation of the test statistics follows the test of the null hypothesis that there is essentially 
‘no problem’, so it is desirable that the probability value is greater than 5%.  
From the results presented in Annexure A (Table (36, Table (37 and Table (38 for Kenya, South 
Africa and Zambia respectively, we note that there is no problem with respect to serial 
correlation over the sample period of 1965-2004 when a VAR of order 2 was considered for each 
country. As a result we concluded that a VAR of order two was a reasonable choice in all three 
models and consequently proceeded to estimating the VECM with the lag order of 2 starting with 
Kenya, South Africa and then Zambia.  
5.5 Kenya 
According to the representation theorem, if series are co-integrated, Granger causality will 
further require the inclusion of error correction terms (ECT) in the stationary model in order to 
capture the short-term deviation of series from their long-term equilibrium path. In fact, the 
evidence of co-integration between variables rules out the possibility of Granger non causality, 
although it does not say anything about the direction of the causality. In this case, the application 
of a vector error correction model (VECM) will enable both the direction of the causality to be 
revealed, and to distinguish between short-run and long-run Granger causality. Taking this view, 
causality can be derived through: a) the : test of the joint significance of lags of other variables 
(Wald test), and b) the significance of the lagged error correction terms (t-test). 
The system of equations applied to test the finance-growth relationship hypothesis in Kenya is 
defined as: 




                             (19) 
where   V^!F, V, VFe4, V!, V, VV], VFVl, Γ and Π represent short 
and long-run coefficients and C is a constant term. We note too that Π is a F a F matrix. The 
rank ^ of matrix Π is equal to the number of co-integrating vectors. The hypothesis of co-












;7 ^#: Π  'b                            (20) 
where ' and b are F a ^ matrices of the full rank. The b in this case refers to the co-integrating 
parameters and ' measures the speed of adjustment towards the long-run equilibrium and is 
called a loadings. 
To ascertain the existence of long-run relationships among the variables, the Johansen co-
integration test was implemented. The estimated trace  ûü5ýê# and maximal eigenvalue  ûþ5# 
test statistics and their corresponding 5% critical values are reported in Table 27. The trace 
statistic tests the null hypothesis that the number of co-integrating vectors, or rank  Π#, is less 
than or equal to ̂ (where ̂  0,1, k , l + 1 for l endogenous variables) against the general 
alternative that the number of co-integrating vectors is greater than ^ i. e. , ûü5ýê  ;<#: rank  Π# ` ^; ;7: rank Π# ¬ ^ 	 1. The maximal eigenvalue statistic tests the same null hypothesis 
against the alternative that the number of co-integrating vectors is equal to ^ 	 1 . . ûþ5 ;<#: rank Π# ¬ ^; ;7: rank Π# ¬ ^ 	 1. 
Table 27: Johansen estimates for Kenya 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% CV 90% CV 
Co-integration LR test based on maximal Eigenvalue statistics  
0=r  1=r  87.5819 45.6300 42.7000 
1≤r  2=r  53.5903 39.8300 36.8400 
2≤r  3=r  41.9428 33.6400 31.0200 
3≤r  4=r  24.6741 27.4200 24.9900 
4≤r  5=r  13.8602 21.1200 19.0200 
Co-integration LR test based on trace statistic 
0=r  1=r  236.5530 124.6200 119.6800 
1≤r  2=r  148.9711 95.8700 91.4000 
2≤r  3=r  95.3808 70.4900 66.2300 
3≤r  4=r  53.4381 48.8800 45.7000 
4≤r  5=r  28.7640 31.5400 28.7800 
       Order of the VAR=2. Variables included in the CV: lnrgdpc, lngfcf, lnpvy, lnwedge, 
       lnint, lnopenk, dum75 & dum94. 
Based on the results in Table 27 it is noted that whereas the maximal eigenvalue test suggests 
that there are only three co-integrating relationships among the variables, the trace test indicates 
there are four co-integrating relationships among the variables. From the discussions on the 
theoretical and empirical literature expounded in Section 3, the a priori expectation is that we 












and growth. It may therefore be inferred that there are three types of competing relationships 
between financial development and economic growth. Consequently the model accepted is that 
of the maximal eigenvalue test and concluded that we have three co-integrating relationships 
among the variables. It means therefore that six restrictions and three normalisations have to be 
imposed so as to exactly identify the long-run model before testing for over-identifying 
restrictions. Below in (Table 27: Johansen estimates for Kenya) we report the co-integration 
results based on Johansen ML procedure.  
5.5.1 Identification of Long-Run Model 
The Johansen’s approach together with the PSS F-tests enabled us to establish the three co-
integrating vectors for Kenya’s model. And following on the identification of the co-integrating 
vectors we proceeded to imposing nine restrictions three of which were normalised on the bd . . V^!F, V, and VFe4# in order to just identify the model of interest.  
As a result, of six restrictions and three normalisations on V^!F, V, and VFe4, we got 
the following just identifying model which we reported in equation 21, 22 and 23 below:  
V^!F  0.95V 	 0.79VFe4 + 0.01VV] 	 0.16VFVl                (21) 
V  0.84V^!F + 0.62VFe4 + 0.04V 	 0.02VV]              (22) 
VFe4  1.31V^!F + 1.54V + 0.11V! 	 0.06V                    (23) 
where the log likelihood function (LL) subject to just-identifying restrictions as reported in our 
output is equal to 62.8398. 
The first vector of equation 21 represents the real per capita income conditioned on investment, 
real interest rates, private credit and openness. All the coefficients in this CV have the expected 
signs. Vector 2 stands for the gross fixed capital formation in which two of the coefficients for 
real per capita income and the uncertainty have the right signs. However, in this second co-
integration vector the private credit and real interest rates appear to have wrong signs. In Vector 
3 which stands for private credit, the real per capita income, wedge and uncertainty all have the 
correct signs with the exception of gross fixed capital formation which have a wrong negative 
sign. However, since the above exact identifying restrictions do not impose any testable 
restrictions on the co-integrating VAR, over-identifying restrictions based on the three long-run 













The above over-identifying restrictions to have equal coefficients on V and VFe4 yielded 
a system of vectors depicted in the matrix 28. This model was easily accepted with the log 
likelihood ratio (LR) statistic for testing these restrictions computed to be 0.087160 [0.768] 
thereby giving rise to the preferred model of the long-run financial development and economic 












 e7 e: eV^!F 1 +.91 0.24# +1.21 0.40#
V +.85 0.21# 1 +1.36 0.72#
VFe4 +.85 0.21# +.74 0.74# 1
V! 0 VV# 0 VV# 0.12 0.10#
V 0 VV# 0.05 0.02# 0.07 0.05#
VV] 0.1 0.200# 0.03 0.20# 0 VV#











                 (24) 
where LR test restriction CHSQ (1) = 0.087160 [0.768]. 
The above three long-run co-integrating vectors can be expressed in three equations in which all 
the coefficients of the explanatory variables appear to have correct signs. 
V^!F  0.85V 	 0.85VFe4 + 0.1VV] 	 0.18VFVl       (25) 
V  0.91V^!F 	 0.75VFe4 + 0.05V + 0.01VV]                 (26) 
VFe4  1.21V^!F 	 1.36V + 0.12V! + 0.07V               (27) 
Caution must be exercised, however, when interpreting the results unearthed in the above system 
of equation. The reason is that although the co-integration implies positive relations between the 
three variables of interest (i.e. income, financial development and investment), co-integration 












ascertained from performing Granger-causality tests that incorporate the co-integrating relation. 
This is what we do next in section 5.5.2. 
After identifying the system of equation as shown in equations 25, 26 and 27, a natural step is to 
examine both the long-run and short-term dynamics that are influenced by temporary deviations. 
To do this we formulate a vector error correction model. According to the VECM also known as 
the Granger representation theorem, if the series are co-integrated as is the case here, Granger-
causality will further require the inclusion of the error correction terms in the stationary model in 
order to capture the short-term deviation of series from their long-term equilibrium path. In fact, 
as pointed out in section 4 the evidence of co-integration between variables rules out the 
possibility of Granger non causality, although it does not say anything about the direction the 
causality. In this case, the application of a vector error correction model (VECM) will enable 
both the direction of causality to be revealed, and to distinguish between short-run and long-run 
Granger causality. Taking this view, we present the vector error correction modelling results in 
Table 28 below. 
5.5.2 The Vector Error Correction Model 
As stated in the previous section we formulated the VECM in order to examine both the short-
run and long-run dynamics of causality. In this case we note that short-term dynamics are 
influenced by temporary deviations from the long-run relationship (Table 28).  
Concerning the long-run causality, the t-statistics for the ECT show that all the three error terms 
i.e. ¿1 +1#, ¿2 +1#, and ¿3 +1# are statistically significant in the real GDP per 
capita and investment equation. However, in the credit equation, no error correction term appears 
to be significant. These results would imply that a long-run causal relationship running from VFe4 to V^!F exists, although not in the opposite direction, that is, from V^!F to VFe4 
(as V^!F is not statistically significant in the ). This finding is based on the fact that the -
statistic of the error correction term in the  was not statistically significant. Furthermore, these 
results seem to suggest that there is a two way causality existing in the long-run between V^!F and V. The results therefore do not lend support to the claims that economic 
growth precedes financial development in the case of Kenya. Conversely, V and VFe4 
seems to cause and precede real per capita income.  
With regards to the short-run causality the :-test of the lags of the differentiated variables show 












short-run influence of V^!F and V! on the dynamic behaviour of VFe4. Finally, the 
results from the VECM seem to show that in the long-run supply-leading hypothesis is supported 
as financial development seems to lead economic using both the financial development proxies. 
While in the short-run it’s the demanding-following hypothesis which is supported by the 
empirical results. 
Table 28: Granger-Causality Tests on VECM 
 














































        In the case of short-run estimates, figures in parentheses are the coefficient terms, while  
        for the error terms the terms in parentheses are p-values. 
In summary the results tabulated in Table 28: Granger-Causality Tests on VECM) seem to 
support the existence of unidirectional causal relation between finance and growth hypothesis in 
both the short-run and long-run. What is clearly highlighted in above VECM is that in the short-
run it’s the demand-following hypothesis which is supported by the Wald-test results. While 
bank credit to the private sector, gross fixed capital formation and the wedge primarily influence 
real economic activities in the long-run, as can be seen by significance of the components of the 
lagged error-correction terms. However, the results show that the magnitude of these responses 
are rather high, suggesting that the gross fixed capital formation, credit to the private sector and 












These results are not surprising given the close relationship of the financial intermediary (i.e. 
banking sector) with industry in Kenya. Our findings are broadly consistent with the view that 
the financial systems are more likely to promote long-run economic growth. Similar findings are 
reported by Luintel and Khan (1999), Arestis and Demitriades (1997), Arestis et al. (2001).  
5.6 South Africa 
With regard to the South African case a similar system of equations as the one applied for in 
Kenya was used to test the finance-growth relationship and the model was defined as follows: 




                            (28) 
where   V^!F, V, VFe4, V!, V, VV], VFVl, Γ and Π representing 
short and long-run coefficients and C is a constant term.  
As already pointed in section 5.4.2 the results of the tests to determine the order of VAR using 
both the AIC and SBC criteria select 2 as the appropriate order of the VAR. Diagnostic tests (the 
LR test) for possible serial correlation in the residuals of the individual equation suggests that 
serial correlation is not a problem in a statistical sense. Using model (28) defined above, we 
report the CV results based on both Eigenvalues and trace statistics. 
Table 29, presents the co-integration rank statistics defined by the eigenvalue and the trace 
statistics respectively, together with the corresponding asymptotic critical values at the 0.05 and 
0.10 significance levels reproduced using 2 as the order of the VAR. Both statistics reject the 
hypothesis that there is no co-integration relationship between the seven - 1# variables under 
investigation. However, the eigenvalue statistic could not reject ^ ` 3 just as the case was for 
trace statistic which failed too to reject ^ ` 4. Despite these conflicting results, we however 
settled for trace statistic results which seems to agree with economic theory, that there should be 
three long-run (co-integrating) relations namely: demand-following, supply-leading and the 
indirect causal relations, 
Based on the above empirical results and theoretical underpinnings that variables move together 
in the long-run (i.e. they are co-integrated) we proceeded further with the analysis in an attempt 












Table 29: Johansen estimates – South Africa 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% CV 90% CV 
Co-integration LR test based on maximal Eigenvalue statistics  
0=r  1=r  57.9136 42.3000 39.3900 
1≤r  2=r  42.4959 36.2700 33.4800 
2≤r  3=r  31.1341 29.9500 27.5700 
3≤r  4=r  23.0227 23.9200 21.5800 
4≤r  5=r  14.1567 17.6800 15.5700 
Co-integration LR test based on trace statistic 
0=r  1=r  177.4022 110.1000 105.4400 
1≤r  2=r  119.4887 83.1800 78.4700 
2≤r  3=r  76.9928 59.3300 55.4200 
3≤r  4=r  45.8587 39.8100 36.6900 
4≤r  5=r  22.8360 24.0500 21.4600 
        Variables included in the co-integrating vector:  
       & . 
5.6.1 Identification of Long-Run Model for RSA 
In order to estimate the possibility of the long-run relationship and to enable us to extract the 
three structural relationships imbedded in the co-integrating space, we imposed some 
assumptions based on the identifying restrictions. The fact that results reveals three co-
integrating vectors we imposed six restrictions and three normalisations on V^!F, V and 
VFe4. The restrictions as mentioned before were imposed so as to identify the long-run model 























 e7 e: eV^!F 1 +.66 0.04# +1.06 0.07#
V . 78 4.17# 1 +1.54 0.15#
VFe4 2.52 3.20# +.74 0.04# 1
V! 0 VV# +.27 0.06# +.42 0.08#
VV] 0.15 0.28# 0 VV# 0 VV#
VFVl 0 VV# +.11 0.09# 0 VV#











              (29) 
LL subject to exact identifying restrictions = 222.3971. The above matrix can be written in the 
usual way as: 
V^!F  +0.78V 	 2.25VFe4 + 0.15VV] + 0.33V                   (30) 
V  0.66V^!F + 0.71VFe4 	 0.27V! 	 0.11VFVl                (31) 
VFe4  1.06V^!F + 1.54V 	 0.42V! + 0.02V                (32) 
The vectors expressed in equation 29 through to 31 do not obviously support the finance-growth 
theory because some of the coefficients such as gross fixed capital formation in the first CV, 
credit and the wedge in the second CV and then finally wedge and gross fixed capital formation 
in the third CV have the wrong signs. In addition to the just-identified system depicted in the 
above system of equations, the investment and credit were further restricted to 2h: 	 :  1 so 
that they can have equal signs. This restriction produced an over-identified system depicted in 
matrix 32, which is easily accepted with the log likelihood ratio (LR) statistic for testing these 
restrictions to 0.22132, with p-value of 0.638 giving rising to a preferred model of the long-run 























 e7 e: eV^!F 1 +.66 0.06# +1.06 0.04#
V +.27 0.07# 1 +1.54 0.15#
VFe4 1.72 0.06# +.74 0.04# 1
V! 0 VV# +.27 0.06# +.42 0.08#
VV] 0.08 0.02# 0 VV# 0 VV#
VFVl 0 VV# +.11 0.01# 0 VV#











                 (33) 
Once more we reproduce the results from matrix (33) in the usual way as follows: 
V^!F  0.267V 	 1.72VFe4 + 0.084VV] + 0.17V        (34) 
V  0.66^!F 	 0.71VFe4 	 0.27V! 	 0.11VFVl            (35) 
VFe4  1.06V^!F 	 1.53V 	 0.42V! + 0.02V               (36) 
From the above restrictions three links have been particularly emphasised in the analysis of long-
run dynamics: the relationship between real GDP per capita and financial development and vice 
versa. And the indirect relationship finance and growth via gross fixed capital formation. The 
statistical analysis described in the body of this section shows that in the long-run real GDP 
responds positively to the share of real investment and credit to the private sector by the 
commercial banks (see e7 in matrix 33). In the e: results seem to suggest that investment 
share responds positively to the real per capita income and financial development performance 
proxied by credit (see e:) while in the last e we have credit responding positively to real per 
capita income and gross fixed capita formation.  
With respect to the e: and e the signs of V! are counter intuitive. This result can be 
interpreted as follows: if the V! rate is increasing, then the V and VFe4 are picking 












of banks to raise investment and credit. It is difficult to imagine how such developments can 
speed up the economic growth. One explanation for the result obtained in equation 34 and 36 
regarding the sign of the wedge is that it could be used as proof for the theories explaining the 
negative relationship between financial sector development and economic growth. 
Another possibility to explain this result is connected with the high costs of developing the 
financial sector system. The observed country was isolated from the rest of the world for quite 
some time. Thus if the wedge between the loan and deposit rate (operating margin) is low, due 
say to competition then it is not possible to finance substantial investments from the cash-flow. 
This may result in underdevelopment of the financial and this may lead to low growth rate of the 
economy due to low investments. 
This result also raises the argument for the possibility of existing banks in South Africa charging 
monopoly interest rates because of the entry barriers of additional banks under the high growth 
of loan demand. To capture this effect we look at the plots of the wedge and credit over time. We 
find that the development of these two indicators are striking, and leads us to argue that banks 
did not raise the wedge when the loan demand was rising. Thus, the proposition of temporary 
monopoly profits does not seem to hold. Based on the above discussion and results we proceed 
to our next step which is constructing of the VECM.  
5.6.2 The Vector Error Correction Model for RSA 
Referring to the results in Table 30 the ]1 +1#, ]2 +2# and ]3 +1# depict the first, 
second and third co-integration vectors, respectively. The results of the temporal Granger 
causality test on this VECM are reported in (Table 30: Granger-Causality Tests on VECM). 
Concerning the long-run causality, the t-statistics for the ECT show that  ]1 +1# is 
statistically significant in the V^!F equation. The same is the case in the V equation 
where ]2 +2# is statistically significant. However, in the VFe4 equation ]3 +1# was 












Table 30: Granger-Causality Tests on VECM for South Africa 
 


















































In the case of short-run estimates, figures in parentheses are the coefficient terms, while for 
the error terms the terms in parentheses are p-values. 
 
These results would imply that a long-run causal relationship running from VFe4 to V^!F 
exists, although not in the opposite direction, that is, from V^!F to VFe4 (as the error 
correction term is not statistically significant in the third long-run equation). In the investment 
equation the results show that there is a long run causality running from V^!F, VFe4 and 
V! to V. Our results therefore do not lend support to the claims that V^!F causes 
VFe4. Conversely, our long-run results seem to support the supply-leading hypothesis that 
financial development via credit cause real per capita income. The long-run causal results also 
seem to support the existence of the indirect causal relation running from V! via V 
to real per capita income. The intuition behind this indirect causal relation is that South Africa 
experienced the repression of the financial sector system which may have contributed to the 
government controlling the interest rates more especially during the pre 1994 era. 
 
With regards to the short-run causality the :-test of the lags of the differentiated variables show 












short-run influence of V^!F and V! on the V. Finally, a unidirectional Granger 
causality between financial development (credit) and growth in the short-run is found. The above 
results seem to confirm the supply leading hypothesis unearthed in the long-run dynamic. With 
regard to policy implications, we suggest that South Africa continues with the reforms on the 
financial sector system. It is hoped that this will not only bring about efficiency in the system but 
sustain the growth of the economy too. 
5.7 Zambia 
Last but not least we take a look at the empirical results for Zambia. For the selection of the 
order of the VAR tests, both the AIC and SBC criteria selected 3 and 1 as the order of the VAR 
respectively. Due to reasons alluded earlier in this chapter, we chose the VAR of order 2. 
Diagnostic tests (the LR test) for possible serial correlation in the residuals of the individual 
equations suggest that serial correlation is not a statistically significant problem. Co-integration 
results for finance and growth using model (37) for the order of the VAR (2), together with their 
associated 90% and 95% critical values are reported in Annexure A (Table (38): Testing for lag 
order in a VAR – Zambia). 
In carrying out the analysis on the relationship between finance and growth, it must be pointed 
out that the analysis of the causal effect between finance and growth entails first testing the 
model without including the dummies. Using this first scenario, the results failed to establish any 
evocative co-integration relationship between finance and growth model. Against this no further 
analysis were attempted using this model. Therefore, the results reported under this test are those 
which include the two dummies (i.e. !¿75 and !¿92). In summary the system of equation of 
the VAR with lag of order 2 was treated as data congruent and consequently we proceed with the 
rest of our analysis based on the VAR of order 2. 
Given a well specified VAR(2), the next step is to determine the rank of Π, i.e. determine the 
number of the co-integrating vectors. The Johansen procedure was once again applied in this 
case to test the finance-growth relationship hypothesis and the model was defined as: 
















where once again   V^!F, V, VFe4, V!, V, VV], VFVl, Γ and Π 
representing short- and long-run coefficients and C constant term. Furthermore, as the case was 
for Kenya and South Africa, the number of long-run relations (r) for Zambia also depends on the 
eigenvalues, trace of the matrix corresponding to equation 37 and indeed the a priori expectation. 
Using the Johansen ML technique for estimating the coefficients in the matrix (Johnston & 
DiNardo, 1997) and testing for r (Patterson, 2000) we note the following in the case of Zambia’s 
model. The results tabulated in Table 31 show that both the Maximum eigenvalue ûþ5 and the 
Trace statistics ûü5ýê suggest r = 2.  
Table 31: Johansen estimates – Zambia 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% CV 90% CV 
Co-integration LR test based on maximal Eigenvalue statistics  
0=r  1=r  67.1259 49.3200 46.5400 
1≤r  2=r  49.7522 43.6100 40.7600 
2≤r  3=r  30.6303 37.8600 35.0400 
3≤r  4=r  18.5835 31.7900 29.1300 
4≤r  5=r  15.0456 25.4200 23.1000 
Cointegration LR test based on trace statistic 
0=r  1=r  198.0231 147.2700 141.8200 
1≤r  2=r  130.8972 115.8500 110.6000 
2≤r  3=r  81.1450 87.1700 82.8800 
3≤r  4=r  50.5147 63.0000 59.1600 
4≤r  5=r  31.9311 42.3400 39.3400 
      Order of the VAR=2. List of CVs: lnrgdpc, lngfcf, lnpvy, lnwedge, lnuc, lnint, lnopenk, 
       Dum75 and Dum92. 
Although maximum eigenvalue statistic and the trace test are consistent in this model our 
theoretical prior is that there are 3 long-run relationships (that is direct and indirect causal 
relation) and this exerted a bias in favour of ^  3. Based on ̂  3 we proceeded with the 
identification of the three long-run eg. 
5.7.1 Identification of Long-Run Model 
Identifying the long-run structure basically involves testing hypothesis of financial growth nexus 
in the form of direct and indirect relationship as indicated above. Thus, normalisation restrictions 
were imposed on three vectors involving V^!F in e1, V in e2 and VFe4 in e3. In 
addition to these restrictions six addition zero restrictions were made. The outcome is the just-












V^!F  0.31V 	 1.67VFe4 + 0.02VV] 	 0.84VFVl       (38) 
V  3.88V^!F 	 1.88VFe4 	 0.35V 	 1.55VFVl       (39) 
VFe4  +0.75V^!F 	 0.13V 	 0.14V! + 0.24VFVl     (40) 
The empirical results in the above system of equations show that a direct interpretation of the 
estimates is not straightforward. When examining the unrestricted co-integrating vectors we 
notice immediately how different the estimated vectors are from the theoretical underpinnings of 
finance and growth nexus. For instance we see that signs of the coefficients of variables in many 
cases different (see V in e2 and also V^!F, V! and VFVl in e3. 
Based on this unsatisfactory result, we then proceeded to test the finance-growth nexus 
hypotheses using the above just-identified model as a basic model by imposing over-identifying 
restrictions. Since we expect the long-run relations to include real per capita income to have 
equal coefficient we therefore restricted these variables to have equal coefficients. These 
restrictions produced the over-identified system in the co-integrating vector of matrix (41), 
which was easily accepted with a CHSQ 2# = 5.2110 [.074]. This in essence gave rise to the 













 e7 e: eV^!F 1 +.66 0.19# +0.06 0.19#
V +.15 0.16# 1 +0.21 0.10#
VFe4 1.14 0.21# +1.13 0.38# 1
V! 0 VV# 0 VV# 0.15 0.03#
V 0 VV# 0.17 0.07# 0 VV#
VV] 0.01 0.002# 0 VV# 0 VV#























Consequently, the long-run co-integrating relationship involving direct and indirect causal 
relationships between finance and growth is reproduced in the usual equation form as follows:  
V^!F  0.15V 	 1.14VFe4 + 0.01VV] 	 0.75FVl        (42) 
V  0.66V^!F 	 1.13VFe4 + 0.17V 	 1.65VFVl                (43) 
VFe4  0.66V^!F 	 0.21V + 0.15V! + 0.76FVl            (44) 
The results reported above are striking, and show that in the first co-integrating vector ( 1) 
V^!F is positively determined by VFe4 with the coefficient 1.14, which is significant at the 
one percent level. Importantly, V, VV] and VFVl also appear to affect V^!F with 
coefficients of 0.15, -0.01 and 0.75 respectively which are significant at the five percent level. 
These results appeal to yield results that are supported by the theory. For instance, the first 
estimate in the co-integrating vector (e1) supports the endogenous growth view that gross fixed 
capital formation drives long-run economic growth. Similarly the negative effect of interest rates 
on real per capita income is in agreement with the traditional view of a long-run positive link 
between growth and capital accumulation and a negative long-run link between accumulation 
and cost of capital (see Mishkin, 1981 and Romer, 1990). The second co-integrating vector (e2) 
shows that V^!F, VFe4 and VFVl all have positive coefficients which are significant at 
the one percent level.  
The results from the e3 seem to give results which are partially consistent with theory. The 
reason for this lies in the fact that while V^!F, V and V! all are statistically 
significant and have correct signs, the same can not to be said to be the case with respect to VFVl which though was found to be significant had a wrong sign. One possible explanation 
for this counter intuitive result could be the failure by policy makers to stabilising the economy 
before opening it up to the outside competitors. 
5.7.2 The Vector Error Correction Model 
Conditional on the above long-run estimates, results for the vector error correction model in 












Table 32: Granger-Causality Tests on VECM for Zambia 
In the case of short-run estimates, the figures in parentheses are the coefficients while  
for the ECM the terms in parentheses are p-values. 
Having discovered long run relationships via the co-integrated vector method, vector error-
correction techniques are applied. The lagged residuals from the co-integrating regression with 
the appropriate number of lags are included in the Granger-causality test structure. The lag 
length structure depends on the restricted error-correction models. For both Models, the 
restricted error-correction specifications pass a series of diagnostic tests, including serial 
correlation based on the inspection of Lagrange multiplier.  
Results in Table 32 also report the findings for the endogeneity of all variables, based on the 
error-correction equations. From the three co-integrating vectors established above, estimates of 
the parameters show that the error-correction term measuring the long-run disequilibrium is 
significant in two out of the three equations (i.e. ]1 +1#  +0.1, ]2 +0.34# and 
]3 +1#  0.02, which was found not to be statistically significant. Thus, concerning the long-
run causality, the t-statistic appears to be significant in only the first and second co-integrating 
vectors. However in the VFe4 vector equation none appear to be significant. This implies that 
all the variables in the e1 and e2 have a tendency to restore equilibrium and take the burden 
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of any shock to the system. In this case the t-tests for the error-correction terms, at the 1% level 
of significance, indicate that V^!F is granger caused by VFe4.  
These results would imply that a long-run causal relationship running from VFe4 to V^!F 
exists, although not in the opposite direction, that is, from V^!F to VFe4 (as V^!F is not 
significant in the long-run equation). Our results therefore do not give support to the claims that 
in the long run a bi-directional causality does exist between finance and growth in Zambia. 
Conversely, private credit as a proxy of financial development seems to cause and precede real 
per capita income. 
Regarding the short-run dynamics (Granger-causality in the strict sense) of e1, the Wald-tests 
suggest that V^!F is affected by changes in V, VFe4, and V!. This finding is 
based on the significance of the p-values of these variables at 10, 5 and 10 percent respectively. 
The short-run dynamics in e2 hV! e3  indicate that there is no causality existing between 
variables of interest. This means that only a unidirectional relationship exists from private credit 
and wedge to real per capita income. This of course is in addition to the causal inference running 
from gross fixed capital formation to growth as mentioned before. 
To complete the analysis of the causal relationship it is useful to compare the VECM results with 
those generated through Toda-Yamamoto method. The argument for this as mentioned in chapter 
4 is to check for the robustness of the results. Hence the next section is cantered on the 
discussion of causality relationship between finance and growth in levels using the Toda and 
Yamamoto framework. It must be pointed out that this only involves the long-run dynamics. 
5.8. Toda-Yamamoto Level VAR results 
In this section analysis of results from the point of view of Toda and Yamamoto method is 
employed. The econometric estimations from this section are intended to offer some robust 
checks to our earlier results obtained under the VECM modelling in chapter 5. Thus, the analysis 
of these results will show whether our earlier results are robust or not. The empirical estimations 
are based on the hypothesised relationships constructed in the theoretical framework. They 
indicate the type of hypothetical relation the financial development via credit and efficiency of 
the banking industry has with the economic activities in three selected countries namely Kenya, 
South Africa and Zambia. We thus begin the analysis with Kenya, followed by South Africa and 











5.8.1 Brief Recap of Toda-Yamamoto Method 
These tests are based on null hypotheses formulated as zero restrictions on the coefficients of the 
lags of a subset of the variables. However, such tests are grounded in asymptotic theory; yet, it 
must be borne in mind that asymptotic theory is only valid for stationary variables, thus if a 
series is known to be non-stationary, - 1#, then such inferences can only be made if the VAR is 
estimated in first differences, and therefore stationary. This causes problems because the unit 
root results based on the tests of the null hypothesis of stationarity have low power against the 
alternative hypothesis of trend stationarity. Similarly, the tests for co-integrating rank in 
Johansen’s tests are sensitive to the values of trend and constant terms in finite samples and thus 
not very reliable for typical time series sample sizes. In other words, it is possible that incorrect 
inferences could be made about causality simply due to the sensitivity of stationarity or co-
integration tests. 
In this section the methodology proposed by Toda and Yamamoto (1995) is applied in testing for 
causality in the Finance-Growth relationship. As stated earlier on in chapter 4, Toda and 
Yamamoto avoid the problems outlined above by ignoring any possible non-stationarity or co-
integration between series when testing for causality, and fitting a standard VAR in the levels of 
the variables (rather than first differences, as is the case with the Granger and Sims causality 
tests), thereby minimising the risks associated with possibly wrongly identifying the orders of 
integration of the series, or the presence of co-integration, and minimises the distortion of the 
tests’ sizes as a result of pre-testing (Toda-Yamamoto, 1995; Giles, 1997). 
In this case all one needs to do is to determine the maximal order of integration !þ5 (where !þ5 is the maximal order of integration suspected to occur in the system), which we expect to 
occur in the model and construct a VAR in their levels with a total of  	 !þ5# lags. Toda and 
Yamamoto point out that, for !  1, the lag selection procedure is always valid, at least 
asymptotically, since l ¬ 1  !. If  !  2, then the procedure is valid unless l  1. Moreover, 
according to Toda and Yamamoto, the MWald statistic is valid regardless of whether a series is 
an - 0#, - 1# or - 2#, non co-integrated or co-integrated of an arbitrary order. Based on this we 
move to the estimation of the causal inference in levels. 
5.8.2 Estimation Results  
The results of tests of restrictions from a VAR estimated by the procedure prescribed by Toda 











these results do not include short-run dynamics. Based on this, one must bear in mind that when 
we do check for the robustness of our results, this will be with those results obtained using the 
error-correction models and mainly those pertaining to long-run causal dynamics. Below in 
Table 33, Table 34, and Table 35 we report the results based on the Toda and Yamamoto 
method. 
5.8.3 Kenya 
Starting with Kenya, the results in Table 33 seem to support the bi-direction hypothesis between 
credit to the private sector and economic growth. As we can see from these results the null 
hypothesis of Granger no-causality can be strongly rejected at the 99 percent confidence level in 
the case of credit and growth with p-values of 0.016 in e1. Similarly, we reject the null 
hypothesis of Granger no causality in e3 where the p-value of MWald statistic for real per 
capita income was found to be 0.022. With regard to the rest of the variables we failed to reject 
the null hypothesis of Granger no-causality.  
Table 33: Results of long-run causality test 
based on Toda-Yamamoto Augmented lags Methods for Kenya. 
Variables Order of 
unaugmented 
VAR Model(a) 
Source of causation 
  lnRGDPC lnGFCF lnPVY lnWEDGE 
lnRGDPC 2  
- 
( )12χ =0.31 
[ ]58.0  
( )12χ =5.76 
[ ]016.0  
( )12χ =0.07 
[ ]79.0  
lnGFCF 2 ( )12χ =0.34 
[ ]56.0  
 
- 
( )12χ =1.14 
[ ]27.0  
( )12χ =0.01 






( )12χ =5.21 
[ ]022.0  
 
( )12χ =0.08 





( )12χ =1.58 






( )12χ =1.09 
[ ]30.0  
 
( )12χ =0.70 
[ ]40.0  
 
( )12χ =0.00 




Optimal lag length is determined by AIC and SC. VAR order = k+dmax were k 
is the lag length used in the system and dmax is the maximum order of integration  
n the system. Here, it is I(1) and k=1. 
 
Results obtained under this method though shows only two causal relationships between finance 












VECM results in that they too support both the demanding-following and supply-leading 
hypothesis.  
5.8.4 South Africa 
The results in Table 34 for South Africa are different from those of Kenya. With regard to e1
we notice that in all the three explanatory variables we failed to reject the null hypotheses of 
Granger no-causality. This implies that there is causal relation running from V, VFe4 and 
V! to V^!F. Results also show that in e2 the null hypothesis for Granger no causality 
for V^!F and VFe4 could not be rejected. These results would therefore imply that causality 
runs from V^!F and VFe4 to V. Furthermore, these results seem to indicate the 
existence of the indirect causal relationship in the economy (that is private credit to growth via 
investment). In summary results obtained here support those found in VECM in that both models 
appear to lend support to the supply-leading and the indirect causal relationship found in the 
long-run of VECM. 
Table 34: Results of long-run causality test 
based on Toda-Yamamoto Augmented lags Methods for S. Africa. 
Variables Order of 
unaugmented 
VAR model 
Source of causation 
  lnRGDPC lnGFCF lnPVY lnWEDGE 
lnRGDPC 3 - ( )32χ =13.55 
[ ]004.0  
( )32χ =12.16 
[ ]007.0  
( )32χ =9.59 
[ ]022.0  
      
lnGFCF 3 ( )32χ =11.3
2 
[ ]010.0  
- ( )32χ =17.68 
[ ]001.0  
( )32χ =1.58 
[ ]663.0  
      
lnPVY 3 ( )32χ =0.14 
[ ]143.0  
( )32χ =4.33 
[ ]228.0  
- ( )32χ =0.62 
[ ]892.0  
      
lnWEDGE 3 ( )32χ =0.28 
[ ]963.0  
( )32χ =1.19 
[ ]756.0  
( )32χ =3.62 
[ ]306.0  
- 
Optimal lag length is determined by AIC and SC. VAR order = k+dmax were k is the lag  
length used in the system and dmax is the maximum order of integration in the system.  













Lastly, in the case of Zambia the results tabulated in Table 35 indicate that the null hypothesis 
for Granger no-causality from V to V^!F, and V! to V^!F cannot be rejected 
at 99 percent level (with p-values of 0.04, and 0.047 for the MWald statistic respectively). In the 
same vein we found causality running from credit to gross fixed capital formation. This means 
that in the long-run, Zambian’s economy experience two types causation that is direct and 
indirect causality. This finding is based on the empirical results which point to the following: 
first, unidirectional causal relationship running from V and V! to V^!F, and 
secondly causal relation running from VFe4 to V^!F via V.  
Table 35: Results of long-run causality test 
based on Toda-Yamamoto Augmented lags Methods for Zambia. 
Variables Order of 
VAR Model 
Source of causation 
  lnRGDPC lnGFCF lnPVY lnWEDGE 
lnRGDPC 2 - ( )12χ =4.23 
[ ]040.0  
( )12χ =0.37 
[ ]543.0  
( )12χ =12.17 
[ ]000.0  
      
lnGFCF 2 ( )12χ =0.09 
[ ]769.0  
- ( )12χ =3.94 
[ ]047.0  
( )12χ =0.04 
[ ]836.0  
      
lnPVY 2 ( )12χ =0.06 
[ ]809.0  
( )12χ =0.47 
[ ]492.0  
- ( )12χ =1.19 
[ ]275.0  
      
lnWEDGE 2 ( )12χ =0.02 
[ ]894.0  
( )12χ =0.82 
[ ]366.0  
( )12χ =0.05 
[ ]830.0  
- 
Optimal lag length is determined by AIC and SC. VAR order = k+dmax were k is the lag  
length used in the system and dmax is the maximum order of integration in the system.  
Here, it is I (1) and k=1. 
5.8.6 Constancy of Co-Integration Space 
Hansen (1992) cautions that estimated parameters of a time series may vary over time. Parameter 
tests are thus important, since unstable parameters can result in model misspecification, which 
have potential to bias the results.  
These tests as described by Pesaran and Pesaran (1997) are based on recursive 1-step ahead 
residuals, that is the equation is estimated over the sample 1 to  l 	 1# and used to predict 












next step is to roll forward the sample end date and prediction period by 1 and this continues 
until all Z observations are used in estimation. The caveat in this test is that if dummy variables 
are included into the UVAR it will not be feasible to look at recursive residuals because the 
dummy variable(s) will take the value 0 throughout some sample periods. Thus, this problem can 
only be avoided if the parameters attached to the dummies are fixed at their estimated values in 
the full sample. To test for stability we use the Hansen (1992) and Pesaran and Pesaran (1997) 
tests. According to Pesaran and Pesaran (1997), the short-run dynamics are essential in testing 
for stability of long-run coefficients. The Pesaran and Pesaran (1997) test amounts to estimating 
the error-correction models like those in section 5.7. 
Here all variables are as previously defined and error-correction term is calculated from the long-
run co-integrating vectors. Once the models have been estimated, Pesaran and Pesaran (1997) 
suggest applying the cumulative sum of recursive residuals (CUSUM) and the (SUSUMSQ) test 
proposed by Brown et al. (1975) to assess the parameter constancy.  
In this thesis, the stability of all the three models employed in this analysis was estimated by 
ordinary least squares method and the residuals were subjected to the CUSUM and CUSMSQ 
test. Figure 28 to Figure 33 shows the plots of the CUSUMSQ statistics for the three models 
respectively. 
 
Figure 28: CUSUMSQ Results for Kenya 
 
 

























Figure 30: CUSUMSQ Results for South Africa 
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From the above six figures, the results indicate absence of instability in the coefficients as the 
plot of the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ statistics are confined within the 5% critical bounds of 
parameter stability. This indicates that the structure of the parameters have not diverged 
abnormally over the period of the analysis. 
 Plot of Cumulative Sum of Squares of Recursive Residuals



















Conclusion & Policy Implications 
 
This chapter provides a summary, an overview and assessment of various conclusions reached at 
the close of each chapter of this thesis and recommends areas for possible further research. This 
study empirically investigated the causal relationship in the sub-Saharan countries. It focused on 
financial institutions and in particular financial institutions such as banks in the three countries 
namely, Kenya, South Africa and Zambia. The main issue of causality has four definitions which 
are commonly adopted in literature. Firstly, financial development and economic growth nexus 
are linked to the early theoretical model of Schumpeter on supply-leading. According to this 
theoretical model as argued in chapter 2, financial development is seen as the determinant of 
economic growth. In this view, the line of causation runs from financial sector to economic 
growth, where finance is one among many other growth inducing factors. Therefore, finance acts 
as a supply leading growth mechanism. Specifically, recent theoretical underpinnings give 
rationales for the assumption that well-functioning monetary, banking systems and capital 
markets may be vital ingredients for economic growth (see theoretical framework of the 
empirical studies outlined in chapter 2).  The caveat to this line of thought is that arguments 
advanced to support this may vary. However, Schumpeterian authors as well as the Neo-
Keynesians usually stress the ability of the banking system to create money and channel it into 
productive and innovative uses. Others claim that it is the information gathering and processing, 
which is accomplished by banks and capital markets that helps to improve the efficiency of the 
capital allocation. 
Secondly, financial activity is taken to be the result of economic activity. Financial development 
is thus demand-driven. The argument which is advanced under this theory is that, as the growing 
economic activities requires more and more of capital, institutional raising and pooling of funds 
for fixed capital formation are created in response to their demand. 
Thirdly, financial activity and economic growth are seen as not causally related. In this view, the 
observed correlation between them is said to be spurious. The implication of this result is that 
economies grow and so do the financial sector system. However, what is critical in this case is 












Fourthly, some scholars see financial activity as an obstacle to economic growth. Thus, as in the 
previous case, the causation runs from financial development to economic growth, but the focus 
here lies on the potentially destabilising effects of financial crises. 
The rest of this chapter is sub-divided into five sections. Section 2 extends the research into two 
different ways. First, it present the summary of literature based on African countries including 
their empirical studies. This section also includes the theoretical framework covering most 
importantly the causality issue between finance and growth, followed by the various links 
through which finance affects growth. For instance, transmission channels, structure of the 
financial systems whether bank or market based. All this is summarised by the empirical studies 
which are sub-grouped according to: (1) whether they are based on cross-country with banking 
intermediary or time series with banking intermediary and (2) whether the study is cross-country 
with either financial intermediaries or time series with both financial intermediaries and security 
markets. Emphasis on all these studies is placed on the investigated link, method applied, 
variables used and indeed the major findings. Results on cross-country studies show consistency 
with regard to the positive link between finance and growth. On the other hand, time series 
studies on causality seem to show conflicting results in both developing countries as well as less 
developing countries. 
Section 3 presents a summary of all three countries included in the study. The summary extends 
the study in three different directions. Firstly, it focuses on the macroeconomic performance of 
the economies. Secondly, the section discusses the experience of the reforms on the financial 
sector development. Reflecting on these two aims we now present the general conclusions drawn 
from these reviews. 
Kenya 
The financial sector reforms adopted by the government had varied effects on the development 
of the financial sector system. The repression policies instituted by the government which 
favoured the establishment of NBFIs led to more of these institutions being formed and less of 
the commercial banks. However, when the rules were levelled between them, the banking sector 
expanded due to mergers and take-overs.  It was found that policies of the Kenyan government 
led to a situation where the banking sector system was not dominated by the foreign banks.  
Finally, the reforms that were instituted by the government of Kenya did not lead to financial 
disintermediation though the system was highly concentrated. In any case, the financial sector 













Despite the financial repression policies implemented on the banking system, the private sector 
found a number of ways of how to better manage banks in order to spur growth. In view of this, 
the South African banking system managed to achieve some form of development despite the 
economy experiencing the downward trend. The market forces and indeed financial policies led 
to the amalgamation of the banks and the birth of ABSA and First Rand. The policies of the mid 
and late 1990s also led to the re-entry of foreign banks into the banking system. The notable 
banks which came back include Barclays bank which bought ABSA and Standard Chartered 
bank which bought Twenty20. At the same time the distinction between the commercial banks 
and merchant banks disappeared. The policies reforms of the 1990s also brought in a number of 
innovations in the banking system such as internet banking, cell phone banking and 
mushrooming of cash teller machines. Above all the banking contribution to the economic 
growth achieved remarkable results by 2004 when the sector contribution to GDP ranked first. 
The similarity in the financial policies of South Africa to that of Kenya is that both countries 
implement policies which favoured the creation of local banks. This argument can also be 
extended to include Zambia where formation of local banks was encouraged by the government. 
Furthermore, unlike Kenya and Zambia, where foreign banks have long played a critical role, 
this situation was different in the case of the South African banking sector system which was 
mainly dominated by local players (i.e. ABSA, Standard, First Rand and Nedcor) fairly recently. 
Furthermore, despite the banking system being highly regulated, its performance has been good 
with the system appearing well managed to drive the growth of the economy. 
Zambia: The financial sector in Zambia survived the initial financial policies implemented in the 
1970s and 1980s. This limitation in the effects of financial repression has been linked to two 
issues. First the moderate inflation which was prevailing helped to mitigate this factor. Second, 
the main channel of resource allocation in Zambia during that period was not the banking system 
but the foreign exchange controls. 
The negative effects on the banking system however started taking its effect in the late 1980s. 
This was attributed to high inflation rates which the economy experienced. The high inflation 
which went up to 180% led to a decline in financial development as real interest rates turned to 
be highly negative. The adoption of the policies was also negatively affected as there was too 











trend was similar to that of Kenya although in the case of Zambia the effects of both policy 
reversals and policies implemented were worse on the financial sector. 
In summary, the reforms instituted in Zambia have yielded mixed results with the reforms 
showing little effect on the development of the financial sector system. For instance, credit 
provided by the commercial banks to the private sector has been declining since reforms were 
implanted. Similarly, the wedge, i.e. the difference between deposit and lending rate, has 
remained high. Overall, the Zambian financial sector system seems to rank lowest among the 
three countries included in the study.  
Section 4 is a summary discussion of the models used in this thesis. They include PSS ARDL, 
VECM and Toda and Yamamoto. These three methods were preferred because of their unique 
characteristics. For instance PSS ARDL method helped in pinning down the exact variables in 
the VECM needed in the normalisation. The VECM on the other hand helped with its special 
features to test the direction of causality in both short- and long-term dynamics. Last but not least 
Toda and Yamamoto, based on its simplicity and high power of prediction, was used to test for 
the robustness of the results. 
Section 5 provided an extensive discussion of the properties of the time series data. Both 
univariate and multivariate models to analyse the degree of integration are presented. While the 
latter produced mixed results, the univariate unit-root tests backed the assumption that the data 
are difference-stationarity for all the time series, using the ADF test for stationarity. 
Consequently, the VECM appears to be the appropriate framework to analyze the long-run 
economic equilibrium relationships as well as the short-run adjustments of finance and growth. 
In this section, the I(1) analysis of the VECM was carried out using the Johansen procedure. 
Two rank tests as well as an analysis of the roots near the companion matrix came to the 
conclusion that each seven-variable VECM contains three co-integrating vectors which can be 
identified as long-run relationships of financial development and economic growth and their 
reverse relationship. Furthermore, the third co-integration was identified through the indirect 
relationship of finance-growth involving gross fixed capital formation. Zero restrictions were 
used to achieve this identification: for the growth vector, it was assumed that wedge is irrelevant 
whereas the credit vector was identified by restricting the long-run influence of interest rate to 
zero. Finally, the indirect influence involving investment or gross fixed capital formation 












Then over-identifying restrictions were tested to see whether long-run predictions by economic 
models are supported by the data. 
On the growth vector, it was tested whether the financial sector development via credit is 
significant and has the correct sign. The second vector tested whether gross fixed capital does 
have the positive impact on growth and the last vector tested the long-run relationship involving 
credit and growth. Whereas all the three hypotheses were accepted, the coefficient of the wedge 
for South Africa was found to be counter intuitive in that it had a wrong sign in both e2 and 
e3. The other difference among the three countries with regard to long-run relation was that, 
openness variable in e3 for Zambia also had the incorrect sign. 
Results for the supply-leading hypothesis between finance and growth turned out to be more 
homogeneous across countries and easy to model. The identification strategy discussed above 
yielded sensible results for the three countries whose long-run finance-growth nexus was found 
to be consistent as generally assumed in the literature. The same identification strategy produced 
slightly (but significantly) supply-leading long-run results when applied to the South Africa and 
Zambia. In the second vector, both growth and private credit were supported by the theory which 
postulates their positive relationships. The same was true in the third vector where, the positive 
long-run relation as argued in literature was found to exist between finance and growth and also 
between investment and private credit. Unfortunately, like said before we found the positive link 
between wedge and investment in the case of South Africa and also negative relationship 
between openness and private sector in the case of Zambia, an unsatisfying feature that did not 
disappear whatever over-identifying restriction was added to the models. Therefore the 
identifying restriction and the model specification itself were questioned and alternatives were 
searched for. Unfortunately no alternative identifying restriction could give us the correct signs 
for wedge and openness variables. Based on the different basic models, the set of over-
identifying restrictions was tested in all three countries. Most importantly, a linear heterogeneity 
restriction on the coefficients of growth, finance and investment was tested to see whether 
growth is positively link to finance and vice versa. Also tested was the positive relationship 
between private credit and growth which was found to be consistent with the theory 
(Schumpeter, 1911). These findings with regard to long-run relation involving key variables 













In the case of the main question of the thesis, (i.e. which way causality runs between finance and 
growth), the following general results were obtained. First, the supply-leading and demand-
following were found to exist although the evidence varied across the three countries. For 
example, an unambiguous support for the supply-leading hypothesis was found to exist in the 
case of South Africa using both measures of financial intermediation (i.e. VFe4 and V!). 
This finding is supported by the test results found in VECM and complemented by those 
obtained using the method proposed by Toda-Yamamoto. Another important result from the 
VECM model is that of indirect causal relationship between V! and V^!F via V. 
The same can be said to be true when we look at the relationship between VF 4 and V^!F in 
Toda-Yamamoto model. We find in addition to the direct relation between VFe4 and V^!F 
an indirect relationship via gross fixed capital formation. The results for South Africa are 
supported by the findings of Chandana (2002) and the World Bank (1999), which explains that 
an indirect causal relationship exists between finance and growth in South Africa.  
In the case of Kenya our results seem to support both the uni-directional and bi-directional causal 
relationship between finance and growth. For instance the long-run causal relationship running 
from VFe4 to V^!F is found to exist in VECM. This result is supported too by Toda-
Yamamoto methodology. The point to note is that in addition to the results supporting the 
supply-leading hypothesis, demand-following hypothesis too is supported via the reverse causal 
inference. The results between VFe4 and V^!F also reveal the indirect causality relationship 
taking place via investment. The implication of the above results is that we have support for the 
existence of both the uni-direction and bi-direction causality in the economy of Kenya.  
Finally, regarding Zambia, financial development was also found to be a necessary causal factor 
in the growth processes of the economy. In particular, evidence for the supply-leading hypothesis 
between VFe4 and V^!F took effect indirectly via V. However, when test causality 
was carried out between V! and V^!F results showed that the causality runs from 
finance to growth.   
In view of the above results, it can be stated that the three countries namely Kenya, South Africa 
and Zambia yielded similar results that supported the hypothesis that causation in the long-run is 
in accordance with the supply-leading and demand-following hypothesis if we use the 
complexity (sophistication) of the financial sector to measure the degree of financial 
intermediation. Thus, expanding the size of the financial sector via financial credit and efficiency 












Furthermore, a somewhat different picture emerged from the results for all the three countries 
when we consider the short-run dynamics. In particular, the Kenyan data which suggested the 
demand-following as opposed to supply-leading which is common to both South African and 
Zambian cases. Over the short-run, our results imply the presence of uni-directional causality 
between the degree of financial development (as measured by the level of credit offered by banks 
to the private sector and wedge) and economic growth, giving credence to the supply-leading in 
two out of three cases and the demand-following propositions in only one case. Thus, in the 
short-run while financial development leads to economic growth in South Africa and Zambia, 
it’s the economic growth which induces growth in financial development and vice versa in the 
case of Kenya.  
In addition to the above results, the VECM and Toda and Yamamoto suggest at least two more 
important observations. First, the economic stimulus of more sophisticated and efficient financial 
markets in Kenya, South Africa and Zambia became noticeable when we consider the long-run 
relationship. Of course, such long lags in the beneficial effect of an efficient financial sector on 
economic growth carries with it the risk that policymakers in these countries may be deceived in 
believing that improving the operation and diversity of their financial markets has no real 
economic advantages. Yet, the empirical results in this thesis indicate that financial 
intermediation through both credit and wedge contributes to economic growth. The finding that 
such a favourable economic effect requires a somewhat long time to be felt implies that policies 
to promote efficient financial institutions in the two countries should be persistent over a 
somewhat prolonged period of time. The second observation pertains to the results being 
somewhat country-specific and varying across the particular proxy used to measure the degree of 
financial intermediation. This, however, should not be too surprising as these countries exhibit 
diverse economic environments, and the proxy variables used address different aspects of their 
financial maturity. Other studies (e.g. Demetriades & Hussein, 1996) have also reported results 
that are highly country specific with considerable variation across proxies of financial deepening.  
Based on the results obtained under VECM and Toda Yamamoto, the countries differ as to the 
relevance of demand-following causal relation in both the VECM and Toda Yamamoto. Whereas 
the expected supply-leading causal relationship was found in all the three countries, demand-
following causality was only found in the case of Kenya. The assumption of no causal influence 
based on demand-following was best supported by the South African and Zambian data. 












expectations of supply-leading hypothesis being the main driver in developing countries and note 
demand-following as the case was for Kenya. It must be noted at this stage that the result of 
demand-following for Kenya is not unique for this study alone as other studies have gotten 
similar results (see Agbetsiafa, 2003). 
Finally, Kenya, South Africa and Zambia also differ as to the question in which variables are 
involved in the co-integrating vectors. However the scenario is different when the error 
correction mechanism is considered. The three VECMs all have in common the number of 
endogenous variables (4 out of the 6).  
The discussion of the causal relationship between finance and growth is not yet complete. The 
indications given so far cannot replace the finding in the literature which point to the fact that 
causal relationship issue is not yet settled. This analysis should be carried out with the most 
parsimonious PVECM, i.e. after elimination of the insignificant short-run coefficients remaining 
in the system. A further increase in the time period, number of countries to be covered, number 
of coefficients as well as employing a thorough impulse-response analysis represents the natural 
extension of the analysis presented in section 6. Another extension consists of using these results 
for model-based forecasts, e.g. a simultaneous forecast of finance and growth for Kenya, South 
Africa and Zambia. Last but not least, it would be useful to see how sensitive the central finding 
of this thesis, the existence of three co-integrating vectors, identifiable as growth, finance and 
gross fixed capital formation, are with respect to the choice of variables. For instance, it would 
be interesting to see whether leaving out the private credit and wedge (the typical financial 
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Table (36): Testing for lag order in a VAR – Kenya 
Test Statistics and Choice Criteria for Selecting the Order of the VAR Model 
Based on 36 observations from 1969 to 2004. Order of VAR = 4 
List of variables included in the unrestricted VAR: lnrgdpc, lngfcf,  lnpvy, lnwedge, 
lnuc, lnopenk, lnint 
List of deterministic and/or exogenous variables: const 
Order LL AIC SBC LR test Adjusted LR 
test 
4 201.5880 96.5880 13.4533 ---------- -------- 
3 165.1949 85.1949 21.8542 CHSQ( 25)=    72.7862[.000] 30.3276[.212] 
2 144.9372 89.9372 46.3904 CHSQ( 50)=    13.3016[.000] 47.2090[.586] 
1 109.4238 79.4238 55.6710 CHSQ( 75)=  184.3284[.000] 76.8035[.421] 
0 -75.0158 -80.0158 -83.9746 CHSQ(100)= 553.2077[.000] 230.5032[.000] 
         AIC=Akaike Information Criterion SBC=Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 
Table (37): Testing for lag order in a VAR – South Africa 
Test Statistics and Choice Criteria for Selecting the Order of the VAR Model 
Based on 36 observations from 1969 to 2004. Order of VAR = 4 
List of variables included in the unrestricted VAR: lnrgdpc, lngfcf,  lnpvy,  lnwedge, 
lnint, lnuc, lnopenk. 
List of deterministic and/or exogenous variables: const 
Order LL AIC SBC LR test Adjusted LR 
test 
4 349.9980 143.9457 143.9457 -------- -------- 
3 301.1125 139.8541 139.8541 CHSQ( 25)=     97.7712[.000]   35.3063[.083] 
2 265.6568 200.6568 149.1925 CHSQ( 50)=   168.6824[.000]   60.9131[.139] 
1 228.5826 188.5826 156.9123 CHSQ( 75)=   242.8308[.000]   87.6889[.150] 
0   61.5606   46.5606   34.6842 CHSQ (100)= 576.8749[.000] 208.3159[.000] 
         AIC=Akaike Information Criterion SBC=Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 
 
Table (38): Testing for lag order in a VAR – Zambia 
Test Statistics and Choice Criteria for Selecting the Order of the VAR Model 
Based on 36 observations from 1969 to 2004. Order of VAR = 3 
List of variables included in the unrestricted VAR: lnrgdpc,  lngfcf,  lnpvy,  lnwedge, 
lnint, lnuc, lnopenk. 
List of deterministic and/or exogenous variables: const 
Order LL AIC SBC LR test Adjusted LR 
test 
3 46.4035 -15.5965 -134.142 -------- -------- 
4 15.0467 -59.9533 -120.363 CHSQ( 25)=     62.7137[.000]   28.8144[.083] 
1 -17.6573 -67.6573 -107.930 CHSQ( 50)=   128.1217[.000]   58.8667[.139] 
0 -153.669 -178.669 -198.806 CHSQ (75)=   400.1455[.000] 183.8506[.000] 












Figure 34: Graphs on data in levels and first differences. 
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